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The international investment regime has faced several criticisms               
already since the mid­2000s. Scholars and civil society have called both                     
for refinement of the content of the numerous bilateral investment treaties                     
(BITs) and other international investment agreements (IIAs), as well as                   
for reconsideration of the purpose of the investment regime. 
 
Over the past few years, we face a phase of ‘re­orientation’ of                       
international investment law. The 1990s rush of conclusion of BITs is                     
slowing down and gives way to the negotiations at the regional level.                       
This era of transition from investment bilateralism to regionalism                 
presents us with a paradox, which has revived the question of the legal                         
status of multinational corporations. On the one hand, the mega­regional                   
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) concluded and being negotiated advance                 
the protection of investors and facilitate their access to Investor­State                   
dispute settlement (ISDS). On the other hand, States attempt to react to                       
investors’ growing power either by opting out from ISDS or by                     
reforming investment standards to better reflect their interests. 
 
One of the primary objectives of States during this phase of                     
re­orientation of international investment law is safeguarding their right                 
to regulate for public purpose interests. In order to meet this goal, the                         
past few years States slightly shift towards sustainable development, a                   
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concept that has been criticized as threatened by the old IIA regime. The                         
adoption of a sustainable development­oriented approach in investment               
law also depends largely on the tribunals that are tasked with the                       
interpretation of IIAs. Despite their current reluctance to engage in a                     
sustainable development discussion, this situation may alter with the                 
conclusion of the post­2015 FTAs. These treaties make more references                   
to the principle, both in separate chapters and in their investment                     
chapters. They also place at the arbitrators’ disposal interpretative tools                   
for the integration of sustainable development into their argumentation.  
 
This thesis concludes that regionalism has not be suitable to                   
resolve the ‘battle’ of predominance between investors and States. It                   
argues that other options that may be more suitable to strike a delicate                         
balance between the protection of foreign investment and the public                   
interests of States, and reflects on changes that may render the investment                       
regime more compatible with sustainable development. Special focus is                 
given to the drafting of a multilateral investment treaty, which, although                     
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International investment law is one of the most dynamic and                   
remarkably transformed fields of international law of the past decades. In                     
response to globalization and due to a widespread belief among States                     





growth, FDI flows started increasing over time and, in 2016, they reached                       
their highest ever level.  This boost, together with the expansion of the                       2
international activities of multinational corporations, made clear the need                 
for an international normative framework. Today, international             
investment law has been enshrined mainly in bilateral investment treaties                   
(BITs) and less in other International Investment Agreements (IIAs).  
 
Despite the recognition of international investment law as a                 
sub­branch of public international law, it is of a unique character, as it has                           
a distinctive private element stemming exactly from the category of                   
persons to which such international rules apply: private corporations.                 
Investment treaties provide for substantive standards of protection of                 
foreign investors, even though they are not parties to the IIAs .  For the                         
enforcement of these substantive standards, IIAs also confer procedural                 
rights on these private entities.  Arguably the most important clause of                     
these treaties is the Investor­State Dispute Settlement mechanism (ISDS),                 
which entitles investors to commence arbitration against the host­State.                 
This hybrid nature of the investment regime, and especially the                   
substantive and procedural rights granted to investors, have enhanced the                   
idea of the ‘international subjectivity’ of the latter. Several authors started                     









Although the BIT system has been in place for around sixty years,                       
it only attracted the attention of the international community in the early                       
2000s. Shortly afterwards, the dissatisfaction with the investment legal                 
framework started growing. Critical voices have been raised both with                   
regards to the treaties in place and investment arbitration. Some                   
commentators have remarked that the plurality of investment instruments                 
in place, in combination with the different – and most times – vague                         
wording of substantive standards included in them, have led to expansive                     
and inconsistent interpretations by arbitral tribunals, which calls the                 
legitimacy of the system into question. The main concern, which is of                       
particular relevance to the issue of 'international subjectivity' of                 
corporations, has been that the BITs regime offers numerous legal rights                     
for foreign investors, without establishing corresponding responsibilities             
for them.  Academic and policy circles argue that the  current system                     
works only in favour of investors, while it does not take due account of                           
the interests of States and largely neglects the sustainable development                   
impact of investment. The growing number of investor claims                 
challenging a wide array of States' regulatory measures on public interest                     
matters, as well as the growing number of ISDS awards having                     
far­reaching implications for sustainable development contributed to the               
spread of this criticism. 
 




substantive and procedural ­ of the current international investment                 
regime and the impact of the latter on their regulatory powers. Having                       
understood that the BIT regime becomes irrelevant, especially in terms of                     
addressing emerging environmental and social challenges, States now               
reconsider their investment policies. Instead of pursuing investment               
regulation through bilateral treaties, they started shifting to regionalism.                 
More specifically, the linkage between investment and trade has created a                     
tendency of adopting a holistic approach to deal with them and States                       
start integrating investment chapters in regional Free Trade Agreements                 
(FTAs). Beyond protecting foreign investment, these FTAs contain               
language that aims at building  a sustainable­development friendly               
investment framework. In order to ensure, however, that the investment                   
regime does not pose obstacles to States' sustainable development paths,                   
more need to be done. As most of these so­called 'new­generation'                     
investment instruments still have in place the ISDS mechanism, the role                     
of investment tribunals in interpreting investment standards in line with                   
sustainable development objectives is crucial. 
 
The remainder of this Introduction will first provide the PhD                   
project description (Section 1.1). It will subsequently give a brief                   
background of the evolution of the international investment law regime                   
over time (Section 1.2), before discussing the 'international subjectivity'                 
theories and their relation to international investment law (Section 1.3).                   
With this background in mind, Section 1.4 will state the objectives of this                         
work, research questions and significance of the thesis, while Section 1.5                     
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The PhD was conducted as part of the research project  “The basis                       
of international law: new European and Mediterranean actors in                 
international society in the 21st century” of the Law School of the UIC,                         
undertaken by the GRE ­ Study group on fundamental issues in                     
international contemporary society and coordinated by Prof. Carlos               
Espaliu Berdud.  
 
The research topic of this PhD is directly linked to the project of                         
the above mentioned Research Group and, particularly, to the issue of                     
‘international subjectivity’ and the emergence of new actors on the                   
international scene. This thesis can be seen as complementary to the                     
research activities undertaken by the Group, as it focuses on international                     
economic law and it presents a different angle of ‘international                   
subjectivity’ examining the legal status of multinational corporations.               
More specifically, in a first stage, this research discusses the loss of                       
prominence of the State on the international investment regime, while                   
assesses the augmented role of multinational corporations and reflects on                   
whether these actors could be considered as new subjects of international                     
19 
 
investment law. In a second stage, this work provides thoughts on how to                         
balance the negative effects of the multinational corporations’ dominance                 
in investment law. 
 
As accepted by the Doctorate Academic Committee, this thesis is                   
presented as a compendium of publications. More specifically, the PhD                   
consists of two articles published in indexed journals included in the                     
CARHUS Plus system. The first article is published in the Issue 2016/2                       
of the  Revue Belge de Droit International , classified in the category ‘B’                       
of the CARHUS + 2014 list. This article corresponds to the first aspect of                           
the research, meaning the rights that the recently concluded Free Trade                     
Agreements (FTAs) ­ and especially the Investor­State Dispute               
Settlement (ISDS) mechanisms of their investment chapter ­ confer to the                     
multinational organizations. The article reviews the investment protection               
clauses of these treaties and questions how these provisions change the                     
position of the multinational corporations in the international legal                 
system and whether they erode the state sovereignty. The second article is                       
published in 2018, in the second Issue of the 27th Volume of the  Review                           
of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law ,             
classified in the category ‘A’ of the CARHUS + 2014 list. This article                         
summarizes the findings of the second aspect of the research; it covers                       
the social provisions of the new­generation FTAs, namely the sustainable                   
development, labour and environmental clauses, and attempts to answer                 
the question of whether these provisions and their interpretation by                   
investment tribunals are an effective tool in minimizing the power of                     
20 
 
corporations and in striking the right balance between the interests of                     
States and investors. 
 
This PhD project was awarded the 2016 Pre­Doctoral Scholarship                 
of the UIC and has been completed in the course of three years. The first                             
year of the doctorate was devoted to the collection and analysis of the                         
bibliography, reading of all the scientific material and drafting of the first                       
article. During the second year, the first article was sent for publication                       
and I proceeded in the drafting of the second article, which was                       
subsequently also sent for publication. The first article was accepted for                     
publication in this second year of the PhD. In the third year, the second                           
article was also published. During this year, I also assisted with the                       
preparation and attendance of conferences and seminars of the                 
Charlemagne Institute for European Studies (ICEE). Moreover, as               
required for the International mention of the Doctoral Certificate, the last                     
year of the PhD I performed a three­months research stay in the  KFG                         
Research Group ­ The International Rule of Law ­ Rise or Decline? , in                         
the Humboldt University in Berlin. This research stay helped me acquire                     











Current debates on foreign investment regime may imply that the                   
law in this field is a recent development. However, the will of States to                           
protect foreign investors had already appeared during the pre­1945                 
colonial period. Back then, the rules governing foreign investment were                   
mainly of customary international law nature and the disputes arising                   
were resolved through the system of home­State diplomatic protection.                 4
This regime faced a significant change after the World War II.                     
Improvements in transportation and communication facilitated FDI flows               
around the world, and the expansion of the international activities of                     
multinational corporations made clear the need for an international                 
investment normative framework. Some early attempts of codification in                 
the international level were made between 1948 and 1960, but they were                       
not successful. First in 1948, the draft Havana Charter included a                     
provision on investment, however, it never came into force. Other                   5













Bogota Agreement and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade                   
(GATT) did not regulate investment. Finally, non­governmental             6
initiatives designed to create a legal framework for investment, such as                     
the 1948 ICC International Code of Fair Treatment of Foreign                   
Investments and the 1960 ILA Draft Statutes of the Arbitral Tribunal for                       
Foreign Investment And the Foreign Investment Court were never                 
adopted.   7
 
As the negotiations on a multilateral investment treaty failed,                 
States followed a different path: the path of bilateralism. They started                     
concluded Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), instruments that have               
been defined as  “agreements between two countries for the reciprocal                   
encouragement, promotion and protection of investments in each other’s                 















concluded in 1959 between Germany and Pakistan and, soon, BITs                   9
became the principal instruments for the regulation of investment                 
relationships. These agreements originated from the wish of               
capital­exporting countries to protect the assets of their investors in                   
capital­importing countries, thus they were exclusively concluded             
between a developed and a developing State. Their main objective was to                       
constrain the ability of developing host States to discriminate against                   
foreign investors. Early BITs did not include any provision on dispute                     
settlement. Foreign investors had two avenues if a host State interfered                     
with their investment; either to seek relief in the national courts of the                         
host State or, if these courts were ineffective, to persuade their home                       
State to espouse their claim and exercise diplomatic protection. However,                   
the emergence of several investment disputes at that time made obvious                     
that both options had important limitations.  With regards to the first                     
option of national courts, foreign investors were often encountering                 
difficulties caused by the partiality and lack of independence of the                     
host­State judiciary. The second option of diplomatic protection was                 
again problematic, as home governments would frequently prove               
reluctant to take up an investor's claim should higher political risks were                       
at stake. This is why, in the 1970s we see the first BITs to introduce ISDS                             









In the 1990s, a second round of attempts for the establishment of                       
multilateral investment rules took place; in 1995, negotiations on a                   
proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) begun within the                 
Organisation for Economic Co­Operation and Development (OECD),             
however they only lasted for three years, as States could not agree on                         
core principles of investment protection. Similarly, the 1996 Singapore                 11
Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO) started                 
working on a program on the relationship between international trade and                     
investment, which, however, was also discontinued due to the divergent                   
interests of States. While codification in the multilateral level failed,                   
during the 1990s bilateralism proceeded forward with giant strides; until                   
the late 1980s only 381 BITs existed, but, by the end of 2000, their                           
number reached 2,067. The purpose of these so­called 'first generation'                   12
BITs was still limited to the protection of foreign investors, which was                       
reflected in the content of these treaties; BIT standards were traditionally                     
very broad and were not defined precisely. The same decade was also                       
when foreign investors 'discovered' the ISDS mechanism. The first ISDS                   










and was followed by a vast number of cases during the 1990s and                         
especially the 2000s. 
 
While quantitative data of the United Nations Conference on                 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) show that the total number of BITs                     
number has risen up to 2952, today this proliferation of bilateral                     14
instruments has gradually slowed down. On the other hand, the IIA                     
making in the regional level has accelerated, with States starting                   
integrating investment chapters in their FTAs. This practice is not new;                     
investment provisions in regional FTAs are already present since 1992,                   
when the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) was signed.                 
However, it is only since 2007 that a vast majority of such regional                           15
instruments with detailed chapters on investment started emerging. This                 
shift to regionalism has coincided with a general phase of 're­orientation'                     
of international investment law. Probably under the pressure of ISDS                   
cases that still rapidly increase (with their current number to reach 855),                       16
States started redrafting their old­generation IIAs, refining their content                 
and expanding their scope to also include public interest matters. These                     


















'International subjectivity', despite being a fundamental concept             
of international law, has been highly contested. It is mainly linked to the                         
doctrine of legal personality, which, as argued by the International                   17
Court of Justice (ICJ),  "has sometimes given rise to controversy" .                   18
Indeed, several opinions on the question of which entities can qualify as                       
subjects of international law have been expressed. The most withspread                   
theory, at least throughout the 19 th century, has been that States are the                         
only subjects of international law. The emergence of new actors,                   
especially after the World War II, brought about systematic changes to                     
the classic international legal order. This had as a result the State                       
sovereignty principle to start ebbing away and the departure from the                     
idea that States are the only regulators of international law. A milestone                       
towards the broadening of the circle of subjects of international law was                       
the  Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations                       






case of 1949. In its advisory opinion, he ICJ recognized the legal                       
personality of international organizations, stating that subject of               
international law can be any entity which is  “capable of possessing                     
international rights and duties, and have capacity to maintain their rights                     
by bringing international claims”  . Building on the  Reparation for                 19
Injuries case, several definitions of ‘international subjectivity’ emerged.               
Some of them directly echoe the definition of the ICJ, while others add                           20
elements to it. Brownlie and Dixon, for instance, state that international                     
legal personality further stems from the capacity of the entity to conclude                       
international agreements and to enjoy immunities from national               
jurisdictions, and to be subject to international claims. Although most                   21
definitions accept the legal personality of some non­State entities,                 
different theories there have been formed on how this personality is                     
















States remain the primary subjects of international law and upgrade other                     
entities to subjects of international law, endowing them with rights and                     
obligations, and the ‘individualistic conception’ supporting that the               22
‘international subjectivity’ of non­state actors ­ mainly individuals ­                 
exists  a priori and does not derive from States.  23
 
If today the legal personality of international organizations is                 
undisputed, this is not the case for multinational corporations. The issue                     
of ‘international subjectivity’ of corporations is of special relevance to                   
international investment law. As discussed above, investors are direct                 
recipients of both the substantive protection standards of investment                 
treaties and of the procedural right to bring ISDS claims. States, on the                         

















game controlled by corporate plaintiffs”  . Do these rights bestowed on                   24
investors elevate them to subjects of international law? 
 
According to the literature, one way to answer this question could                     
be by  considering whether the aforementioned rights belong directly to                   
investors, or rather to States. Several authors support the former position;                     
among them Douglas, who writes that  “ the investor is bringing a cause                       
of action based upon the vindication of its own rights rather than those of                           
its national State.” . The same position was held by a number of                       25
investment tribunals. The most prominent examples are the  CPI vMexico                     
case and the  Occidental v. Ecuador cases, where tribunals asserted that                     
“companies are to have a direct claim for their own benefit”  . These                       26

















'international subjectivity' of investors, upgrade investors  "to the status of                   
a partial subject of international law”  . Similarly, Tully writes that                   27
“  (c) orporations clearly have a degree of international legal personality                 
which encompasses for example locus standi before  (International Centre                 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes) ICSID Tribunals”  . Not everyone                 28
agrees with this view. Several authors have supported the so­called                   
‘derivative rights’ thesis, arguing that investors do not have individual                   
rights and are only permitted to enforce their home States’ rights.                     29
According to Shaw, the participation of investors in itself is not sufficient                       
to convey to corporations the status of a subject of international law.                       30
Others have taken the intermediate position of ‘contingent rights’,                 
claiming that IIAs only grant procedural rights to investors, while                   
substantive rights are only granted to the treaty parties. This latter                     31
















which alleged that  “ the  (substantive) rights...only exist at the                 
international plane between the NAFTA Parties”  , while “(i) nvestors are                 
the objects or mere beneficiaries of those rights”  .    32
 
Even if we accept that investors have individual rights, is this                     
sufficient for their elevation to subjects of international law? As                   
mentioned above, one of the criteria that has been seen as indicative of                         
legal personality is whether an entity, besides rights, also has obligations                     
under international law. In this vein, several authors have denied the legal                       
personality of corporations. Both Cassese and Malanczuk, although               
recognize that corporations are beneficiaries of international rules,               
believe that they have not been granted rights or obligations under                     
international law. At the other end of the spectrum, Nowrot believes that                       33
there is a  “presumption in favour of multinational corporations being                   
subject to international legal obligations to contribute to, inter alia, the                     
promotion and protection of human rights, core labour and social                   













Argentina tribunal claimed that investors have obligations deriving from                 
the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) standard, stating:  
“ international law accepts corporate social         
responsibility as a standard of crucial importance for               
companies operating in the field of international             
commerce. This standard includes commitments to           
comply with human rights in the framework of those                 
entities’ operations conducted in countries other than             
the country of their seat or incorporation. In light of                   
this more recent development, it can no longer be                 
admitted that companies operating internationally are           
immune from becoming subjects of international law” .  35
 
Adopting a totally different approach, some scholars, such as                 
Clapham, have left the question of international subjectivity of investors                   

















The divergent views in the literature regarding the ‘international                 
subjectivity’ of investors may indicate that the changing structure of the                     
international system has rendered the traditional positivist thought of                 
‘subjects’ and ‘objects’ of international law outdated. Therefore, unlike                 38
previous legal scholarship, this research does not aim to give a direct and                         
absolute response to the question of whether investors have legal                   
personality. Rather, the objective of this thesis is to peripherally touch                     
upon the issue of ‘international subjectivity’, by addressing the broader                   
question of what rights have been bestowed to investors by IIAs in place                         
and what powers have been retained by States. The examination of                     
States’ rights under IIAs is imperative, as the legal standing of investors                       
in the international investment legal sphere cannot be conceptualized in                   
isolation from the respective standing of States, who are, ultimately, the                     
ones drafting investment treaties.   39
 
In order to answer the aforementioned question, this research will                   
focus  on the recently signed or being negotiated FTAs, whose reforms                     
were meant to address the concerns related to the growing power of                       





objective of the thesis is to assess whether the public interest elements –                         
and more specifically the sustainable development, environmental and               
human rights provisions – incorporated in these FTAs ‘change the                   
scenery’ of international investment law, placing States back into a                   
predominant position. Special weight is given to sustainable               
development, a concept that has been acknowledged as being able to help                       
achieve the objectives of all stakeholders and to deliver a stable, clear                       
and predictable IIA regime.  40
  
Finally, we cannot grasp the full picture of the international                   
investment framework without taking into consideration the role of                 
arbitral tribunals, the third 'wheel' of investment arbitration.  This is                   
because, in international investment law, a field so fragmented and still                     
vague, arbitrators are not only decision­makers, but, through their                 
interpretations, also shapers of law. Their decisions are decisive for the                     
future of investment law and, consequently, for the status of investors in                       
the international legal sphere. Along this line, this thesis analyses the                     
reasoning and awards of ISDS tribunals, especially when adjudicating                 
cases with explicit public interest – environmental and human rights –                     
components, with the purpose to determine whether their interpretations                 
preserve the right of States to regulate, or rather support the business                       
interests of investors.  Furthermore, this research aims to detect whether                   
new­generation FTAs could alter the practice of ISDS tribunals, by                   




interpret investment standards in a more sustainable­development             
friendly way.  
 
On this understanding, the key questions to which this thesis seeks                     
resolution are: 
● What are the rights conferred on investors under the investment                   
treaty regime? Have these rights been strengthened or reduced                 
with the conclusion of FTAs?  
● What are the reforms of new FTAs that enhance the status of                       
States? Are the sustainable development provisions incorporated             
in these FTAs capable of preserving the regulatory freedom of                   
States? 
● To what extent investment tribunals affect the standing of                 
investors and States under the investment legal regime, and how –                     
if at all – the sustainable development components of                 




With international investment law in turmoil, these questions               
seem more pertinent than ever. Naturally, existing literature has already                   
attempted to articulate the concerns regarding the IIA regime, however                   
most of the academic works  were produced before the new era of                       
modernization of investment treaties, thus study the ‘old­generation IIAs’                 
and mainly BITs. Moreover, they are usually limited to the question of                       
36 
 
what rights, and of what nature, investment treaties grant to investors,                     
without reflecting on the rights retained by States.  41
 
The contribution of this research to the existing literature is that it                       
extends the discussion to the new developments in international                 
investment rule­making that took place after 2015. More particularly, it                   
focuses on two significant shifts that characterize this era of                   
reconceptualization of international investment law. The first is the shift                   
from bilateralism to regionalism, and especially the trend of regulating                   42
investment through so­called 'mega­regional' FTAs, meaning instruments             
signed and being negotiated by countries or regions with a major share of                         
world trade and FDI. The second is the shift towards sustainable                     
development. The need to align international investment law with the                   
new development agenda and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)               
was underlined by UNCTAD in its  World Investment Reports of 2015 and                       
2016. Following UNCTAD's recommendations, all new­generation           43
FTAs include sustainable development­oriented reform elements. The             
significance of this work lies in the fact that it examines both the status of                             
investors  and States in the light of these new developments. It, therefore,                       
looks at the issue of ‘international subjectivity’ from a different angle,                     









It has been suggested that  “  (i) nvestment policymaking is getting                 
more complex" , but also, "more uncertain" . This seems to be confirmed,                     44
as, already before regionalism takes effect, its future seems nebulous: the                     
ratification of certain FTAs is doubtful and some States seek multilateral                     
solutions for the regulation of investment. The analysis of this work                     45
could not be more timely; as long as regional FTAs is still the prefered                           
way to regulate investment, this thesis evaluate whether they can improve                     
the investment treaty system, and whether other the alternatives proposed                   






The term 'legal scholarship' can cover several methods of                 
research. An interesting classification was proposed by Jan Smits, on the                     
basis of the questions that could be asked about the law. According to the                           
author, these questions are: (1) 'how does the law read?' (2) 'how ought                         
the law to read?', (3)‘what are the consequences to society of applying a                         
certain legal rule?’ and (4) ‘what is law and how does it develop?'. The                           






to describe the positive law in a certain field. The second question is what                           
Smits calls 'normative approach'; the objective of this method is not                     
merely to describe law, but rather criticize it and suggest improvements.                     
The third question is linked to the so­called 'empirical legal research',                     
while the fourth question relates law with other systems and tries to                       
explain it from an external perspective ('explanatory legal theory').   46
 
Following the categorization of Smits, this work could be seen as                     
a combination of the 'descriptive legal theory' and the 'normative                   
approach'. A good legal research cannot be done without a careful                     
description of its research object. Therefore, this thesis makes a selection                     
of international investment instruments and performs a detailed textual                 
analysis of their legal provisions. The treaties chosen are the post­2015                     
mega­regional FTAs that are considered as trendsetters, namely the                 
Trans­Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), the EU­Canada           
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), the             
China­Australia FTA, the EU­Singapore FTA, the EU­Vietnam FTA and                 











the EU­Singapore and the EU­Vietnam FTAs are not strictly­speaking                 
mega­regionals, they are worthy of discussion, as they can be considered                     
as ‘pathfinder agreements’ on the road to an eventual EU­ASEAN                   
mega­regional FTA.  In order to identify what makes these agreements                   48
qualify as trendsetters, a comparative analysis is also performed between                   
these agreements and older IIAs. Moving on from the description, this                     
research examines these legal instruments with a more critical eye,                   
concentrating on the question of how the law ought to read. This critical                         
analysis is not imaginable without the review of the vast amount of                       
academic literature and civil society reports. In addition, the relationship                   
of the investment regime with other fields of international law is                     
explored. Therefore, regulations and soft­law instruments of international               
organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), the World Trade                   
Organization (WTO) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) are                 
also made part of the research. Moreover, guidelines and model laws of                       
other international bodies, such as the Organisation for Economic                 
Co­Operation and Development (OECD),  United Nations Commission on               
International Trade Law  (UNCITRAL), and UNCTAD are considered.               
Finally, the thesis looks at the investment jurisprudence by both a                     
'descriptive' and 'normative' angle; it presents the arguments put forward                   
2015, not yet adopted); Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) (still in 
negotiations). 
48 L H Kiang, Minister of Trade & Industry of Singapore, ‘Speech at the                           





by the disputing parties in ISDS cases, analyses the reasoning of                     
tribunals, and detects which party usually prevails in different cases, why,                     
and whether for good reasons. 
 
For the better conceptualization of the context and the normative                   
arguments made in the thesis, some theoretical and historical                 
explanations of the creation and evolution of the foreign investment                   
protection regime are also given. Last but not least, although this research                       
is library based, empirical studies performed by other authors are                   








Chapter 1 is the introductory part of this thesis. It discussed the                       
preface and the background of the research, it defined the objectives and                       
importance of the work, and it described the research methodology.                   
Including the Introduction, this thesis is structured into four chapters.  
 
Chapter 2 corresponds to the first objective of the research: to                     
'situate' investors in the international legal sphere during this era of                     
‘re­orientation’ of international investment law. The provisions of the                 
41 
 
recently concluded or negotiated FTAs are analysed and compared with                   
clauses of earlier IIAs. Both the substantive and procedural rights                   
conferred on investors are presented and special emphasis is placed on                     
ISDS provisions. From this analysis we draw conclusions about the                   
increased strength of multinational companies in the investment legal                 
sphere. Afterwards, the ‘reaction’ of States to this growing power and                     
their attempts to restrict it are examined. In this realm, the backlash                       
against ISDS and the building of stronger State­to­State and domestic                   
processes are discussed. Furthermore, the FTA provisions that aim to                   
enhance transparency and consistency are evaluated. Finally, Chapter 2                 
contributes with reflections on the results of regionalism and on the                     
future of international investment law, estimating whether the conclusion                 
of a multilateral investment treaty would be the desirable and plausible. 
 
Building on the discussion on regionalism, Chapter 3 assesses                 
whether new­generation FTAs are able to address the concerns expressed                   
about the inadequacy of the current investment regime to preserve the                     
regulatory activities of States and of the ISDS mechanism to resolve                     
public interest disputes. It principally concentrates on sustainable               49
development, a broad concept that encompasses social, environmental               
and human rights elements. The question of whether the investment                   






rather than hinders – sustainable development is asked. The Chapter                   
reviews the sustainable development language of the new­generation               
FTAs, studying both the separate environmental and labor chapters                 
introduced in these treaties, as well as the sustainable­development                 
references made in the investment chapters. Afterwards, the Chapter                 
turns to arbitrators, investigating their current practice when facing                 
environmental and human rights claims. It, afterwards, outlines the                 
interpretative tools at the disposal of tribunals for the alignment of IIAs                       
with the SDGs set out by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.                       
More specifically, it explores whether tribunals could rely on other                   
international agreements, customary law as well as soft­law instruments                 
when adjudicating disputes with public interest components. Finally, the                 
Chapter suggests further reforms, both of the profile of the                   
decision­makers and of the investment agreements themselves, that               
would render the investment regime more compatible with sustainable                 
development. 
 
Chapter 4 is the concluding chapter of the thesis. It briefly                     
summarizes the findings of this work, provides some final thoughts on                     























Over the past few years, we face a phase of ‘re­orientation’ of                       
international investment law. The traditional bilateral regime is losing                 
ground and States are starting to integrate investment chapters in regional                     
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), following older models such as the                   
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This shift has been                   
accompanied by promises of governments that these agreements would                 
achieve a better balance between the protection of investors and the                     
44 
 
rights of States. With several new­generation IIAs ‘under construction’,                 50
crucial questions arise. Have States kept this promise? Do the new                     
agreements guarantee the regulatory power of States or do they                   
strengthen the role of multinational corporations in the international                 
forum? Does regionalism have the anticipated results? What will be the                     
future of international investment law? 
 
The present Chapter’s purpose is to identify the ‘standing’ of                   
multinational corporations in the international investment legal plane               
under the light of the provisions of the recently concluded or negotiated                       
mega­regional FTAs. Section 2 examines whether the reforms made in                   51
these treaties augment the role of investors in international investment                   
law. Special attention is paid not only to the investment chapters of the                         
agreements but also to other FTA chapters which could be proven                     
relevant to ISDS. In Section 3, the ‘reaction’ of States to the growing                         
power of investors and their attempts to minimize it will be analyzed.                       
The third part will contribute with reflections on the results of                     











whether the conclusion of a multilateral investment treaty would be the                     





2.2 New­generation FTAs as a Reaffirmation of Investors’ Growing                 
Power 
This Section assesses whether the amendments of the               







Wide investor protection can already be observed in the first                   
article of the investment chapters of new FTAs, the definitions.  
 
Rather than following NAFTA’s exhaustive list of covered               
investments and explicit exclusion of certain types of assets, the new                     52






investment as ‘ every kind of assets ’ and then provide an indicative list,                       
which is long and vague, encompassing controversial portfolio               
investments and intellectual property rights. In order to avoid expansive                   54
interpretations in ISDS, they set out certain characteristics that assets                   
should have to qualify as investments. But the list is again indicative                       
(‘ such as ’), giving latitude to tribunals to stretch the scope of investment. 
 
The definitions of investor are also quite broad and follow the                     
NAFTA model, covering the Party itself, natural and legal persons and                     55
granting them pre­establishment rights (‘ that seeks to make … an                   
investment ’). Some IIAs include a denial of benefit clause for                   56
enterprises that do not have ‘ substantial business activities ’ or are not                     
‘ directly or indirectly owned or controlled by a natural person’ of the                       
















spelled out in the agreements. They, therefore, do not inspire confidence                     







The new IIAs were meant to clearly define and circumscribe                   
substantive standards. The Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) poses to                   
the host State the obligation to treat investments justly. Usually                   
constructed as an open­ended, without precise meaning standard, it has                   
been turned into an ‘all­encompassing’ provision, popular to investors.                 59
Concerns about expansive interpretations by investment tribunals and               
lack of predictable results, put it at the core of the investment regime                         60
reform. Interestingly, the drafting of the standard in mega­regional FTAs                   












sufficiently address the concerns. The new EU IIAs narrow FET’s scope                     
providing a closed, exhaustive list of States’ obligations, but they do not                       61
prohibit the protection of investors to go beyond the customary                   
international law (CIL) on the treatment of aliens. They also protect                     
‘ specific representations ’ and ‘ legitimate expectations ’ of investors.             
Although all mega­regional FTAs omit umbrella clauses, these concepts                 
re­introduce a disguised umbrella clause, as contractual obligations               62
between States and investors could be elevated to treaty obligations,                   
which could promote corporate favoritism. On the other hand, the US                     63
agreements have always linked FET with CIL. TPP is no exception and                       64
Article 9.6 explicitly refers to CIL as the standard of treatment to be                         
afforded to investments. In theory, this approach would better protect                   

















eager to apply CIL basing it in State practice and  opinio juris ; instead                         
they usually cite decisions of previous tribunals, rendering the distinction                   
between CIL­linked or non­CIL­linked FET standards relatively             
meaningless. As none of the new FTAs expressly prohibit arbitrators to                     65
do so, these practices will probably not cease to exist. Finally, despite                       
using softer language than EU IIAs, TPP also recognizes that ‘legitimate                     
expectations’ of investors can be relevant when an infringement is                   
determined.   66
 
Indirect expropriation, namely the loss of investors’ expected               
profits because of States’ actions that are not necessarily directed to the                       
investor, is the second most­alleged standard in ISDS. Because of its                     
nebulous language in BITs and early regional IIAs, tribunals have, over                     67















contradictory awards. Scholars have called for omission of the standard,                 68
however, States have only moved to a modest reform. On a positive                         69
note, mega­regional FTAs add an explanatory annex in their investment                   
chapters, which outlines criteria distinguishing indirect expropriation             
from non­compensable regulatory actions. The wording of the texts,                 70
though, comes to undermine these changes; regulatory actions can still                   
amount to expropriation ‘ in rare circumstances ’, which gives great                 
leeway to the tribunals for interpretation. The provision of the                   
‘ case­by­case ’ determination of whether an expropriation has occurred               
has a similar effect. In some agreements, the ‘ reasonable expectations ’ of                     
investors are inserted in the scope of indirect expropriation, which, as                     71
discussed in the FET analysis above, could be a deterrent to States’ right                         
to regulate. 
 
The Most­Favored­Nation (MFN) standard ensures that, in like               














investors from any third country. Over the years, corporations have relied                     
upon MFN clauses in order to import into ISDS more beneficial                     
substantive or procedural provisions from third treaties that the host State                     
is a member to. Investment tribunals, through their interpretation, have                   
allowed this importation. States have acknowledged the             72
‘cherry­picking’ nature of MFN and have taken steps for the restriction                     73
of this practice. However, only EU­Singapore FTA totally omits the                   
standard. TPP Article 9.5(3) excludes ISDS procedures from MFN,                 
meaning that investors cannot use the standard to benefit from                   
jurisdictional clauses of other IIAs. However, they will be still able to                       
attract substantive guarantees, such as more favorable FET and                 
expropriation treatment. CETA and EU­Vietnam, at first glance, exclude                 
both the importation of procedural and substantive provisions. They                 
create, nevertheless, a loophole; they still allow MFN treatment to be                     
used for  ‘measures adopted by a Party pursuant to such (substantive)                     
obligations’ , leaving an open door for investors to invoke these                   74




















National sovereignty is an important principle of international law                 
and is translated to the right of States to regulate. However, the increase                         
of ISDS claims against States’ measures on issues of public interest, and                       
the pro­investor tendency of tribunals in the adjudication of such cases                     76
have created a ‘chilling effect’ on governments. Mega­regional FTAs                 77
were supposed to better reflect the regulatory power of States, but the                       
final texts leave doubts as to whether this goal was successfully met.                       















none of them provide substantial protection. Some agreements just                 
‘ recognize ’ or ‘ reaffirm ’ the right to regulate, while others transpose the                     78
NAFTA language, stating that ‘ nothing … shall be construed to prevent ’                     
adoption of measures of public interest, if, however these measures are                     
‘ otherwise consistent with this Chapter ’. This final condition seems to                   79
negate any intended protection, as it affirms that the right is fully subject                         
to the agreements.  
 
The creation of general exceptions clauses, similar to the General                   
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT) XX or the General                     
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) XIV, has been considered as the                       
preferred way to secure the regulatory freedom of States. Indeed such                     80
clauses are inserted in the new IIAs. However, the exceptions either do                       
not apply at all to the investment chapter, as in TPP, or they only apply to                               
certain sections. Even where they are applicable to the whole                   81
investment chapter, their welfare effects are ambiguous; as evidenced                 82
by the World Trade Organization (WTO) experience, the panels have                   
been reluctant to rule in favor of these exceptions, setting                   










does not amount to the  chapeau ‘ arbitrary or unjustifiable                 
discrimination’ . Given tribunals’ pro­investor tendency, we should             83
expect same results in ISDS.  84
 
Recent trends in investment awards could also endanger the                 
regulatory space of States. In  Achmea II , for example, the tribunal                     
accepted jurisdiction over a claim for a State’s draft regulation, raising                     
questions of when a dispute starts to exist and what is the exact scope of                             
the consent to arbitrate. These questions remain unresolved; the new                   85
IIAs neither explicitly state that a dispute cannot be extended to                     
pre­emptive claims, nor provide that the consent to arbitrate only applies                     
to existing breaches. Although IIAs do not prescribe past decisions as                     























The inclusion of intellectual property (IP) rights in the investment                   
definition, although only sporadically seen in BITs and earlier FTAs, is                     87
now mainstreamed in all new­generation FTAs, ‘inviting’ investors to                 88
invoke IP violations before arbitral tribunals. Such claims already                 
appeared in the  AHS v Niger,  Eli Lilly v Canada and  Philip Morris v                           
Australia ISDS cases. In the absence of explicit qualification of IP rights                       
as covered investments in the relevant BITs, tribunals denied jurisdiction                   
















possible. The exposure of IP rights to ISDS has been characterized as a                         
‘rupture in the fabric of IP law’, which have always been settled by                         90
State­to­State dispute settlement. Some new IIAs partly preserve this                 
norm, removing the issuance of compulsory licenses and the ‘ revocation,                   
limitation or creation of intellectual property rights’  from ISDS.                 91
However, these exemptions apply only to the extent that the measures are                       
consistent with the Agreement on Trade­Related Aspects of Intellectual                 
Property Rights (TRIPS)  or the IP chapter of the IIA, conditions that                       
could be easy for investors to surpass. Furthermore, the carve­outs are                     
only applicable to expropriation claims, meaning that investors can still                   
start proceedings invoking other substantial standards, such as FET or                   
National Treatment. 
 
What is more, the new­generation IIAs make IP chapters more                   
stringent, introducing ‘TRIPS and NAFTA plus’ provisions. Some               
treaties extend the copyright protection from 50 to 70 years, reform that                       92












weaken the standards of patentability, facilitating the acquisition of initial                   
patents. For example, TPP’s Article 18.37 allows for the patenting not                     
only of new products but also of  ‘new uses or new methods of using a                             
known product’ . Hence, pharmaceutical companies will be able to                 
acquire unlimited patents, curtailing access to affordable medicine.               
Likewise, TPP and CETA, although maintaining the TRIPS standard that                   
patents last for 20 years from the filing date,  de facto lengthen their                         
protection, providing for a patent term adjustment to compensate for                   
delays occurring during their registration. CETA further secures               93
monopolies by extending the data protection for pharmaceuticals from                 
five to eight years. The same treaty gives a right to appeal to patent                           94
holders, allowing them to maintain market exclusivity, as the market                   95
approval for generic equivalent medicines is postponed until the appeal                   
procedure is over.   96
 
The Member States of the IIAs will have to adapt their national                       
legislations to reflect these tougher standards, which, in conjunction with                   

















The Financial Services chapters of IIAs have always been in                   
interaction with their Investment chapters. NAFTA’s Article 1401(2), for                 
example, incorporates the investment articles regarding transfers,             
expropriation and denial of benefits into its Financial Services chapter.                   
TPP and CETA move further, also incorporating the concept of the                     
minimum standard of treatment of investors, enabling financial               97
institutions to bring ISDS claims for violations of their ‘legitimate                   
expectations’. A second interaction between the two chapters is the                   
question of whether financial investments qualify as protected               
investments. The investment definitions of early BITs and regional IIAs                   
vary, with some of them including bonds and others not. This inclusion                       98
has been a powerful tool used by corporations to sue countries for                       
measures adopted in response to their financial crises. It started with                     
Argentina which, in 2005, had to perform a debt restructuring. Dozens of                       
cases were initiated against it making it the world’s most sued country                       
under IIAs. A prime example is the  Abaclat v Argentina case, where                       





seeking US$3.6 billion from the country. History repeated itself with                   99
the global economic crisis of 2008; the 2012 Greek ‘haircut’ on                     
sovereign bonds resulted in two lawsuits against the country,  Poštová v                     
Greece and  Laiki v Greece . Despite Greece’s win in  Poštová , the                     100
tribunal decided to allocate the ISDS costs between the parties. With                     101
arbitration costs for the respondent being US$300,000 (which were                 
advanced) and its lawyers’ fees exceeding €4,650,000, it was a very                     102
expensive case to defend. The new­generation IIAs establish the                 
inclusion of bonds in the definition of investment, facilitating the                   103
emergence of similar cases in the future. To mitigate the risk, States add                         
public­debt annexes, which, in principle, prohibit ISDS claims for cases                   
of restructuring debts. But instead of extending this prohibition to the                     


















International investment law and taxation are also linked. Earlier                 
regional IIAs have been criticized for encouraging tax avoidance, by                   
offering the opportunity to corporations to strategically place their                 
investments in countries with optimal tax systems. The conclusion, for                   105
example, of the US­Panama Trade Promotion Agreement has not only                   
not prevented but incentivized money flows to Panama. The Panama                   
Papers scandal that followed, as well as tax evasion practices by                     
transnational corporations such as Starbucks, Amazon and Google               
exacerbated the concerns that existing investment instruments do not                 
secure tax justice. The new wave of IIAs has been expected to address                         106
the matter, but this does not seem to be the case. They do not limit                             
inflows and outflows of capital, therefore, making possible for                 107
corporations to transfer their money to tax heavens that are members to                       















When such tax avoidance practices take place, States should be able to                       
change their tax systems or withdraw tax privileges previously granted to                     
corporations. A growing number of taxation ISDS claims, mainly against                   
developing countries, illustrates that this right is limited. The new IIAs,                     108
aiming to shrink the number of such claims, introduce taxation                   
carve­outs. However, their language is blurry, with exceptions within                 
exceptions. For example, under TPP Article 29.4(6b)(8), a taxation                 
measure can still, under conditions, be challenged as infringing National                   
Treatment or as amounting to indirect expropriation. The text fails to                     
mention the FET standard, which, at a first glance, seems not to be                         
applicable to taxation. However, this could be still subject to expansive                     
interpretations; tribunals could argue that what not explicitly prohibited is                   
deemed permitted and, thus, still apply it. The EU IIAs also take the route                           
of non­explicit­mention. Although they condemn the ‘ avoidance and               
evasion of taxes ’, their tax exception clauses are not applicable to                     
investment, with the exception of CETA that just excludes MFN.                   109
Finally, as discussed in sub­Section II.A.1, the narrowing of investor’s                   

















Being a sensitive issue among countries, the concept of                 
State­owned enterprises (SOEs) has not generally been touched in                 
international trade and investment law. Only GATT Article XVII                 
provides limited rules on the behavior of these entities. This situation is,                       
though, changing in the era of regionalism.  
 
TPP is the first treaty that dedicates a whole chapter to disciplines                       
on SOEs. The rapid growth in number and size of SOEs and their often                           
non­transparent operation and poor management pose, indeed, a need for                   
regulation. But one should not forget that SOEs have different                   110
orientations, as well as that they can play a positive role for countries,                         
fostering economic development and employment opportunities. TPP             111
seems to do exactly that, depriving SOEs from all their benefits.                     









maintenance of SOEs, the agreement removes the GATT safeguard that                   
parties can grant to their SOEs exclusive or specific privileges. On the                       
contrary, Article 17.6 prohibits States from providing non­commercial               
assistance to their SOEs, when this would have ‘ adverse effects to the                       
interests of another Party ’ or could cause ‘injury to a domestic industry .                       
These terms are quite broad and go beyond WTO standards. The concept                       
of ‘ adverse effects ’ is expanded to services, while for the measurement of                       
‘injury to domestic industries’ a long and exhaustive list of economic                     
factors is set out. These rules do not take into consideration the                       112
non­profitable SOEs that need government support to perform public                 
functions. In the same sense, Article 17.4 obliges all SOEs and                     
designated monopolies to ‘ act in accordance with commercial               
considerations ’ and not to discriminate against goods and services of                   
another party, when engaging in commercial activities. Again these                 
provisions disregard SOEs with hybrid role and social functions                 
inextricably linked with their commercial ones, such as natural                 
monopolies in sectors of public utilities, public transport etc. TPP                   
includes carve­outs on the aforementioned norms, though they are quite                   
limited. Article 17.13(2)(3) provides a general exception for SOEs that                   
fulfill a ‘ government mandate’ , while country­specific exemptions of               
particular enterprises are found in annexes. However, apart from the                   
annex for Vietnam, there are no carve­outs related to public good, as we                         
would expect. Overall, the strict rules, in conjunction with the                   




of the chapter, may result to a regulatory chill for States. On top of that,                             113
while the State­to­State Dispute Settlement is the norm, obligations                 
related to ‘covered investments’ spread over the chapter, as well as the                       
requirement for SOEs exercising delegated authority to comply with the                   
whole Agreement, open the way for investors to challenge SOEs’                   114
activities as investment breaches. TPP’s twin brother, TTIP, also intends                   
to insert a SOEs chapter with similar rules. This was made clear by the                           
EU’s textual proposal of January 2015 and confirmed by the leaked TTIP                       
documents released by Greenpeace.   115
 
The initiative for the inclusion of a SOEs chapter belonged to the                       
US. The objectives put forward by the government were that the reform                       
would help in the efficiency and accountability of the existing SOEs, the                       
non­discrimination against private corporations and would provide a               
boost for international competition. The inclusion of the chapter,                 116
however, could also imply political ramifications and more especially the                   












Member States, such as Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam, with an                   
ultimate goal to stem the progress of the ever­growing Chinese SOEs.                     117
After the US withdrawal from TPP, it is unsure whether the remaining                       118
State Parties will maintain the SOE chapter in the agreement. If, however,                       
they do, what we can expect is that such chapter could be particularly                         
burdensome on developing countries such as Malaysia and Vietnam and                   








On the other side of the coin, States are taking action to more                         











2.3.1 Backlash against ISDS: Strengthening State­to­State           
Arbitration and Domestic Litigation 
 
Evaluating the negative effects of the ever­increasing investor               
claims, States are trying to halt this phenomenon. The ‘bravest’ have                     
renounced investment instruments altogether and are building stronger               
domestic processes. This is the example of the Latin American countries                     
Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia, which withdrew from the ICSID                 
Convention and started terminating their existing BITs. This               119 120
termination policy was also followed by Indonesia, which in the years                     
2014 to 2016 denounced 19 out of its 71 IIAs in force. A different                           
approach was taken by South Africa that determined to denounce its BITs                       
on a case­by­case basis and conclude new IIAs only  ‘in cases of                       
compelling economic and political circumstances’ . Other States,             121















Philippines and Japan did so at their 2006 Economic Partnership                   
Agreement (EPA). In 2011, Australia’s government also announced its                 
intention not to include ISDS in its future IIAs. It has kept this                         122
commitment in the 2011 Australia–New Zealand EPA, the 2012                 
Australia–Malaysia FTA and the 2014 Australia–Japan EPA, where               
State­to­State Dispute Settlement (SSDS) was maintained as the sole                 
dispute settlement mechanism. However, both Japan and Australia are                 
signatories of the TPP Agreement that includes the ISDS mechanism.                   
Brazil followed the same strategy and replaced ISDS with SSDS in the                       
Cooperation and Investment Facilitation Agreements concluded with             
Mozambique and Angola, in March and April 2015 respectively. 
 
Even when States insist on ISDS, both their practices and new                     
IIAs demonstrate an attempt to promote SSDS. Hitherto, the two                   
mechanisms have existed alongside each other in investment treaties,                 
without clear indication which one prevails. The truth is that the                     
availability of SSDS has not made much difference; having the                   
disadvantages of the diplomatic protection and little benefit for investors,                   
States have been hesitant in using it. The environment is slowly changing                       
in the era of regionalism. Over the past decade, States have taken their                         







interpretation or declaratory relief. The new­generation IIAs also draw                 123
particular attention to the SSDS chapter; it is made more elaborate and                       
able to resolve a wide range of disputes, providing an attractive                     
alternative even for investment disputes. When it comes to sensitive                   124
issues, some IIAs break the silence and explicitly declare prevalence of                     
SSDS. This is mainly the case of investment disputes in financial                     
services, where the ISDS proceedings are suspended until the                 
State­to­State tribunal/committee renders its –binding to the ISDS               
Tribunal­ decision. Similarly, after the much­discussed  Philip Morris v                 125
Australia case, TPP Article 29.5 excludes tobacco­related challenges               
from ISDS.  
 
Likewise, the new wave of IIAs advances the backstage role of                     
domestic courts. States used to include ‘fork­in­the­road’ clauses in their                   
BITs, giving to investors an irrevocable election between litigation at the                     
courts of host States or investment arbitration. However, having the ISDS                     













new­generation IIAs substitute ‘fork­in­the­road’ with waivers. These             126
clauses do not discourage national proceedings, as they permit investors                   
to first commence a proceeding in domestic courts and, if they wish, to                         
discontinue it in favor of ISDS. Knowing that their choice will not be                         
final, the option of domestic courts could become more appealing to                     
investors. Finally, some new IIAs bind arbitrators to follow the                   
interpretation of national courts when examining domestic law. They                 







Having its roots in the similar concept of commercial arbitration,                   
investment arbitration has always been developed in secrecy. However,                 
its hybrid nature differentiates it from the purely private, commercial                   
model. Often involving matters of public interest or of particular political                     
and financial risk, investment disputes require greater openness, stability                 









investment law is characterized by significant progress in the                 
transparency levels. It started with the adoption of two instruments in                     
2014: the  UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty­based               
Investor­State Arbitration  and the UN General Assembly’s  Convention               
on Transparency in Treaty­based Investor­State Arbitration . The new               
IIAs follow this transparency path, either directly referring to the                   
UNCITRAL Rules or adopting rules, where all pleadings, awards and                   129
decisions shall be publicly disclosed. This could lead to scrutiny of                     130
investors’ claims, who may think twice before starting a proceeding with                     
little chance to succeed. 
 
The  amicus curia is a concept inextricably linked to transparency.                   
It can improve accountability, assist the tribunals in being well­informed                   
















being widely used in public international law,  amici curiae have for a                       
long time been disregarded in investment arbitration. BITs and older                   
FTAs, even though permitting non­disputing parties to intervene in the                   
proceedings, make no mention of third­party submissions. This lack of                   132
explicit consent resulted in two unsuccessful early attempts of                 
participation in  Methanex and  UPS cases. In 2003, the NAFTA Free                     133
Trade Commission issued a statement setting out detailed – but not                     
binding ­ criteria to be applied by tribunals when deciding whether                     
submissions should be accepted. This was followed by the ICSID                   134
amendment of Arbitration Rules and Additional Facility Rules in 2006                   
with the insertion of Rule 37(2) establishing similar criteria, and                   
confirmed by the 2010 UNCITRAL Transparency Rules Article 4 and 17.                     
Following these developments,  amici curiae submissions have been               
















participation is no longer sought only by NGOs, as it used to be, but by                             
diverse entities, such as international organizations, industry bodies,               
indigenous people and consultancy companies. The system has become                 136
more permissive, with more and more tribunals granting leave to                   
participation. In fact, the tribunals themselves sometimes request               137
submissions from non­party entities. However, this trend of               138
permissiveness is not absolute, as tribunals usually do not go beyond the                       
acceptance of filing written submissions. The innovation of new IIAs is                     139
that they explicitly incorporate third­party participation. Although they               140
still give significant latitude to tribunals  (“ the tribunal may accept” ), this                     
novelty will probably be in favor of States, as the experience of ISDS                         

























Counterclaims in investment arbitration are a still rare               
phenomenon, which however have started picking up speed. The                 
reluctance of host States to bring such claims lies in the long­standing                       
perception that the sole objective of ISDS is protecting the rights of                       
investors. However, this does not seem to have been the rationale of                       142
the drafters of the ICSID Convention, who believed in the equal access                       


















46 explicitly allows counterclaims, stating that  “ the Tribunal shall, if                   
requested by a party, determine any incidental or additional claims or                     
counterclaims arising directly out of the subject­matter of the dispute” .                   
After their 2010 modification, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules confirmed               
the idea; Article 21(3) provides that  “ the respondent may make a                     
counterclaim [...] provided that the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction over                   
it” .  Counterclaims are advantageous for States, as they would be enabled                     
to seek affirmative relief from tribunals. The notion could lead to                     
diminishment of the number of ISDS claims; investors, regularly                 
expecting counterclaims, could be discouraged from starting proceedings.             
States have recognized these benefits and counterclaims have                 144
flourished within the past five years. Their success depends mainly on                     145

















decline jurisdiction when there is no explicit consent for their use.                     146
However, a recent approach first introduced in Pr. Reisman’s dissenting                   
opinion in  Roussalis case, and then adopted by the tribunal in  Goetz case,                       
creates a novel situation. It suggests that the investor's consent to                       147
counterclaims is implied by the consent to arbitration itself and,                   
therefore, tribunals may broaden their jurisdiction  ratione personae to                 
encompass counterclaims even without specific treaty mention. The               
new­generation IIAs, with the exception of TPP, still remain silent on                     148
the issue, but this new approach encourages counterclaims to be more                     
widely braught and examined. 
 
High arbitration costs have always been one of the main concerns                     
of the investment arbitration system. The Organization for Economic                 
Co­operation and Development (OECD) calculated them to reach US$8                 
million on average in 2012, with costs exceeding US$30 million in some                       














adopted different approaches to their allocation, causing uncertainty, as                 
States could predict neither the outcome nor the level of the fees they                         
would have to pay. The traditional approach has been the one generally                       150
used in public international law, ‘pay your own pay’, whereby each party                       
bears its own costs. By the end of 2011, half of the cases brought made                             151
use of this rule, which has been criticized as particularly burdensome for                       
small economies and developing countries. Because of the general                 152
dissatisfaction, States have sought ways to alleviate costs. The cycle of                     
reforms started again with the modification of UNCITRAL Arbitration                 
Rules in 2010; per Articles 42(1) and 40(2) all arbitration costs  ‘shall in                         
principle be borne by the unsuccessful party. However, the arbitral                   



















determines that apportionment is reasonable’ . The new­generation IIAs               
adopt this ‘costs­follow­the­event’ approach and further shrink             
arbitrators’ latitude to apportion the costs between the parties, allowing                   
them to do so only ‘ in exceptional circumstances’ . Seeking to rein in                       153
arbitration costs, the new IIAs give resort to mediation and also provide                       





2.3.4 Advancing Consistency: Authoritative Interpretations,         
Appellate Mechanism and Permanent Court 
 
Tempering the abusive interpretation by tribunals and achieving               
uniformity of investment awards seems to be at the top of States                       
priorities.  
 
By delegating to arbitrators the ruling of ISDS claims, States are                     
deliberately denouncing an element of their sovereignty, in return for new                     









‘masters of the treaties’, sharing interpretive authority with tribunals.                 156
So far, apart from the 2001 NAFTA Free Trade Commission’                   
Interpretation, States have not made use of this authority. But feeling                     157
that their ties with the treaties are being cut off, they are now trying to                             
strengthen their interpretative role. They are endowing their recent IIAs                   
with specialized treaty committees consisted of all State­parties               
representatives and assign them tasks such as developing               
recommendations about substantive standards, adopting binding           
authoritative interpretations, amending the rules of the agreement and                 
appointing the members of tribunals. Some new IIAs also clearly set                     158
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as applicable law,                   159
preventing ISDS tribunals from sidestepping its rules of interpretation                 
and deviating, that way, from the intention of the treaty­drafters.  160
 
The ISDS institutional structure is characterized by brand­new               














consisted of lawyers of big law firms, raising concerns that they have a                         
‘business interest’ in cases and, thus, are investor­biased. Aiming to                   161
eliminate these vested interests, some IIAs assign to the treaty                   
committees the task of compiling a roster of arbitrators and choosing                     
from it in case of disagreement between the parties. A binding code of                         162
conduct is also created, excluding conflicts of interest and safeguarding                   
arbitrators’ impartiality.   163
 
After many years of discussions, CETA and the draft text of TTIP                       
provide for a second instance facility. It is not the first time that the                           164
words ‘appellate body’ appear in an IIA; older and recent agreements                     
also mention such a mechanism but they only suggest a future, potential                       
establishment. The novelty of the two agreements lies in the fact that                       165
the Appellate Tribunal is created by the pact itself and is binding, similar                         
to the WTO Appellate Body. The appeals procedure improves the                   
annulment process of ICSID Article 52(1); besides the correction of                   
procedural errors, it also provides for the review of the awards on the                         











The EU has again become a pioneer attempting to change the                     
structure of the first instance. First seen in the November 2015 TTIP                       
proposal and then included in EU­Vietnam FTA and CETA, the new                     166
system aims to replace the  ad hoc tribunals with a standing investment                       
court. Some voices have been heard to suggest that it will pose several                         
technical and political challenges. But States have felt that its benefits                     167
would outweigh the drawbacks; the court, consisted by tenured and                   
carefully selected judges, seeks to ensure greater legitimacy, fairness and                   
independence. A major innovation is that the tribunal members will be                     
appointed by the committee, depriving the investors of any influence on                     
the selection. The investors will also not be able to choose the                       168
respondent to the claim; it will be in the EU’s sole determination whether                         
the claim should be addressed by a Member State or the Union itself.                         169
Whether such a Court will be established is still unclear, but, if it does, it                             
could be valuable for small European States that in the past found                       
















2.4 Regionalism: Towards A Harmonization Of International             
Investment Law? 
 
The surge of regionalism had been considered as a tool to abate                       
the dissatisfaction over the bilateral investment system and to equalize                   
the powers of investors and States, by obtaining a first consolidation of                       
investment law. Mega­regional FTAs had, hence, been seen as a                   170
‘stepping stone’ for a future multilateralization, which would be                 171
achieved with the gradual accession of additional States to existing                   
regional instruments. This Section will evaluate whether the goal of                   172
such harmonization has been accomplished through regionalism, and               
whether the drafting of a multilateral investment treaty would be either                     
desirable or plausible.  
 
It could be argued that mega­regional FTAs, governing a                 
substantial share of the global investment, make some progress towards                   









These treaties reflect a consensus between their participants on                 
addressing the concerns of the current regime, providing more clarified                   
substantive obligations, liberalization commitments and stronger           
regulatory transparency. However, this fledging regionalism has added               173
an extra layer to the already fragmented bilateral system; most IIAs                     
affirm their co­existence with older bilateral or regional agreements and                   
are silent on which one prevails, resulting in overlaps. Investors are,                     174
thus, able to choose from these parallel treaties those that are the most                         
preferential under which to bring their claims. To address this issue, the                       
EU adopted a Regulation that provides for the replacement of                   
Member­States’ BITs with the new IIAs concluded by the Union.                   175
Nonetheless, all BITs include ‘transitional­period’ provisions, which             
guarantee protection even upon termination, meaning that the overlap                 

















At the other end of the spectrum, if the goal is the uniformity of                           
international investment law, this could be facilitated through a                 
multilateral investment system. A multilateral treaty could better balance                 
economic with public purpose interests, so as to meet both the                     
expectations of the investors and host States. With the creation of unified                       
rules, it could create a regulatory framework that both provides                   
safeguards for securing foreign investment while also addressing               
non­investment concerns, such as the right to regulate on health care and                       
the environment. This could further contribute to the elimination of                   176
contradictory interpretations of the various ad hoc tribunals, providing a                   
more secure environment both for States and investors. Without a doubt,                     
the negotiating power of developed countries, the source of most FDI                     
flows, would be still stronger during the drafting of such treaty.                     
Nevertheless, a coalition of all developing countries trying to protect                   
their interests could bring about a more balanced regime. Thus, a                     
multilateral treaty could end the perpetual battle between investors and                   
States over who will prevail and thereby lead to a ‘golden mean’. Of                         
course, in order to have positive effects, a potential multilateral                   
framework should be properly constructed. This would be only achieved                   
through open negotiations between states and representatives of the                 







treaty­making by arbitrators and investors, as well as provision for                   
corporate liability to ensure non­violation of human rights and                 
environmental laws. Towards this direction,  on 13 September 2017, the         
EU Commission  released a Recommendation for a Council Decision                 
which would initiate the negotiations for the setting up of a Multilateral                       
Investment Court, suggestion that is currently discussed during the                 177
consultations of the UNCITRAL Working Group III on the reform of                     
ISDS.  178
 
However, the multilateralization of investment law is still viewed                 
with skepticism by both scholars and developing countries alike. Some                   
commentators assert that a multilateral treaty is not necessary as BITs can                       
already develop uniform standards, which would harmonize the               
investment regime. However, as seen before, the substantive standards                 179
of BITs and FTAs are still far from uniform. The concerns of developing                         
States mainly stem from the role foreign investors would acquire upon                     
the drafting of such treaty. They claim that, under a multilateral system, it                         
would be easier for corporations to move their investments from country                     
to country causing unpredictability. A second argument put forward is                   









cumbersome for the economically weaker party, which can still channel                   
and guide investment in support of its development. The critics                   180
conclude that while individual consents of arbitration in bilateral treaties                   
cannot elevate investors to subjects of international law, their                 
unconditional recognition in a multilateral treaty would establish their                 
legal personality. Especially as States would not be able to unilaterally                     
modify or denounce such a treaty, thereby withdrawing the legal status                     
accorded to corporations, as they could do with BITs. But the situation                       181
is not much ­if any­ different under the current regime; the myriad                       
bilateral and regional IIAs offer several alternatives to corporations on                   
where to place their investments, forcing States to make concessions in                     
order to attract and maintain FDI. Furthermore, almost all IIAs are                     
negotiated based on the draft model of the more powerful State, and as                         
States hold regular meetings with corporate lobbyists, investors have                 















personality of investors, we could argue that the ever­increasing number                   
of BITs and regional IIAs and their contracting parties, as well as the                         
binding consent to ISDS that they provide, already imply a  de facto                       
transformation of investors into subjects of international law. This                 
becomes more obvious if we consider the role that investors can play in                         
investment law­making; in the absence of a uniform or customary                   
regime, arbitrators mainly rely on the parties’ pleadings when identifying                   
the meaning the substantive standards of IIAs. This gives investors a                     
more pervasive role in influencing the shaping of investment law by                     
proposing interpretations that are frequently adopted by tribunals and                 
cited in subsequent awards.  183
 
Be that as it may, the idea of a multilateral investment treaty                       
seems even more farfetched, with developed countries trying to maintain                   
fragmentation. The recent decision of the US government to withdraw                   
from TTP in favor of pursuing bilateral agreements points in this                     













regarding the continuation of the TTIP negotiations, which is further                   
enhanced by the government’s intention to strengthen commerce and                 
investment ties with Great Britain after Brexit. Under these                 185
developments, not only does the drafting of a multilateral treaty seem                     
utopian, but the future of regionalism also appears nebulous. Other                   
developed countries do not seem to take the same view regarding                     
mega­regionals; ASEAN members expressed the wish for the TPP to                   
proceed, even without the US, and will possibly explore the                   186
opportunity to commence negotiations with China for the conclusion of                   
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. The EU also               187
seems to stand by the regional approach, although the ratification of some                       
of its FTAs face problems. More specifically, the conclusion of the                     
EU–Singapore FTA is pending after an opinion of the Court of Justice of                         
the EU (CJEU) and, in addition to this, on 6 September 2017, Belgium                         188















of CETA conforms to the EU Treaties. No matter what will happen                       189
with the EU FTAs, what is sure is that with the absence of the US, one of                                 
the major economic players, the regional model may have an ‘expiration                     







The ‘BITs’ rush’ of the 1990’s is slowing down and is being                       
replaced by intensified efforts at the regional level. In the aftermath of the                         
2008 global financial crisis, States felt that their economies would be                     
revived through a strong, ’one shot’ regulatory framework that would                   
combine supplementary sectors such as trade, investment and services.                 190
Thus, over the past decade, initiatives have been taken for the conclusion                       












but also ‘liberalize’ investments. As the IIAs universe is expanding,                   
concerns about the notable growth of investors’ power have been brought                     
to the surface, not only by developing countries and civil society, but also                         
by developed States that are now becoming targets of ISDS claims. This,                       
in turn, revived the question of ‘international subjectivity’ of                 
multinational corporations.  
 
This Chapter has engaged to the discussion of ‘international                 
subjectivity’ by examining both the rights of corporations and States in                     
light of the new trend of governments to sign regional FTAs. It observes                         
that this era of transition from investment bilateralism to regionalism                   
presents us with a paradox. On the one hand, the mega­regional Free                       
Trade Agreements signed and being negotiated advance the protection of                   
investors and facilitate their access to the ISDS mechanism. On the other                       
hand, States attempt to react to investors’ growing power either by opting                       
out from investment arbitration or by reforming investment standards to                   
better reflect their interests.  
 
Reviewing this ‘battle’ of predominance, this Chapter argues that                 
regionalism has not been suitable to resolve it. Although some steps were                       
taken towards the consolidation of the investment regime, regionalism                 
ultimately led to a further fragmentation. It can serve as a ‘sweet spot’ for                           
investors, who not only maintain their powers, but are given even more                       
means to proceed against States. What is sure is that, with the main                         
purpose of international investment law still being the protection of                   
90 
 
investors and with globalization making multinational corporations             
indispensable components of world economy, their role will not be easily                     
diminished. Given the fact that regionalism does not seem to deliver the                       
desired results, the alternative of a multilateral investment treaty could be                     
the ‘one­eyed man in the land of the blind’, marking a new beginning in                           
balancing States and investors conflicting interests. However,             
multilateralism still raises concerns among States and academics, which                 
implies that the creation of such a treaty is utopian. At the same time, the                             
future of regionalism itself seems also uncertain, with the US government                     
































Sustainable development has been defined in various ways, but no                   
definition is yet universally accepted. The content of the principle was                     
initially shaped by the 1987 Brundtland Report and the 1992 Rio                     191
Declaration, which placed human beings at the centre of sustainable                   
development and put weight on environmental protection. Since then                 192







its meaning has evolved; the Rio+10 and Rio+20 summits described                   
sustainable development in terms of three pillars: economic, social and                   
environmental. The recent adoption of the 2030 Agenda adds further                   193 194
elements to the concept. While still based on the three pillars, Agenda                       
2030 also directly mirrors the human right framework; it is grounded in                       
international human rights treaties, and its Sustainable Development               
Goals (SDGs) and targets encompass issues related not only to economic                     
and social rights but also cultural, civil and political rights.  195
 
Agenda 2030 also creates a strong linkage between sustainable                 
development and investment, explicitly linking its promotion with               
substantive SDGs and targets. The adoption of investment promotion                 196
regimes is also mentioned as a means of implementation of the Agenda.                     
However, the current regulatory framework for international               197
investment law has been criticized as threatening sustainable               
development. These concerns reinforce the need for the establishment of                   
effective rules and processes to facilitate the realization of the SDGs.                     198
193 ‘Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Plan of Implementation                       
of the World Summit on Sustainable Development’ UN Doc A/CONF.199/20 (4                     
September 2002) I, para 2; UNGA, ‘The Future We Want’ UN Doc A/RES/66/288 (27                           
July 2012) I, para 3. 
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On a positive note, governments have embarked on a path of reforming                       
international investment agreements (IIAs), shifting shyly towards             
sustainable development; however, the steps taken thus far do not seem                     199
to be sufficient. 
 
Although IIAs are inter­State agreements, States are not the only                   
ones shaping the international investment regime. Through investor­State               
dispute settlement (ISDS), arbitrators are entrusted with the task of                   
interpreting these agreements. Therefore, whether and how sustainable               
development will be put into practice also depends to a great extent on                         
their decisions. Sustainable development should be considered as an                 
‘interstitial’ principle or a principle for the legal interpretation of                   
international treaties. How could arbitrators apply this principle in                 200
ISDS when resolving investment disputes, particularly those with explicit                 
public interest components? Do the so­called new generation IIAs                 
impose an obligation on them towards integrating the principle into their                     
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Johannesburg Take Us? Ethical and Legal Approaches to Sustainable Development in                     




interpretation? Does the arbitration system itself need to be reformed for                     
the aims of sustainable development to be fulfilled? 
 
Existing literature has already attempted to resolve tensions               
between existing IIAs and environmental or social issues. This Chapter                   201
201  L J Dhooge, 'The North American Free Trade Agreement and the Environment:                         
Lessons of  Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States'' (2010) 10  Minnesota                     
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Investment Agreements from a Sustainable Development Perspective’ (2015) 3                 
Groningen Journal of International Law 59; S W Schill, C J Tams and R Hofmann,                             
International Investment Law and Development Bridging the Gap (Edward Elgar,                   
2015); J E Viñuales, ‘Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law:                       
The Current State of Play’ in K Miles (ed),  Research Handbook on Environment and                           
Investment Law  1 (Edward Elgar, 2016), at 2­3; S Hindelang and M Krajewski,  Shifting                           
95 
 
extends the discussion to 'new generation' mega­regional FTAs and                 
assesses whether they have addressed these sustainable             
development­related concerns. It principally concentrates on arbitral             202
tribunals and the methods that they could employ in order to advance the                         
principle of sustainable development. To do so, it first analyses the                     
current practice of ISDS tribunals when confronted with investment                 
disputes with explicit public interest components. In a second stage, the                     
Chapter examines whether 'new generation' FTAs contain language               
aligning international investment law with SDGs and whether they                 
provide tools that would enable arbitrators to interpret their provisions in                     
light of the 2030 Agenda. Finally, it reflects on changes to ISDS and                         






The gradual expansion of investors' activities in domains of                 
public interest, such as water, energy or health care, has given rise to                         
arbitration disputes involving a variety of investments with significant                 
sustainable development impacts. The majority of these             
Paradigms in International Investment Law: More Balanced, Less Isolated, Increasingly                   
Diversified (Oxford University Press, 2016). 
202 The Chapter focuses on the Trans­Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), the                     




sustainable­related issues, were brought either as environmental claims or                 
as human rights assertions. 
 
Environmental claims have been relatively slow to arise in the                   
ISDS context. In early cases, the ‘traditional approach’ of arbitrators was                     
to prioritize investment law, considering it as  lex specialis . Based on                     203
the ‘sole effects doctrine’, some tribunals regarded the public purpose                   204
objective of a State measure as irrelevant to the decision as to whether                         
the investment treaty was breached. For instance, both the  Santa Elena                     
and  Water Management II tribunals, hearing indirect expropriation cases,                 
stressed that  “expropriatory environmental measures – no matter how                 
laudable and beneficial to society as a whole – are, in this respect,                         
similar to any other expropriatory measures” ,  hence it was not a reason                       
to exclude or limit investor compensation. Taking a different approach,                   205
other tribunals engaged in the discussion of environmental issues, but                   
still considered them as subordinate to investment protection. In the                   
Metalclad award, arbitrators applied a strictly economic impact test to                   
find that an indirect expropriation had occurred, as the owner was                     
203 M Koskenniemi, ‘Fragmentation of International Law – The Function and Scope of                         
the Lex Specialis Rule and the Question of “Self­Contained Regimes”: An Outline’                       
(2009) 1  Transnational Dispute Management . 
204  C Henckels, ‘Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate’ (2012) 15  Journal of                           
International Economic Law 223, at 225 (fn 4). 
205 Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v Republic of Costa Rica , ICSID Case                             




deprived  “of the ... reasonably­to­be­expected economic benefit of               
property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State”  .                       
In the  Tecmed and  Glamis cases, investment tribunals, although                   206
seemingly having weighed public purpose and investors’ interests               
equally, set forth an expansive interpretation of the fair and equitable                     
treatment (FET) standard, prioritizing the ‘legitimate expectations’ of               
investors. The non­discrimination standards have also been open to                 207 208
wide interpretation; the  S.D. Myers tribunal adopted a competitive                 
business approach in its assessment of ‘like circumstances’ and found the                     
environmental decisions of the host State to be breaching its treaty                     
obligations.  209
 
206 Metalclad Corporation v Mexico (n 68), para 103. See also N                       
Bernasconi­Osterwalder and L Johnson, ‘International Investment Law and Sustainable                 
Development: Key Cases from 2000–2010’ (International Institute for Sustainable                 
Development 2011), at 78­79. 
207  Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v United Mexican States , ICSID Case No                       
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award (29 May 2003) paras 123, 139, 149;  Glamis Gold Ltd. v United                           
States  (n 136), para 354. 
208 The non­discrimination standards prohibit discrimination on the basis of nationality.                     
The most common non­discrimination standards of IIAs are the national treatment (NT)                       
and the most­favoured nation treatment (MFN), which require treatment no less                     
favourable than the one afforded to national or other foreign investors respectively. 




Since 2012, we can observe a steep increase in disputes with                     
environmental relevance, which serves as a confirmation of the                 210
growing importance of sustainable development in the field of                 
international investment law. The gradually changing treatment of such                 
disputes by ISDS tribunals points in the same direction. In the  Chemtura,                       
Al Tamimi and  Charanne cases, the tribunals took into account the                     
purpose of the host States’ environmental measures, accepting the latter                   
as a valid exercise of their regulatory powers. Similarly, in the  Marion                       211
Unglaube, Mamidoil , and  Peter Allard cases, arbitrators considered the                 
relevance of the host States’ economic conditions, expecting ‘due                 
diligence’ from investors. However, these steps are modest, as                 212
arbitrators only assess environmental claims as part of the factual                   
analysis rather than as questions of law. Furthermore, the fact that                     213
210 Viñuales (n 201), at 12­13:  ‘A total of 60 such disputes have been filed […] which                                 
amounts to more than half of the entire 114­set.’. 
211 Chemtura  Corporation v Canada (Award) (2 August 2010) PCA Case No  2008­01                         
(UNCITRAL) IIC 451 (2010), para 266;  Adel A Hammadi Al Tamimi v Sultanate of                           
Oman , ICSID Case No ARB/11/33, Award (3 November 2015), paras 388­444;                     
Charanne and Construction Investments v Spain (Award) (21 January 2016) (Stockholm                     
Chamber of Commerce, Case No 62/2012). 
212 Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Petroleum Products Societe Anonyme S.A. v Republic of                       
Albania , ICSID Case No ARB/11/24, Award (30 March 2015), paras 613­614;  Marion                       
Unglaube v Republic of Costa Rica , ICSID Case No ARB/08/1 and  Reinhard Unglaube                         
v Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/20, Award (16 May 2012), para 258;                             
Peter A. Allard (Canada) v The Government of Barbados (Award) (27 June 2016) (PCA                           
Case No 2012­06) IIC 864 (2016). 
213 C L Beharry and M E Kuritzky, ‘Going Green: Managing the Environment through                           
International Investment Arbitration’ (2015) 30  American University International Law                 
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several recent awards still insist on the ‘traditional approach’ makes                   214
clear that investment and environmental law are still not on an equal                       
footing. 
 
Although still infrequent, human rights arguments also appear in                 
ISDS. The acceptance of jurisdiction by tribunals ruling cases related to                     
human rights does not seem to follow a firm pattern; the reference to                         
international law as applicable law in the IIA was sometimes considered                     
sufficient to establish jurisdiction for claims brought by the investor,                   215
while in other cases it was not. But even in cases where arbitrators denied                           
jurisdiction, they nevertheless took the human rights argumentation into                 
consideration as ‘part of the factual matrix of the claimants’ complaints’.                   
This willingness to draw analogies with human rights seems, however,                     216
Review 396. 
214 Abengoa S.A. y COFIDES S.A. v United Mexican States , ICSID Case No                         
ARB(AF)/09/2, Award (18 April 2013);  Hassan Awdi, Enterprise Business Consultants,                   
Inc. and Alfa El Corporation v Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/10/13, Award (2 March                           
2015), para 312;  Bilcon of Delaware et al. v Government of Canada (Award on                           
Jurisdiction and Liability) (17 March 2015) (PCA Case No 2009­04) IIC 688 (2015),                         
paras 691­692. 
215 Chevron & Texaco v Ecuador (n 141) (Interim Award) (1 December 2008) IIC 355                             
(2008), paras 2, 3 and 207;  Desert Line Projects LLC v Republic of Yemen, ICSID Case                               
No ARB/05/17, Award (6 February 2008);  Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v Republic                       
of Lebanon, ICSID Case No ARB/07/12, Decision on Jurisdiction (11 September 2009). 




one­sided. Unlike investors’ claims, when it comes to defences of                   217
States, arbitrators tend to dismiss human rights­related assertions without                 
elaborating on their dismissal. This is particularly true with regard to                     218
water arbitration cases, where tribunals either did not take cognisance of                     
the right, as in  Vivendi and  Biwater , or refused to enter into a                         219
discussion, noting that the respondent State had failed to sufficiently                   
argue it, as in  Azurix . Differently, the  Suez and  SAUR tribunals                     220
acknowledged that human rights are to be taken into consideration but set                       
a very high threshold for host States to prove the proportionality of their                         
measure. Only a few exceptions to this reluctance can be found in case                         221
law; the  Continental Casualty and  Philip Morris tribunals dismissed the                   
217 T Meshel, ‘Human Rights in Investor­State Arbitration: The Human Right to Water                         
and Beyond’ (2015) 6  Journal of International Dispute Settlement 277, at 282­283; V                         
Kube and E U Petersmann, ‘Human Rights Law in International Investment Arbitration’                       
(2016) 11  Asian Journal of WTO and International Health Law and Policy 65, at 86. 
218 CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentine Republic , ICSID Case No ARB/01/8,                       
Award (12 May 2005);  EDF International SA, SAUR International SA, and Leon                       
Participaciones Argentinas SA v Argentine Republic , ICSID Case No ARB/03/23,                   
Award (11 June 2012). 
219 Compania de Aguas del Aconquija SA and Vivendi Universal SA v Argentine                         
Republic , ICSID Case No ARB/97/3, Award (20 August 2007);  Biwater Gauff Ltd v                         
United Republic of Tanzania , ICSID Case No ARB/05/22, Award (24 July 2008). 
220 Azurix Corp. v Argentine Republic ,  ICSID Case No ARB/01/12, Award (14 July                         
2006). 
221 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA and Vivendi Universal SA v                           
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investor claims, holding that the governmental measures taken were                 
proportionate to the intended objectives: the country’s grave economic                 
crisis and the need to protect public health respectively.  222
 
Third parties have also participated in investment disputes with                 
sustainable development components, and since 2008 the number of                 
amicus curiae briefs has doubled. The first time that                 223
Non­Governmental Organizations (NGOs) tried to intervene was in the                 
Methanex case. Despite the outcome,  Methanex is considered to be a                     224
ground­breaking decision, as the tribunal recognized that it had the power                     
to accept  amicus curiae submissions, opening the door for more petitions                     
in the future. After some early unsuccessful attempts of participation,                   225 226
we can observe an increased openness of tribunals towards  amicus curiae                     
222 Continental Casualty Company v Argentine Republic , ICSID Case No ARB/03/9,                     
Award (5 September 2008);  Philip Morris Brand Sàrl (Switzerland), Philip Morris                     
Products S.A. (Switzerland) and Abal Hermanos S.A. (Uruguay) v Oriental Republic of                       
Uruguay , ICSID Case No ARB/10/7, Award (8 July 2016). 
223 Bastin (n 135), at 128. 
224 Methanex Corporation v United States of America (Decision on Amici Curiae) (15                         
January 2001) (UNCITRAL) IIC 165 (2001). 
225 S Saha, ‘Methanex Corporation and the USA: The Final NAFTA Tribunal Ruling’                         
(2006) 15  Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 110; H                       
Mann, ‘Opening the Doors, at Least a Little: Comment on the Amicus Decision in                           
Methanex v. United States’ (2001) 10  Review of European Community and                     
International Environmental Law  241. 
226 United Parcel Service of America Inc. v Canada , ICSID Case No, UNCT/02/1,                         




submissions. In addition, participation is no longer sought only by                   227
NGOs, but also by international organizations, business associations and                 
indigenous peoples. Nevertheless, their acceptance remains at the               228
discretion of tribunals, which, as the case law shows, has so far not been                           
consistent. 
 
After the analysis of the jurisprudence, one could conclude that                   
the responses of arbitrators to sustainable development lack consistency.                 
Inconsistent awards have raised concerns about the legitimacy of the                   
arbitral process; several commentators argue that ISDS exhibits investor                 
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3.3 The Role of Arbitrators in Promoting Sustainable Development                 
under New­Generation Free Trade Agreements 
 
Given the increasing number of ISDS cases involving some                 
sustainable­development component, it is very likely we will also see                   230
such issues being addressed by tribunals set up under the post­2015                     
FTAs. In this section, we will examine whether these treaties contain                     
language that imposes the duty upon, or enables arbitrators to render                     
decisions that would – borrowing the tripartite typology of States’                   






3.3.1.1 Sustainable development, environmental and labour           
chapters  
 
Unlike early IIAs, where explicit reference to sustainable               
development was either absent or only appeared in preambles, new                   231
generation FTAs give greater weight to the principle. They all include                     
preambles reaffirming the commitments of the parties to further                 
230 UNCTAD, ‘Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development’ (UNCTAD                 
2015) 56 (UNCTAD IPFSD). 




sustainable development  create new opportunities for workers, contribute               
to raising living standards and reduce poverty. Furthermore, they                 
in corporate sustainable development chapters, which recall           232
international instruments such as the Rio Declaration, Agenda 21 and the                     
ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, and                   
acknowledge the aim of promoting investment in such a way so as to                         
contribute to the objective of sustainable development. These chapters do                   
not generate new obligations for the Parties, but rathe r embody a                     
cooperative approach, focusing on dialogue between the Parties and                 
relevant stakeholders with regard to trade­sustainable development             
issues. A novel feature of the sustainable development chapters is that                     233
they aim to strengthen the corporate social responsibility (CSR), directly                   
mentioning that the Parties shall take into account the Organisation for                     
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for             
Multinational Enterprises and, in EU­Vietnam FTA, the ILO Tripartite                 
Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and             
Social Policy. Although the CSR article again lacks firm                 234
commitments, it demonstrates the acceptance of the Parties that, as                   
Muchlinski claims,  “some kind of accountability for the social                 









consequences of their (investors')  actions may be inevitable under                 
international law”  . The focus on the CSR standard can be proven very                       235
helpful for ISDS tribunals when adjudicating cases with environmental                 
and human rights components. 
 
Following the example of older IIAs, all post­2015 FTAs also                   
incorporate environment and labour provisions, either as separate               
chapters, or as part of the sustainable development chapter. The                   236 237
environmental and labour chapters include positive and negative               
obligations for the parties. They all contain a ‘right­to­regulate’                 
provision, which acknowledges “ the right of each Party to establish its                     
levels of environmental and protection, and to adopt or modify                   
accordingly its laws and policies”  . In order to avoid potential                   238
distortion effects that may result from the liberalisation of trade and                     
investment flows, the FTA labour and environmental chapters also                 239














which prohibit the retrogression from the existing level of protection                   
accorded by national laws as an incentive to attract foreign investment..                     240
Derogations not only can occur by the positive action of weakening the                       
labor standards, but also by omissions through their lack of enforcement.                     
Therefore, all new generation FTAs combine the  'non­derogation'               
provisions with an  ‘enforcement of laws’ clause, under which no Party                     
“ shall fail to effectively enforce its labour laws, through a sustained or                       
recurring course of action or inaction” .  Despite having the form of                     241
negative obligations, both the  'non­derogation' and the  'enforcement of                 
laws' clauses could be seen as 'building a wall' against external pressures                       
of multinational corporations, ensuring that the regulatory autonomy of                 
States will not be affected by the actions of the former. 
 
Neither the sustainable development nor the environmental and               
labour chapters of the treaties examined in this article gives recourse to                       
dispute settlement mechanisms. Disputes are to be resolved only by                   242












being directly applicable to ISDS, both the preambles and sustainable                   
development­related provisions could be seen as a manifestation of                 
parties’ intention to strengthen the importance of sustainable               
development. They clarify the object and purpose of the agreements and,                     
as provided by Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the                           
Treaties (VCLT), they constitute relevant ‘context’, allowing             244







Turning to provisions that can form the basis of an ISDS claim,                       
sustainable development references are also present. The EU FTAs                 
analysed  ‘reaffirm’  the right of the parties to regulate in order to achieve                         
legitimate policy objectives. The wording of this provision, strongly                 246
reminiscent of preambular language, is quite vague and cannot be seen as                       
providing clear guidance for ISDS tribunals. A similar right­to­regulate                 
provision can be found in the TPP, which states that  “nothing …shall be                           
construed to prevent’ the adoption of measures of environmental and                   
244 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into                             
force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331 art 31(2). 





health objectives, unless these measures are  ‘otherwise consistent with                 
this Chapter.” This provision complicates the intended protection and                 247
confers to the arbitrators the task to determine whether this compliance                     
exists. All new generation FTAs also feature ‘general exceptions’. The                   
post­2015 EU FTAs, importing the language of Article XX of the 1994                       
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, assert that States can adopt                     
measures aiming to protect the environment, human life or health,                   
provided that they are 'necessary’ and not amounting to  'arbitrary or                     
unjustifiable discrimination’ . The vagueness of these terms has made                 248
WTO panels reluctant to rule in favour of the ‘general­exceptions’                   
provision, setting highly demanding levels of proof. Although WTO                 249
case law does not set a precedent for investment arbitration, the absence                       
of a definition of these terms in the EU FTAs make the ‘general                         
exceptions’ open to broad interpretation. Moreover, their applicability to                 
ISDS is quite limited, as they only cover specific sections of the                       
Investment Chapter. The TPP general exception as applied to ISDS is                     
even narrower, only addressing certain obligations under the performance                 
requirement article. Performance requirements are commitments           250
imposed on investors to meet certain goals with respect to their                     
247 TPP art 9.10(a). 
248 CETA art 28.3(1­2); EU­Singapore FTA art 9.3(3); EU­Vietnam FTA Chapter 8­VII,                       
art 1.  





operations in the host country. The TPP generally does not make use of                         251
performance requirements, which are only accepted in the form of                   
‘general exceptions’. Finally, all post­2015 FTAs include indirect               
expropriation annexes, which set forth factors indicating which types of                   
State conduct constitute indirect expropriation. The annexes provide               252
that non­discriminatory regulatory actions designed to protect public               
health, safety and the environment do not constitute indirect                 
expropriation, except in ‘rare circumstances’. While the TPP does not                   253
give guidance to arbitrators on how to apply this term, the EU FTAs                         
elaborate on this aspect defining ‘rare circumstances’ as measures with                   
such a severe impact in light of their purpose that they appear manifestly                         
excessive. Despite the clarification, this wording still leaves great                 
discretion to arbitrators to determine the threshold of indirect                 
expropriation. 
 
To summarize, the new generation FTAs do not provide a clear                     
normative environment for sustainable development. The obscure             
wording of the relevant provisions – either outside or inside the scope of                         
251 UNCTAD,  World Investment Report 2003: FDI Policies for Development: National                     
and International Perspectives (UNCTAD 2003), at 119. 
252 For a comprehensive analysis see L Cotula, ‘Expropriation Clauses and                     
Environmental Regulation: Diffusion of Law in the Era of Investment Treaties’ (2015)                       
24  Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law 278. 











Could arbitrators overcome the ambiguities in these treaties, and                 
integrate sustainable development into their decisions? As investment               
tribunals have competence to decide only within the legal framework of                     
the agreement in question, we need to examine the provisions of the                       
post­2015 FTAs establishing the competence of the tribunals: the                 
‘covered investment’ and ‘governing law’ clauses, and whether they                 
leave room for the consideration of sustainable­development claims.               
Moreover, we need to analyse the existing jurisprudence on these clauses.                     
Although no rule of strict precedent exists in investment arbitration, the                     
vagueness of IIA language has made arbitrators shapers of investment                   
law; through interpretation they create normative rules, which, while                 










The 2030 Agenda  “ reaffirms that every State has … full                   
permanent sovereignty over all its wealth, natural resources and                 
economic activity”  . According protection to investments violating             255
national legislation would undermine the right of States to make                   
decisions in their best interests. Older BITs addressed this issue of                     
legality , explicitly subjecting the definition of ‘covered investment’ to                 
conformity with the domestic laws of the host State. Based on this                       
provision, several tribunals applied the so­called ‘clean hands’ doctrine to                   
examine the legality of an investment, rejecting jurisdiction for                 
investments contrary to the environmental or human rights laws of the                     
host State. The FTAs examined here omitted the domestic law criterion                     256
from the definition of ‘covered investment’. Even so, it could be argued                       
that tribunals could still apply the ‘clean hands’ doctrine, a view which                       
can be derived from the jurisprudence; two recent awards upheld  ‘the                     
widely­held opinion that investments are protected by international law                 
255 2030 Agenda (n 194),  para 18. 
256 Inceysa Vallisoletana, SL v Republic of El Salvador , ICSID Case No ARB/03/26,                         
Award (2 August 2006), para 335;  Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v                         
Republic of Philippines , ICSID Case No ARB/03/25, Award (16 August 2007), paras                       
397 and 401­402;  Alasdair Ross Anderson et al v Republic of Costa Rica , ICSID Case                             
No ARB(AF)/07/3, Award (19 May 2010), paras 57­59. For an analysis see P                         
Dumberry, ‘State of Confusion: The Doctrine of “Clean Hands” in Investment                     




only when they are made in accordance with the legislation of the host                         
State’ , even without the inclusion of a relevant treaty provision.                   257
However, assessing the legality of an investment may not be sufficient by                       
itself.  Cases may arise where national legislation itself falls short from                     
furthering sustainable development, This is particularly true for               
developing countries­signatories of FTAs, such as Malaysia and Vietnam,                 
whose laws for environmental democracy score low.  258
 
This is why, besides  legality , the quality of the investment should                     
also be taken into account in the interpretation of ‘covered investment’.                     
The 2030 Agenda urges investment that stimulates  ‘productivity,               
inclusive economic growth and job creation’ . The question would be                   259
whether arbitrators could reject jurisdiction for investments that do not                   
contribute to the host State’s sustainable development. Under Article                 
25(1) of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes                   
between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention), a                   260
dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the Centre if it directly arises out of                           
an ‘investment’. The absence of an ‘investment’ definition in the                   
Convention gave rise to different interpretations by tribunals. One of the                     









most sustainable development­friendly interpretations was given in the               
Salini  case, where the following criteria were set as the typical                     
characteristics of an investment: (i) commitment of capital; (ii) a certain                     
duration; (iii) participation in risks; and (iv) contribution to the economic                     
development of a host State. The  Salini  test was accepted in several                       261
subsequent cases, but the majority of investment tribunals dismissed the                   
criterion of economic development.  Departing from the model of older                   262
IIAs' wide investment definitions, new generation treaties explicitly               263
require investments to possess certain characteristics. Although some               
new BITs maintain all four  Salini criteria, the FTAs examined here do                       264
not mention the contribution to the economic development. This could                   265
261 Salini Costruttori S.p.A and Italstrade S.p.Av Kingdom ofMorocco , ICSID Case No                           
ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction (23 July 2001), paras 50­52. 
262 Accepted in:  Joy Mining Machinery Limited v Arab Republic of Egypt , ICSID Case                           
No ARB/03/11, Decision on Jurisdiction (23 July 2001), para 53;  Jan de Nul N.V.  and                             
Dredging International N.V. v Arab Republic of Egypt , ICSID Case No ARB/04/13,                       
Decision on Jurisdiction (16 June 2006), para. 91; rejected in  L.E.S.I. S.p.A. et ASTALDI                           
S.p.A. v People's Democratic Republic of Algeria , ICSID Case No ARB/05/3, Award                       
(12 July 2006), para 73(iv);  Siemens, A.G. v Argentine Republic , ICSID Case No                         








265 TPP art 9.1; CETA art 8.1; EU­Singapore FTA art 9.1(1); EU­Vietnam FTA Chapter                           
114 
 
make it more difficult for future FTA tribunals ruling in relation to these                         







All new generation FTAs set applicable rules of international law                   
as the ‘governing law’ of ISDS. Unlike the TPP, the EU FTAs also                         266
explicitly provide for the applicability of the VCLT. As the VCLT                     
codifies customary international law, it should be accepted that TPP                   
tribunals could also make use of its rules of interpretation. As confirmed                       
in the Report of the Executive Directors on ICSID Article 42,  “ the term                         
“ international law” … should be understood in the sense given to it by                         
Article 38(1) of the Statue of the International Court of Justice.” Under                       267
Article 38(1)(a) of the ICJ Statute, one of the primary sources of                       
international law is international treaties. This could give arbitrators the                   
green light to apply to ISDS the binding international human rights and                       
environmental treaties ratified by the disputing parties, even  ex officio , a                     
8­I, art 1(4)(p). In the TPP, the ‘certain duration’ phrasing was also removed. 
266 TPP art 9.25(1); CETA art 8.31; EU­Singapore FTA art 9.19(2); EU­Vietnam FTA                         
Chapter 8­II, Section 3, Sub­Section 5, art 16(2). 




practice that they have so far only sporadically used. These treaties do                       268
not impose obligations on investors, but could be a useful interpretative                     
tool, especially from a sustainable development perspective. For               
example, the 2015 Paris Agreement could become pertinent in the                   269
discussion of some new generation cases springing from shifts in climate                     
change policy. 
 
In this context, the question arises as to whether tribunals could                     
also rely on voluntary instruments to which parties have adhered. Article                     
38 of the ICJ Statute does not identify soft law as one of the sources of                               
international law, a fact that led commentators to suggest it cannot be                       
used by international courts and tribunals. Others argue that the scope                     270
of Article 38 is narrow and acknowledge the role that soft law could play                           
in international law. Investment tribunals do not adopt a coherent                   271
approach; a study undertaken in 2011 shows that although some awards                     
268Azurix  (n 220);  Saipem S.p.A. v The People’s Republic of Bangladesh , ICSID Case No                           
ARB/05/07, Decision on Jurisdiction (21 March 2007), paras 130 and 132. See also                         
Kube and Petersmann (n 217), at 92­93. 
269 Paris Agreement (adopted 15 December 2015, entered into force 4 November 2016)                         
(2016) 55 ILM 740. 
270 J d’Aspremont, ‘Softness in International Law: A Self­Serving Quest for New Legal                         
Materials’ (2009) 19  European Journal of International Law 1075; P Weil, ‘Toward                       
Relative Normativity in International Law’ (1987) 77  American Journal of International                     
Law 413, at 414, fn 7. 
271 C M Chinkin, ‘The Challenge of Soft­Law: Development and Change in                       




cite non­legally binding instruments, only three of them were cited more                     
than once. The use of soft law by arbitrators can be justified by Article                           272
31(3)(c) of the VCLT, which requires decision makers to interpret                   
disputes in the light of all relevant rules of international law applicable                       
between the parties. This so­called ‘systemic integration’ approach could                 
enable arbitrators to fill the gaps of the vague IIA standards and prevent                         
conflicts between IIAs and international legal standards. This could be                   273
of great practical significance for sustainable development, as future                 
tribunals may integrate in their reasoning the SDGs adopted as part of the                         
2030 Agenda. Likewise, tribunals could take into consideration the                 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, already invoked by the                 
respondent in  South American Silver case and mentioned in post­2015                   274
FTAs, as well as the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business                     275
272 T Cole, ‘Non­binding Instruments and Literature’ in T Gazzini and E de Brabandere                           
(eds),  International Investment Law. The Sources of Rights and Obligations 289                     
(Nijhoff, 2012), at 304­305, fn 41. 
273 UNCTAD  Interpretation of IIAs (n 156), at 9; K Berner, ‘Reconciling Investment                         
Protection and Sustainable Development: A Plea for an Interpretative U­Turn’ in S                       
Hindelang and M Krajewski,  Shifting Paradigms in International Investment Law: More                     
Balanced, Less Isolated, Increasingly Diversified 177 (Oxford University Press, 2016),                   
at 186­187. 
274 South American Silver Limited (Bermuda) v The Plurinational State of Bolivia                       
(Respondent Counter­Memorial) (31 March 2015) (PCA Case No 2013­15) 1291,                   
https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1291 , para 220. 




and Human Rights referenced by the tribunal in the  Urbaser case.                     276
These instruments reflect the importance of corporate social               
responsibility (CSR), which, according to the UNCTAD Investment               
Policy Framework for Sustainable Development (IPFSD), includes             
promoting low­carbon and environmentally sound investment. Even             277
without imposing direct obligations on investors, CSR could acquire                 
greater importance in ISDS proceedings, by serving as a means for                     
tribunals to evaluate whether investor protection overrides States’               
national development objectives. Besides assisting governments in the               
implementation of the 2030 Agenda, CSR could have positive effects for                     
investors themselves. In an era that environmental and socio­economic                 
consciousness increases , corporations' adoption of CSR measures could               
increase their competitiveness.  278
 
However, what if there is no (relevant) international treaty signed                   
by both disputing parties? Article 38(1)(b) and (c) of the ICJ Statute                       
allow decision makers to also apply international custom and general                   
principles of law. It is not easy to conclude which rules are recognized as                           
customary international law or as general principles, or how investment                   
276 Urbaser S.A., Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v                         








tribunals could apply them in promoting sustainable development. But                 
some doctrines that are widely recognized in international law could have                     
a role in the interpretation of IIA substantive standards in line with the                         
sustainable development objectives. 
 
For example, the ‘police powers’ doctrine, a norm of customary                   
law operating autonomously from treaty law, could be of help in                     279
determining the scope of indirect expropriation. Literature is divided on                   
its applicability in international investment law, and so is                 280
jurisprudence. In some ISDS proceedings, ‘police powers’ was               
sidestepped by the ‘sole effects’ doctrine, where solely the effect of the                       
governmental measure on the property is crucial in the determination of                     
expropriation. Even in cases where tribunals applied ‘police powers’,                 281
they mostly did it as justification for non­payment of compensation,                   
rather than to exclude liability. The most radical pronouncement of the                     282
279 J E Viñuales, ‘Sovereignty in Foreign Investment Law’ in Z Douglas, J Pauwelyn                           
and J Viñuales (eds),  The Foundations of International Investment Law: Bringing                     
Theory into Practice 317 (Oxford University Press 2014), at 326­328; OECD,  Indirect                       
Expropriation” and the “Right to Regulate” in International Investment Law (OECD                     
Publishing 2004), at 5, fn 10. 
280 B Mostafa, ‘The Sole Effects Doctrine, Police Powers and Indirect Expropriation                       
under International Law’ (2008) 15  Australian International Law Journal  267. 
281 Henckels (n 204). 
282 P Ranjan and A Pushkar, ‘Determination of Indirect Expropriation and Doctrine of                         
Police Power in International Investment Law: A Critical Appraisal’ in L Choukroune                       




rule was made by the  Methanex tribunal, which held that all                     
non­discriminatory governmental measures, enacted in accordance with             
due process, do not constitute expropriation. Although criticized as                 283
negating the very purpose of expropriation provisions, this               284
interpretation seems in line with the indirect expropriation annexes of the                     
post­2015 FTAs examined here. Also, this interpretation is sustainable                 
development­sensitive, as it does not restrain the ability of States to                     
regulate in favour of health or the environment, thus preventing                   
‘regulatory chill’.  285
 
The ‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine, developed by the European                 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) jurisprudence, gives a standard of                   
deference for States to implement public interest measures. To evaluate                   
whether national authorities have overstepped this margin, the ECtHR                 
has developed a proportionality test, which is much less strict than the                       
one usually applied in ISDS. So far, the majority of investment                     286
tribunals have rejected the application of the ECtHR’s ‘margin of                   
283Methanex (n 68) Part IV, Chapter D, para 7. 
284 Ranjan and Pushkar (n 282), at 134­135. 
285 M Paparinskis, ‘Regulatory Expropriation and Sustainable Development’ in M W                     
Gehring, M C Cordonnier­Segger and A Newcombe,  Sustainable Development in World                     
Investment Law 301(Kluwer Law International, 2011), at 321­322. 
286 J Krommendijk and J Morijn, ‘“Proportional” by What Measure(s)? Balancing                     
Investor Interests andHuman Rights by Way of Applying the Proportionality Principle                     
in Investor­State Arbitration’ in P M Dupuy, E U Petersmann and F Francioni (eds),                           




appreciation’, arguing that it is not recognized as customary law.                   287
However, its growing acceptance by international courts shows that the                   
doctrine is emerging as a general principle of international law. In                     288
addition, Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute mentions judicial decisions                   
as subsidiary means for the determination of the rule of law. Based on                         
this provision, investment tribunals could take into consideration ECtHR                 
jurisprudence and subsequently the principles developed by it, a practice                   
that has rarely been followed in ISDS. Scholars have questioned the                     289
suitability of ‘margin of appreciation’ within investment arbitration,               
arguing that it provides no guidance to tribunals regarding the appropriate                     
standard of review, thus exacerbating fragmentation. However, if               290
arbitrators apply the ECtHR proportionality test as ‘corrective and                 
restrictive of the margin of appreciation’, the ‘doctrine could be a                     291
287 Siemens v Argentina (n 262), para 354;  EDF v Argentina (n 218), paras 1003 and                               
1106;  Biwater v Tanzania (n 119), para 515;  Quasar de Valors SICAV S.A. et al. v                               
Russian Federation (Award) (10 July 20012) (SCC Case No. 24/2007) IIC 557 (2012),                         
para 22. 
288 Y Shany, ‘Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?’                         
(2006) 16  European Journal of International Law 907. 
289 Mondev International Ltd v United States of America , ICSID Case No                       
ARB/(AF)/99/2, Award (11 October 2002);  Veteran Petroleum  (n. 216), para 76. 
290 J Arato, ‘The Margin of Appreciation in International Investment Law’ (2013) 54                         
Virginia Journal of International Law 545. 
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promising tool for guaranteeing the right of governments to appreciate                   
their development needs. 
 
The precautionary or  in dubio pro natura principle could also                   
become relevant in ISDS. While no uniform definition exists, the                   
principle is understood as a strategy to cope with possible risks where                       
scientific understanding is incomplete. First introduced in             292
environmental law, it is now enshrined in several international legal                   293
materials and domestic laws, and has been considered by international                   
courts. Hence it is emerging as international custom, an argument that                     294
has also been presented by the host State in the  David R. Aven case.                           295
With this case still pending, the principle may prove a useful device in                         
the adjudication of environment­related investment disputes. It could               
allow arbitrators to deviate from the general rule of international                   
arbitration and shift the burden of proof from the respondent to the                       
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International Law’ (1997) 9  Journal of Environmental Law 221; A Sirinskiene, ‘The                       
Status of Precautionary Principle: Moving Towards a Rule of Customary Law’ (2009)                       
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In summary, we conclude that investment tribunals could use the                   








The increasing number of ISDS cases explicitly touching on                 
matters of public interest has raised doubts as to the suitability of the                         
current arbitration system to pronounce on such disputes, with scholars                   
and practitioners asking for reform. The commitment of the                 297
international community to a sustainable future makes the questions of                   
who arbitrates and  under  what rules crucial. Despite the positive steps                     




297 J Paulsson, ‘Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution’, (2010) 25  ICSID                       
Review ­ Foreign Investment Law Journal 339, at 339­355; G Van Harten, ‘A Case for                             
an International Investment Court’, (2008) Society of International Economic Law                   






It has been said that the investment tribunals so far come from a                         
small pool of ‘male, pale and stale’ corporate lawyers. Statistics show                     298
that although ISDS cases are mainly brought against developing                 
countries or small economies, 68 percent of arbitrators come from North                     
America and Western Europe. This could be considered as problematic                   299
for two reasons.  First, it does not guarantee diversity and pluralism, keys                       
to sustainable development. Second, it does not guarantee sufficient                 
‘participation of developing countries in all the institutions of global                   
governance’ , as SDG 16.8 requires. Investment arbitration should               
comply with this goal, expanding the pool of arbitrators, with the entry of                         
decis ion makers of more nationalities to help ensure that a broader                     
variety of viewpoints be heard. Furthermore, sustainable development               
objectives could be better reflected by the inclusion of decision makers                     
with different backgrounds in the international investment tribunals.               
Examining the new generation FTAs provisions regarding the               
qualification of arbitrators, we can see that they prioritize legal                   
competences, providing that they shall have ‘expertise or experience’ in                   
public international law or international investment law. Legal               300
298 Paulsson, (n 297). 
299 ICSID, ‘ICSID Caseload Statistics no 2016­2’ (2016), available at                   
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/resources/ICSID­Caseload­Statistics.aspx (last   
access 7 August 2018). 




knowledge is undoubtedly important. However, several ISDS cases, and                 
especially those with environmental and human rights components, also                 
include complex social, technical and scientific issues. So far,                 301
investment tribunals have tried to resolve these issues by resorting to                     
external experts. Mega­regional FTAs seem to approve this solution.                 302 303
However, party­appointed experts could entail bias, and if diverging                 
expert opinions occur, arbitrators will be ultimately left to determine                   
which experts they will follow. Also, as far as the  ex officio                       304
appointment of experts is concerned, arbitrators’ practice shows that they                   
are hesitant in taking this initiative. An alternative solution could be the                       305
inclusion of non­legal arbitrators in ISDS, when appropriate, a change in                     
line with SDG 16.7 calling for ‘inclusive, participatory and representative                   
decision­making’. 
 
Other statistics suggest that investment arbitrators favour             
claimants at the expense of the respondent State’s sustainable                 
301 K Fach Gómez, ‘The US­EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Should                       
It Leave a Door Open for Non­Legal Arbitrators?’ (2016) 34  Conflict Resolution                       
Quarterly 199. 
302 Ibid , at 205. 
303 EU­Vietnam FTA art 8.26; TPP art 28.15; EU­Singapore FTA Chapter 8­II, Section                         
3, Sub­Section 5, art 8.26. 
304 Beharry and Kuritzky (n 213), at 404. 
305 R Jacur, ‘Remarks on the Role of Ex Curia Scientific Experts in International                           




development. Their pro­investor tendency could originate from their               306
interest in attracting or maintaining high­paying corporate clients and                 
their ability to act as counsels in other, pending cases. During the                       307
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations of               
November 2015, the EU proposed the replacement of the ISDS                   
mechanism with an Investment Court System. This system was                 308
adopted in the EU­Vietnam FTA and CETA. One of its major                     309
innovations is that a joint Investment Committee of the contracted parties                     
will appoint judges, who  ‘shall be available at all times and on short                         
notice’ . To ensure this availability, a monthly retainer fee will be paid                       310
to them. Likewise, the EU proposal attempts to prevent conflicts of                     311
interests by disallowing the parallel work of arbitrators as lawyers and by                       
introducing a new ‘challenge­of­arbitrators’ system where the decision of                 
disqualification will be made by a neutral authority. The tenure and                     312
financial independence of arbitrators, as well as the neutrality of the                     
system, could address the concerns of investor bias and enhance good                     






311 Ibid art 9(12­13); CETA art 8.27(12­13); EU­Vietnam FTA Chapter 8­II, Section 3,                         
Sub­Section 4, art 12.14­12.15. 
312 TTIP proposal art 9.11(1)(4); EU­Vietnam FTA Chapter 8­II, Section 3, Sub­Section                       
4, art 14(1)(4); CETA art 8.30(1)(3). 
313 ILA ‘Resolution 3/2002, New Delhi Declaration on Principles of International Law                       
126 
 
been said about the feasibility of this system, especially because of the                       
limited enthusiasm of States to reform the current system. These                   
concerns do not lack legitimacy; the EU proposal for the tenure of judges                         
disregards one of the most popular features of investment arbitration:                   
party selection. Also, the establishment of an Investment court would                   314
require renegotiation of the existing investment instruments, which could                 
not happen overnight. A good middle­ground solution could be the                   
adoption of an opt­in Convention, similar to the recent Mauritius                   
Convention on Transparency, which would extend such a permanent                 315
mechanism to States’ existing obligations. As a whole, the adoption of a                       
standing Investment Court in subsequent FTAs could form the basis for                     






If the text of the investment treaties remains vague, it cannot give                       
the tribunals enough direction on interpretation. This is why the                   
Relating to Sustainable Development;, ILA Resolution 3/2002, in International Law                   
Association Report of the 70th Conference (New Delhi 2002) (ILA 2002) Principle 16;                         
G Van Harten, (n 76). 
314 C Giorgetti, ‘Who Decides Who Decides in International Investment Arbitration?’,                     
(2014) 35(2)  University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 431, at 437. 




improvement of the profile of arbitrators alone seems insufficient. Rather,                   
a revision of international instruments should be pursued. 
 
As discussed in Section 2.2.1.2, new generation FTAs have shown                   
attempts of clarification, such as the inclusion of expropriation annexes                   
and the narrowing of the scope of FET and MFN treatment.                     316 317
However, as already remarked, their wording is still vague, making it                     
difficult for arbitrators to strike the right balance between the interests of                       
foreign investors and the public interest of States. IIA models released by                       
NGOs, international organizations and governments, such as the 2005                 
International Agreement on Investment and Sustainable Development             
model, the 2012 Southern African Development Community (SADC)               
Model BIT, the 2015 Indian Model BIT, and the 2015 UN IPFSD, could                         
be of help in aligning IIA substantive standards with the SDGs. States’                       
model BITs are important, as they reflect a government’s negotiating                   
position for future IIAs and serve as a means to achieve coherence in                         
State treaty practice. Despite the need to compromise some of their                     
terms, States usually use their model BITs as the basis for their                       
subsequent investment agreements negotiations. Model BITs prepared             318
316 CETA art 8.10; EU­Singapore FTA art 9.4; EU­Vietnam FTA Chapter 8­II, Section 2,                           
art 14. 
317 For an explanation of the MFN standard see n 208. TPP art 9.5(3); CETA art 8.7(4);                                 
and EU­Vietnam FTA Chapter 8­II, Section I, art 4. The EU­Singapore FTA omits the                           
standard. 




by NGOs and international organizations are even more significant for                   
sustainable development; as the result of the collective work of experts in                       
international law, these templates identify the shortcomings of the current                   
investment regime and provide a new direction consistent with the                   
requirements of the global economy. Although it is quite difficult to                     
evaluate the actual practical significance of these models, they seem to                     
have influenced State treaty practice, with a number of treaties borrowing                     
concepts identified in, for example, the IISD Model. Clarifying the                   319
non­discrimination standards, model BITs set criteria for the               
interpretation of the identical treatment of foreign and local investors in                     
‘like circumstances’ , a concept that remains undefined in new generation                   
FTAs. One of the criteria provided by the IISD and SADC Models is the                           
investment’s  ‘effects upon the local, regional or national environment' ;                 
similarly, the Indian Model BIT refers to  ‘the actual and potential impact                       
of the investment on … the local community, or the environment’ . The                       320
adoption of this criterion in future IIAs could prevent ISDS claims when,                       
for example, a government refuses to issue an emission permit to a                       
319 A De Mestral and C Lévesque,  Improving International Investment Agreements                     
(Routledge, 2013), at 20. 
320 International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), IISD Model International                   
Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development; (2005)             
< https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment_model_int_agreement.pdf > (IISD Model     
BIT), art 5(EB); Southern African Development Community, ‘SADC Model Bilateral                   
Investment Treaty Template with Commentary’ (adopted July 2012)               
< http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp­content/uploads/2012/10/sadc­model­bit­template­final.pdf




foreign corporation for a location where existing investors have                 
exhausted the receptive capacity of the ecosystem. Turning to FET, the                     321
most problematic issue from a sustainable development perspective is the                   
protection of the  ‘legitimate expectations’ of investors. Lacking               
definition, this broad concept indirectly restricts States’ ability to change                   
or introduce public interest policies that may have a negative impact on                       
foreign investors. Interestingly, all IIA models omit investors’  ‘legitimate                 
expectations’ from the FET standard. Although  advisable, it seems rather                   
unlikely that the  'legitimate expectations' provision would disappear from                 
future investment agreements. If the concept were to be maintained, the                     
TPP approach could be follow ed, where  ‘legitimate expectations’ cover                 
only the binding written assurances provided to investors by                 
governments . Similarly, they have left out the  ‘rare circumstances’                 322
condition from the indirect expropriation clause, providing that               
regulatory measures applied to protect public health, safety and the                   
environment never constitute an indirect expropriation. Unlike new               323
generation FTAs, IIA models do not restrict the use of performance                     324
321 The term ‘receptive’ capacity refers to the size of the population that can be                             
supported indefinitely upon the available resources and services of an ecosystem. See                       
http://www.sustainablemeasures.com/node/33 (last access 7 August 2018). 
322 TPP fn 36. See also  Total S.A. v Argentine Republic,  ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01,,                             
Decision on Liability (27 December 2010), para 117;  Grand River Enterprises Six                       
Nations Ltd, et al v United States of America (UNCITRAL), Award (12 January 2011),                           
para 141. 





requirements, and Article 7.4 of the SADC Model BIT calls for foreign                       
corporations to train and employ nationals of the host State. Article 26 of                         
the IISD Model BIT also provides an indicative list of performance                     
requirements that the host States may impose  ‘to promote domestic                   
development benefits from investments’ . These performance           325
requirements could help materialize expected spill­over effects from               
foreign investment, such as employment for skilled domestic and                 
indigenous workers, protection of local sensitive industries, or               
productivity improvement. Moreover, their imposition on investors             326
could help achieve SDG 9.5, asking for the promotion of  ‘scientific                     
research … technological capabilities of industrial sectors in all                 
countries, in particular developing countries by 2030, encouraging               
innovation and substantially increasing the number of research and                 
development workers’ . Finally, IIAs could provide for the mandatory                 327
conduct of sustainable development impact assessments. Envisioned by               
the IIA models, impact assessments could ensure the establishment of                   328
investments that clearly contribute to the SDGs. 
 
According to SDG 16.3, countries should  ‘promote the rule of law                     









should ensure the more active participation of interested parties, both                   
disputing and third parties alike. Investment arbitration has been                 
developed as a one­way street, allowing only investors to file claims.                     
States rarely assert counterclaims, although both ICSID and UNCITRAL                 
Arbitration Rules envision them. The practice of tribunals has so far                     330
been to deny jurisdiction because of the lack of explicit consent in most                         
IIAs. As seen in Section 2.3.3, a recent approach, introduced in                     331
Reisman’s dissenting opinion in the  Roussalis case, and adopted by the                     
tribunal in  Goetz and  Metal­Tech cases, suggests that the investor’s                   
consent to counterclaims is already implied by the consent to arbitration                     
itself, without a need for explicit treaty reference. However, it is not                       332
apparent that tribunals would be inclined to change their practice in this                       
direction. The best solution would be the clarification of the term                     
‘disputes’ to encompass both claims and counterclaims, or the explicit                   333
broadening of the consent to arbitrate on counterclaims. Turning to third                     
330 ICSID Convention (n 119), art 46; United Nations Commission on International                       
Trade Law , UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as revised in 2010 (adopted by UNGA,                         
'UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as Revised in 2010', UN Doc A/Res 65/22, (10 January                         
2011)),  art 21(3). 
331 See, e.g.,  Oxus Gold plc v Republic of Uzbekistan  (Final Award) (17 December 2015)                             
(UNCITRAL) IIC 779 (2015). 
332 Spyridon Roussalis v Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/06/1, Award (7 December                       
2011);  Antoine  Goetz v Republic of Burundi, ICSID Case No ARB/01/2, Award (21                         
June 2012);  Metal­Tech Ltd. v Republic of Uzbekistan , ICSID Case No ARB/10/3,                       
Award (4 October 2013), para 409. 




party participation, the concept of  amicus curiae briefs is now                   
incorporated in post­2015 FTAs. The wording of the provisions shows,                   334
however, that tribunals still have significant latitude in the acceptance of                     
these claims ( ‘the tribunal may accept’ ). So far, arbitrators have not been                       
willing to deliver participation rights beyond the filing of written                   
submissions. The only exception was in the  Piero Foresti case, where                     335
the tribunal also allowed  amici curiae to access case materials. A                     336
reform of new generation IIAs to grant full participation rights, explicitly                     
allowing third parties to attend and make oral submissions at the                     
hearings, could be beneficial. Full participation should not be limited to                     
amici curiae . Sustainable development requires fair representation of all                 
affected stakeholders. For this reason, individuals or local communities                 337
facing labour, human rights or environmental violations by investors,                 
should be allowed to effectively join or even initiate ISDS proceedings. 
 
Lastly, the sustainable development component could be             
strengthened through the selection of suitable arbitral rules under which                   
IIA parties will settle their dispute. All new generation FTAs provide an                       
334 TPP art 9.23(3); CETA Annex 29­A(43­46); TTIP proposal art 23(5). 
335 Bastin (n 135), at 140­141. 
336 Piero Foresti and Others v Republic of South Africa , ICSID Case No                         
ARB(AF)/07/01, Letter from ICSID regarding non­disputing parties (5 October 2009),                   
at 2. 
337 J A Van Duzer, P Simons and G Mayeda,  Integrating Sustainable Development into                           




indicative list, allowing investors to submit a claim under any other rules,                       
if the disputing parties agree. The choice of specialized arbitration                   338
rules could aid in ensuring that the process is properly adapted to the                         
issues raised in these disputes, especially when it comes to disputes with                       
environmental components, which involve complex technical matters. In               
2001, the Permanent Court of Arbitration developed the Optional Rules                   
for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to the Environment and/or Natural                   
Resources. These rules provide for the use of arbitrators with expertise on                       
the subject matter. They also allow tribunals to request a non­technical                     339
document explaining any scientific information, or appoint experts. So                 340
far, no known ISDS case has been settled under the PCA Environmental                       
Rules. Nevertheless, they could offer a sound alternative for the                   
settlement of disputes with sustainable development implications. 
 
Even reformed, ISDS may not be the most appropriate means to                     
further sustainable development. Domestic litigation could secure             
broader access to justice, protecting the rights of stakeholders neglected                   
by the ISDS regime. Despite the concerns of partiality, domestic courts                     
338 TPP art 9.19(4); CETA art 8.23(2); EU­Singapore FTA art 9.16(1); EU­Vietnam FTA                         
Chapter 8­II, Section 3, Sub­Section 3, art 7(2)(d). 
339 Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes                       







could enhance investors’ accountability and prevent them from receiving                 
benefits beyond those provided to domestic investors. IIA models                 
enhance the role of domestic courts, requiring exhaustion of local                   
remedies before accessing ISDS. Conciliation and meditation, already               341
provided by new generation FTAs, may also be sound alternatives.                   342
Being less expensive than ISDS, they could be more accessible to                     







The interaction between international investment law and             
sustainable development should no longer be disputed. Whether this                 
interaction poses a problem or an opportunity depends on from which                     
side of the spectrum we are looking at it. 
 
The current practice of investment tribunals shows that they are                   
reluctant to engage in the discussion and consider the sensitivity of                     
sustainable development­related claims. However, the policies emerging             
341 IISD Model (n 320), art 5.2; SADC Model Bit (n 320), art 28.4(a); Indian Model BIT                                 
(n 264), art 14.3(i­ii). 





with the negotiation and conclusion of new generation FTAs may alter                     
the situation. These instruments include more explicit and implicit                 
references to the principle in their preambles, sustainable               
development­related chapters and investment chapters. Arbitrators may             
fill the gaps of the investment treaties, using the interpretative tools they                       
have at their disposal, and assist in the promotion of sustainable                     
development. 
 
However, it is not apparent that investment tribunals alone would                   
change their practice in this regard. A reform of the current investment                       
arbitration regime is necessary for the creation of a stable and sustainable                       
development­friendly environment. This could be achieved by improving               
the profile of arbitrators, by incorporating people of more nationalities                   
and different backgrounds in the investment tribunals, as well as by                     
redrafting investment instruments to include substantive treaty provisions               
that better reflect the principle. These reforms seem both economically                   
and politically plausible. They do not require an alteration of the                     
investment regime altogether, which would be a difficult task. They                   
rather suggest adjustments directed towards taking sustainable             
development into account, which would respond to the challenges posed                   
by IIAs. Despite potential criticism against the feasibility of the                   
measures, let us not forget that steps which in the past appeared utopian,                         
such as introducing transparency in IIAs and the arbitration system, today                     
are established facts. These reforms are aimed at governments, but could                     
successfully materialize only with the effective support of NGOs and                   
136 
 
international organizations, who, with their expertise, would be able to                   
provide technical assistance, analytical support and assist in consensus                 
building. This has been already recognized by governments, who                 344
entrusted UNCTAD to play a lead role in the facilitation of the IIA                         
reform by organizing multi­stakeholder meetings and consultations with               
member States. UNCITRAL also mandated a working group to                 345
undertake related work. However, even if reformed, the suitability of                   346





344 UNCTAD,  Reform of the IIA Regime: Four Paths of Action and a Way Forward ,                             
Issues Note, No 3, UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2014/6 (UNCTAD 2014), at 5 and 8. 
345 UNGA ‘Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on                       
Financing for Development (Addis Ababa Action Agenda)’ UN Doc A/RES/69/313 (17                     
August 2015), para 91. 
346 UNGA ‘Report of Working Group III (Investor­State Dispute Settlement Reform) on                       











International investment law is one of the fastest growing and                   
most controversial spheres of international law. Despite being a branch of                     
public international law, it exhibits a peculiar mixture of public­law and                     
private­law features which makes it interesting among scholars and civil                   
society. Especially the direct involvement of corporations in the process                   
of ISDS has generated the question of whether investors could qualify as                       
subjects of international law. The ISDS mechanism and the proliferation                   
of investor claims the past few years has also led to concerns that the                           
current system creates a favorable legal environment for corporations                 
vis­à­vis States. Critics say that foreign investors receive great protection,                   
while have few – if any­ duties. On the other hand, the investment regime                           
is believed not only to expose States to financial risks, but also to                         
negatively impact the environment, labour and human rights and have                   
implications for right of governments to regulate for these (or other)                     
public purpose interests. In response to this so­called 'regulatory chill',                   
States have embarked on a path of reforming their existing IIAs. BITs                       
138 
 
have lost their dynamism and States started following a new approach to                       
regulate investment: the conclusion of broader regional FTAs with                 
investment rules contained therein. The wave of new FTAs, concluded                   
and being negotiated after 2015, attempt to address the concerns by                     
refining investment standards and including expansive chapters on issues                 
traditionally not regulated by economic agreements, namely sustainable               
development, environment and labour.   
 
Focusing on the new trend of regionalism, this thesis has                   
attempted to detect the legal standing of investors, by asking what rights                       
the new­generation FTAs confer and what obligations – if any – they                       
impose to investors, as well as what rights States 're­gain' with the                       







The first Chapter is devoted to the Introduction of this thesis,                     
which opened with a historical background and describes the evolution of                     
the international investment regime, and then provided a theoretical                 
understanding of the 'international subjectivity' theories and the way that                   





Turning to the main text of this thesis, Chapter 2 attempted to                       
draw the picture of how the acceleration of regional FTAs has turned out                         
to be a ‘battle’ between corporations and States on who will take up the                           
slack. It observed that regionalism presents us with a paradox; on the one                         
hand, the IIAs concluded or negotiated reaffirm the strengthened role of                     
investors in international investment law, by providing to them higher                   
standards of protection and easier access to ISDS. The broad investment                     
standards of FET, indirect expropriation and MFN have not been                   
sufficiently tightened, but, on the contrary, definitions of investor and                   
investment have been expanded to encompass elements so far not                   
covered, such as intellectual property rights. Furthermore, these new                 
treaties still do not safeguard the right of States to regulate; although                       
some provisions have been inserted to their text in order to secure this                         
right, such as for example the GATT­like general exception clauses, none                     
of them seem able to provide substantial protection. The incorporation of                     
investment in regional FTAs has also resulted to its interaction with other                       
FTA chapters, such as the intellectual property and the financial services                     
and taxation chapters, sliding intellectual property and financial               
violations into ISDS. More specifically, the intellectual property chapters                 
of all post­2015 FTAs became more stringent, extending patent and                   
copyright protections beyond the TRIPS limit. This fact, in conjunction                   
with the inclusion of intellectual property to the definition of covered                     
investment, make the respective chapter applicable to investment               
arbitration. This strengthens the status of investors and could indicate an                     
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avalanche of ISDS claims with intellectual property components in the                   
future. Turning to the financial services chapters, post­2015 FTAs                 
incorporate investment provisions into the latter and include bonds in the                     
definition of investment. Therefore, although some limited carve­outs are                 
provided, investors could generally use these chapters as a basis of their                       
ISDS claims. Finally, the new IIAs move further towards strictly                   
regulating sensitive for States sectors such as SOEs.  
 
On the other hand, Chapter 2 demonstrated that States are trying                     
to  ‘re­engage with the investment treaty system’ . A small group of                     347
countries has taken drastic measures by either terminating IIAs altogether                   
giving competence to domestic courts or opting out from ISDS and                     
promoting SSDS. Mainly, attempts to limit investors’ influence have                 
been made through reform of regional treaties; the new IIAs enhance                     
transparency by explicitly referencing the  UNCITRAL Rules on               
Transparency  and incorporating clauses permitting third­party           
participation. They also embellish ISDS with safeguards such as                 
counterclaims and allocation of costs to the losing party, which could                     
prevent investors from bringing too many claims. In the search for a                       
more predictable environment, some agreements are also introducing               







to adopt binding authoritative interpretations, amending the rules of the                   
agreement and appointing the members of tribunals, as well as the                     
establishment of appellate facilities or a standing investment court, which                   
restrict the arbitrators’ latitude to adopt contradictory and               
investor­friendly interpretations. The Chapter has concluded that,             
although some steps were taken towards the balance between investors                   
rights and States' interests, regionalism ultimately led to a further                   
fragmentation, which serves as a ‘sweet spot’ for investors. 
 
In Chapter 3, the discussion of the reforms of new­generation                   
FTAs was extended. The Chapter focused on the question of whether                     
these agreements are able to mitigate the concerns expressed that the                     
investment regime neglects the sustainable development interests of               
States. In order to reply that question, the current practice of investment                       
tribunals when faced with sustainable development­related – mainly               
environmental and human rights – claims was assessed. The analysis of                     
the respective investment jurisprudence demonstrated that the responses               
of arbitrators to such issues lack consistency; despite some positive steps                     
towards the consideration of sustainable development­related claims,             
most tribunals are still reluctant to engage in the discussion and, if they                         
do, they only assess such claims as part of the factual analysis rather than                           
as questions of law. Afterwards, the sustainable­development language of                 
FTAs was examined. The Chapter observed that all treaties include more                     
explicit and implicit references to the principle in their preambles and                     
investment chapters and they also incorporate environmental, labor and                 
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sustainable development chapters. However, they do not provide a clear                   
normative environment for sustainable development, still leaving great               
leeway to arbitrators for their interpretation. Therefore, the examination                 
of the interpretative tools at the disposal of investment tribunals which                     
could be used for the promotion of sustainable development was                   
essential. In this realm, the Chapter assessed under which circumstances                   
arbitrators could apply the ‘clean hands’ doctrine to examine the legality                     
of an investment, as well as whether they could reject jurisdiction for                       
investments that do not contribute to the development of the host State.                       
In a second stage, it reflected on whether arbitrators could rely on other                         
international agreements, soft­law, and customary international law             
principles in their interpretation and concluded that this is permissible                   
under the ‘governing law’ provisions of FTAs.  
 
In the second Section of Chapter 3 it was argued that further                       
improvement of the IIAs to reflect sustainable development objectives is                   
needed and some recommendations that would render the international                 
investment regime more sustainable development friendly were made.               
First, it was claimed that an expansion of the pool of arbitrators is                         
essential, to encompass people of more nationalities, gender and ages and                     
with broader qualifications. The proposal of replacing ISDS  ad hoc                   
arbitrators with tenured judges of an Investment Court System was also                     
examined and the conclusion was that, although it could be beneficial to                       
sustainable development, it may not be feasible. Then, it was suggested                     
that new­generation IIAs could follow the example of the 2005                   
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International Agreement on Investment and Sustainable Development             
model, the SADC Model BIT, the 2015 Indian Model BIT, and the 2015                         
UN IPFSD and adjust their substantive standards and provisions for                   
amici curiae briefs accordingly. Finally, it was remarked that selecting                   
specialized arbitral rules or turning to other dispute settlement methods,                   







The above analysis has demonstrated that, overall, regionalism               
fell short of the expectations, bestowing on investors even broader rights                     
than the BIT treaty regime did. Whether these robust rights elevate them                       
to traditional subjects of international law is rather ambivalent, but this is                       
'like a finger pointing at the moon and we are concentrating on the                         
finger'. International subjectivity is a technical and and formally                 
constructed concept which creates  'sterile' debates and may not be in                     348
conformity with the changing realities of the international legal scene.                   
What is sure is that there is a growing body of international norms                         
dealing with corporations and their investors, which makes the latter                   





involved in investment dispute settlement but also indirectly contributing                 
to investment law­making. This increasing important role of corporations                 
further accentuates the need of reducing the discrepancy between their                   
robust rights and potential to frustrate the protection of environment,                   
human and social rights and and the inability to hold them liable of                         
abuses of these public goods. Noteworthy in this respect are the efforts                       349
of the post­2015 FTAs, especially with the references to corporate social                     
responsibility (CSR) and their strive to bring sustainable development to                   
the forefront of investment regulation. However, the duties imposed to                   
investors under the CSR articles and the sustainable development                 
chapters still have the form of 'soft law'. For the recalibration of the                         
balance between the protection of investors and the interests of States,                     
these norms should evolve into a developed system of hard­law                   
liabilities. The timing for this shift is more than perfect; in late 2017,                         
UNCITRAL received a broad mandate by governments to work on the                     














modernizing old­generation IIAs. Both forums, through consultations             351
with governments and other interested stakeholders, should stress the                 
significance of imposing binding obligations to investors and identify                 
whether the reforms could be better materialized through bilateral,                 
regional, or multilateral investment regime (as proposed by the EU)  .                   352
The contribution of scholars in this regard could be of paramount                     
importance. Academic literature should critically assess the EU proposal                 
for the set­up of a Multilateral Investment Court, provide enlightening                   
insight on benefits and problems of regionalism  vis­à­vis multilateralism,                 
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Over the past few years, we face a phase of ‘re- orientation’ of international 
investment law. The 1990s rush of conclusion of bilateral investment treaties 
is slowing down and gives way to the negotiations at the regional level. This 
era of transition from investment bilateralism to regionalism presents us with 
a paradox, which has revived the question of the legal status of multinational 
corporations. On the one hand, the mega- regional Free Trade Agreements con-
cluded and being negotiated advance the protection of investors and facilitate 
their access to Investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS). On the other hand, 
States attempt to react to investors’ growing power either by opting out from 
ISDS or by reforming investment standards to better reflect their interests. This 
article reviews this ‘battle’ of predominance and argues that regionalism has not 
been suitable to resolve it. Nevertheless, the drafting of a multilateral investment 
treaty, although it could serve as a ‘golden mean’ between States and investors, 
still raises concerns and still seems as a farfetched idea.
RÉSUMÉ
Au cours des dernières années, nous sommes confrontés à une phase de « réo-
rientation » du droit international des investissements. La ruée vers la conclusion 
des traités bilatéraux d’investissement des années 1990 ralentit en ce moment, et 
cède la place aux négociations au niveau régional. Cette ère de passage du bilaté-
ralisme au régionalisme constitue un paradoxe qui a relancé la question du statut 
juridique des sociétés multinationales. D’une part, les accords méga- régionaux 
de libre- échange conclus et négociés favorisent la protection des investisseurs et 
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facilitent leur accès au Mécanisme de règlement des différends entre investisseurs 
et États (RDIE). D’autre part, les États tentent de réagir au pouvoir grandissant 
des investisseurs, soit en décidant de ne pas adhérer au RDIE, soit en réformant 
les normes d’investissement pour mieux refléter leurs intérêts. Le présent article 
examine cette « bataille » de prédominance et soutient que le régionalisme n’a pas 
pu résoudre. Néanmoins, la rédaction d’un traité d’investissement multilatéral, 
quoiqu’elle puisse constituer le juste milieu entre les États et les investisseurs, 
soulève encore des préoccupations et semble une idée farfelue.
I. — INTRODUCTION
International investment law is one of the most dynamic and remarka-
bly transformed fields of international law of the past decades. In response 
to globalization and due to a widespread belief among States that foreign 
direct investment (FDI) would promote their economic growth, FDI flows 
started increasing over time and today are at their highest ever level. (1) This 
boost, together with the expansion of the international activities of multi-
national corporations, made clear the need for an international normative 
framework. Codification at the multilateral level has been attempted several 
times, without success. (2) Instead, international investment law has been 
enshrined mainly in bilateral investment treaties (BITs) between States and 
investors, (3) and less in other International Investment Agreements (IIAs).
The emergence of this system poses challenges to the classical interna-
tional legal order, with the State sovereignty principle starting to ebb away 
and the gradual departure of the idea that States are the only participants 
of international law. Although the discussion about the legal status of the 
multinationals is not a novel one, the substantial and procedural rights con-
ferred to investors through BITs have enhanced the idea of their ‘interna-
tional subjectivity’. (4) Especially the inclusion of the Investor-State Dispute 
 (1) 36% in 2015 to an estimated US$1.7 trillion. See UNCTAD, Global Investment Trend Monitor, 
No. 22 (UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2016/1).
 (2) In 1968 and 1998 by OECD members, see Organization for Economic Co- operation and Devel-
opment (OECD), Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, Oct. 12, 1967, O.E.C.D. 
No. 23081, 7 I.L.M. 117 (1968); OECD, Negotiating Group on the Multilateral Agreement on Invest-
ment (MAI), Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Draft Consolidated Text, OECD Doc. DAFFE/
MAI(98)7/REVI (22 Apr. 1998). In 2004 during the WTO Doha Development Round, see Doha 
Working Program, Decision adopted by the Genera Council, on 1 August 2004 (“July Package”), 
WTO doc. WT/L/579 para 1 lit. g, 2 August 2004.
 (3) By April 2015, the IIA regime had grown close to 3,300 treaties. See UNCTAD, World Invest-
ment Report 2015 — Reforming International Investment Governance (UNCTAD/WIR/2015), p. 124
 (4) A. CASSESE, International Law in a Divided World, Clarendon, 1986, p. 123; P. MUCHLINSKI, 
“Corporations in International Law”, in R. WOLFRUM (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, OUP, 2010; J. E. Alvarez, “Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?”, 
Santa Clara Journal of International Law, Vol. 9, 2011, p. 31; M. PENTIKÄINEN, “Changing Inter-
national ‘Subjectivity’ and Rights and Obligations under International Law — Status of Corpo-
rations”, Utrecht Law Review, Vol. 8, 2012, pp. 145-153; J. G. KU, “The limits of Corporate Rights 
Under International Law”, Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 12, Issue 1, 2012, pp. 741-745.
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Settlement mechanism (ISDS), which allows investors to sue States before 
international tribunals, and the proliferation of such claims over the past 
few years (5) could serve as an argument for the recognition of corporations’ 
legal personality by States. (6)
Today the interest in the discussion stands at its peak, as we face an era of 
‘re- orientation’ of international investment law with a shift towards regional-
ism. (7) The linkage between investment and trade has created a tendency 
of adopting a holistic approach to deal with them; the traditional bilateral 
regime is losing ground and States are starting to integrate investment 
chapters in regional Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), following older models 
such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This shift has 
been accompanied by promises of governments that these agreements would 
achieve a better balance between the protection of investors and the rights of 
States. (8) With several new- generation IIAs ‘under construction’, crucial 
questions arise. Have States kept this promise? Do the new agreements guar-
antee the regulatory power of States or do they strengthen the role of multi-
national corporations in the international forum? Does regionalism have the 
anticipated results? What will be the future of international investment law?
The present article’s purpose is to identify the ‘standing’ of multinational 
corporations in the international investment legal arena during this phase of 
evolution. In the first part, the growing power of investors will be discussed 
and a comparison between existing and recently concluded or negotiated 
IIAs will be drawn, (9) with special focus on their ISDS provisions. In 
the second part, the ‘reaction’ of States to this increased strength and their 
attempts to restrict it will be analyzed. The third part will contribute with 
reflections on the results of regionalism and on the future of international 
investment law, assessing whether the conclusion of a multilateral invest-
ment treaty would be the appropriate and most plausible way to balance the 
rights between investors and States.
 (5) Total number of 696 ISDS claims, see http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/isds (accessed 
15 July 2016).
 (6) For ‘recognition theory’, see R. PORTMANN, Legal Personality in International Law, Cambridge 
University Press, 2010, pp. 80-125.
 (7) UNCTAD, supra note 3, pp. 107-108 and 124-125.
 (8) European Commission, Investment Protection and Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement in 
EU agreements, Fact Sheet, 11 November 2013.
 (9) The article intends to investigate the activities of a wide range of States and examine IIAs 
considered as trendsetters. For this purpose the Trans- Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), 
the EU- Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), and Australia-China 
FTA (signed), the EU- Singapore FTA, EU- Vietnam FTA (negotiations concluded) and the Trans-
atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) (in negotiation) will be analyzed.
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II. — NEW- GENERATION IIAS AS A REAFFIRMATION 
OF INVESTORS’ GROWING POWER
In order to meet the concerns expressed about the inadequacy of the cur-
rent investment regime to preserve the regulatory activities of States, (10) 
the mega- regional FTAs were revisited to address existing flaws. This Section 
will examine whether the amendments made were substantial and whether 
they augment the role of investors in international investment law.
A. — Broad Investment Provisions
1. — Investment and investor definition
Wide investor protection can already be observed in the first article of the 
investment chapters of new FTAs, the definitions.
Rather than following NAFTA’s exhaustive list of covered investments 
and explicit exclusion of certain types of assets, (11) the new treaties adopt 
a more investor- friendly, loose approach. (12) They define investment as 
‘every kind of assets’ and then provide an indicative list, which is long and 
vague, encompassing controversial portfolio investments (13) and intellec-
tual property rights. In order to avoid expansive interpretations in ISDS, 
they set out certain characteristics that assets should have to qualify as 
investments. But the list is again indicative (‘such as’), giving latitude to 
tribunals to stretch the scope of investment.
The definitions of investor are also quite broad and follow the NAFTA 
model, (14) covering the Party itself, natural and legal persons and granting 
them pre- establishment rights (‘that seeks to make … an investment’). (15) 
Some IIAs include a denial of benefit clause for enterprises that do not have 
‘substantial business activities’ or are not ‘directly or indirectly owned or 
controlled by a natural person’ of the Party. (16) Although useful additions, 
the meaning of these concepts is not spelled out in the agreements. They, 
 (10) See F. L. GARCIA et al., “Reforming the International Investment Regime: Lessons from 
International Trade Law”, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 18, Issue 4, 2015, p. 861-892.
 (11) NAFTA Art. 1139.
 (12) TPP Art. 9.1, ChAFTA Art. 9.1(d), EU- Singapore FTA Art. 9.1(1), EU- Vietnam FTA 
Art. 8.4(p), CETA Art. 8.1, TTIP proposal Definitions.
 (13) Previous IIAs have excluded portfolio investments from covered investments: 
D. GAUKRODGER, Investment Treaties and Shareholder Claims: Analysis of Treaty Practice, OECD 
Working Papers on International Investment, No. 2014/03, OECD Publishing, 2014, pp. 12-13.
 (14) NAFTA Art. 1139, TPP Art. 9.1, ChAFTA Art. 9.1(e), EU- Singapore FTA Art. 9.1(2), 
EU- Vietnam FTA Art. 8.4(q), CETA Art. 8.1.
 (15) TPP Art. 9.1(ft12) limits the pre- establishment rights to investors that have taken ‘concrete 
actions’ to make an investment. Similarly EU- Vietnam FTA Art. 8.4(q)(ft9). EU- Singapore FTA 
does not provide for pre- establishment rights.
 (16) TPP Art. 9.15, ChAFTA Art. 8.17, EU- Singapore FTA Art. 9.1(3)(4), EU- Vietnam FTA 
Art. 8.4(a)(b)(c), CETA Art. 8.1 and 8.16, TTIP proposal Art. 9.
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therefore, do not inspire confidence that they will prevent ‘treaty- shopping’ 
practices from investors with covered subsidiaries. (17)
2. — Substantive standards
The new IIAs were meant to clearly define and circumscribe substantive 
standards. The Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) poses to the host State 
the obligation to treat investments justly. Usually constructed as an open-
ended, without precise meaning standard, it has been turned into an ‘all- 
encompassing’ provision, popular to investors. (18) Concerns about expansive 
interpretations by investment tribunals and lack of predictable results, (19) 
put it at the core of the investment regime reform. Interestingly, the drafting 
of the standard in mega- regional FTAs follows divergent approaches. Nev-
ertheless, none of them seems to sufficiently address the concerns. The new 
EU IIAs narrow FET’s scope providing a closed, exhaustive list of States’ 
obligations, (20) but they do not prohibit the protection of investors to go 
beyond the customary international law (CIL) on the treatment of aliens. 
They also protect ‘specific representations’ and ‘legitimate expectations’ 
of investors. These concepts re- introduce a disguised umbrella clause, (21) 
as contractual obligations between States and investors could be elevated 
to treaty obligations, which could promote corporate favoritism. (22) On 
the other hand, the US agreements have always linked FET with CIL. (23) 
TPP is no exception and Article 9.6 explicitly refers to CIL as the standard 
of treatment to be afforded to investments. In theory, this approach could 
better protect States’ regulatory authority. ISDS panels, though, have not 
been always eager to apply CIL basing it in State practice and opinio juris; 
instead they usually cite decisions of previous tribunals, rendering the dis-
 (17) B. A. MELO ARAUJO, The EU Deep Trade Agenda: Law and Policy, Oxford Studies in Euro-
pean Law, 2016, pp. 117-119.
 (18) Ch. SCHREUER, “Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice”, The Journal of World 
Investment and Trade, Vol. 6, Issue 3, 2005, p. 364. Also see Mondev International Ltd v United States 
of America, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/99/2, Award 11 October 2002, para 118; Waste Management, 
Inc v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/3, Award 30 April 2004, para 99.
 (19) UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International 
Investment Agreements II (UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/5), pp. 10-11.
 (20) EU- Singapore FTA Art. 9.4, EU- Vietnam FTA Art. 8.14, CETA Art. 8.10, TTIP proposal 
Art. 3.
 (21) K. NADAKAVUKAREN SCHEFER, International Investment Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2013, p. 425: “An ‘umbrella clause’ is a BIT provision that extends investor protection to any obli-
gation made by the state with respect to an investment”. Umbrella clauses have been omitted in 
all new IIAs.
 (22) S. SINCLAIR et al., “Making Sense of the CETA: An Analysis of the Final Text of the Canada- 
European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement”, Canadian Centre for Policy 
Alternatives, 2014 p. 17, www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/
National%20Office/2014/09/Making_Sense_of_the_CETA.pdf (accessed 15 July 2016).
 (23) NAFTA Art. 1105(1) and NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation 
of Certain Chap. 11 Provisions (31 July 2001), www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/Commission/CH1 
1understanding_e.asp (accessed 15 July 2016).
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tinction between CIL- linked or non-CIL- linked FET standards relatively 
meaningless. (24) As none of the new FTAs expressly prohibit arbitrators to 
do so, these practices will probably not cease to exist. Finally, despite using 
softer language than EU IIAs, TPP also recognizes that ‘legitimate expecta-
tions’ of investors can be relevant when an infringement is determined. (25)
Indirect expropriation, namely the loss of investors’ expected profits 
because of States’ actions that are not necessarily directed to the investor, is 
the second most- alleged standard in ISDS. Because of its nebulous language 
in BITs and early regional IIAs, (26) tribunals have, over the decades, devel-
oped different tests to regulate it, resulting in contradictory awards. (27) 
Scholars have called for omission of the standard, (28) however, States have 
only moved to a modest reform. On a positive note, mega- regional FTAs add 
an explanatory annex in their investment chapters, which outlines crite-
ria distinguishing indirect expropriation from non- compensable regulatory 
actions. (29) The wording of the texts, though, comes to undermine these 
changes; regulatory actions can still amount to expropriation ‘in rare circum-
stances’, which gives great leeway to the tribunals for interpretation. The 
provision of the ‘case-by-case’ determination of whether an expropriation 
has occurred has a similar effect. In some agreements, the ‘reasonable expec-
tations’ of investors are inserted in the scope of indirect expropriation, (30) 
which, as discussed in the FET analysis above, could be a deterrent to States’ 
right to regulate.
The Most- Favored-Nation (MFN) standard ensures that, in like circum-
stances, an investor will be accorded the same treatment as investors from 
any third country. Over the years, corporations have relied upon MFN clauses 
in order to import into ISDS more beneficial substantive or procedural pro-
visions from third treaties that the host State is a member to. Investment 
 (24) Railroad Development Corporation (RDC) v Republic of Guatemala, ICSID case no 
ARB/07/23, Award 29 June 2012. See also UNCTAD supra note 18, pp. 11-12 and 44-58; and 
M. C. PORTERFIELD, “A Distinction Without a Difference? The Interpretation of Fair and Equi-
table Treatment Under Customary International Law by Investment Tribunals”, Investment Treaty 
News, Vol. 3, Issue 3, 2013, www.iisd.org/pdf/2013/iisd_itn_march_2013_en.pdf (accessed 15 July 
2016).
 (25) L. JOHNSON and L. SACHS, “The TPP’s Investment Chapter: Entrenching, rather than 
reforming, a flawed system”, Columbia Center on Sustainable Development, 2015, p. 4, http://ccsi.
columbia.edu/files/2015/11/TPP- entrenching-flaws-21-Nov-FINAL.pdf. (accessed 15 July 2015).
 (26) NAFTA Art. 1110.
 (27) Metalclad Corporation v The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1, Award 
30 August 2000 and different approach in Methanex Corporation v United States of America, UNCI-
TRAL, Award 3 August 2005.
 (28) V. BEEN and J. C. BEAUVAIS, “The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s Investment Inter-
national ‘Regulatory Takings’ Doctrine”, New York University Law Review, Vol. 78, 2003, p. 37; 
P. D. ISAKOFF, “Defining the Scope of Indirect Expropriation for International Investments”, 
Global Business Law Review, Vol. 3, 2013, p. 200.
 (29) TPP Annex 9-B, EU- Singapore FTA Annex 9-A and 9-C, EU- Vietnam FTA Annex 9-A X, 
CETA Annex 8-A
 (30) TPP Annex 9-B(3aii), CETA Annex 8-A(2c).
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tribunals, through their interpretation, have allowed this importation. (31) 
States have acknowledged the ‘cherry- picking’ nature of MFN (32) and have 
taken steps for the restriction of this practice. However, only EU- Singapore 
FTA totally omits the standard. TPP Article 9.5(3) excludes ISDS proce-
dures from MFN, meaning that investors cannot use the standard to benefit 
from jurisdictional clauses of other IIAs. However, they will be still able to 
attract substantive guarantees, such as more favorable FET and expropri-
ation treatment. CETA and EU- Vietnam, at first glance, exclude both the 
importation of procedural and substantive provisions. They create, never-
theless, a loophole; they still allow MFN treatment to be used for ‘measures 
adopted by a Party pursuant to such (substantive) obligations’, (33) leaving 
an open door for investors to invoke these measures, and consequently MFN, 
in ISDS. Be that as it may, critics have argued that the maintenance of MFN 
in IIAs itself nullifies the attempts of clarification of the other substantive 
standards. (34)
B. — Right to Regulate
National sovereignty is an important principle of international law and is 
translated to the right of States to regulate. However, the increase of ISDS 
claims against States’ measures on issues of public interest, and the pro- 
investor tendency of tribunals in the adjudication of such cases (35) have 
created a ‘chilling effect’ on governments. (36) Mega- regional FTAs were sup-
posed to better reflect the regulatory power of States, but the final texts leave 
doubts as to whether this goal was successfully met. Purported safeguards 
can be found spread throughout the agreements, but none of them provide 
substantial protection. Some agreements just ‘recognize’ or ‘reaffirm’ (37) 
 (31) For the cases where MFN claims were accepted see A. TOKESER & J. MO, “Drafting MFN 
Clause in Investment Chapter of Trans- Pacific Partnership Agreement”, Trade and Investment 
Law Clinic Papers, Geneva Centre for Trade and Economic Integration, 2012, Annex G.3, pp. 40-44; 
Also Z. DOUGLAS, “The MFN Clause in Investment Arbitration: Treaty Interpretation Off the 
Rails”, Journal of International Dispute Settlement, Vol. 2, Issue 1, 2011, pp. 98, 101.
 (32) European Commission, Consultation on Modalities for Investment Protection and ISDS in 
TTIP, Tradoc 152280, March 2014, p. 4,
 (33) CETA Art. 8.7(4), EU- Vietnam FTA Art. 8.4
 (34) G. VAN HARTEN, “Reforming the System of International Investment Dispute Settlement”, 
in Ch. LENG LIM (ed.), Alternative Visions of the International Law on Foreign Investment: Essays in 
Honour of Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, Cambridge University Press, 2016, pp. 120-121.
 (35) G. Van HARTEN, “Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication (Part Two): An 
Empirical Study of Investment Treaty Arbitration”, Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Vol. 53, Issue 2, 
2016, p. 540.
 (36) L. POULSEN, “Bounded Rationality and the Diffusion of Modern Investment Treaties”, 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 58, 2013, pp. 1 ff; P. J. KUIJPER et al., Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement (ISDS) provisions in the EU’s international investment agreements, Vol. 2, Studies, Euro-
pean Parliament, Directorate- General for External Policies of the Union- Directorate B- Policy 
Department, 2014, p. 74.
 (37) EU- Vietnam FTA Art. 8.13bis, CETA Art. 8.9(1).
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the right to regulate, while others transpose the NAFTA language, stating 
that ‘nothing … shall be construed to prevent’ adoption of measures of pub-
lic interest, if, however these measures are ‘otherwise consistent with this 
Chapter’. (38) This final condition seems to negate any intended protection, 
as it affirms that the right is fully subject to the agreements.
The creation of general exceptions clauses, similar to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT) XX or the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) XIV, has been considered as the preferred way to 
secure the regulatory freedom of States. (39) Indeed such clauses are inserted 
in the new IIAs. However, the exceptions either do not apply at all to the 
investment chapter, as in TPP, or they only apply to certain sections. (40) 
Even where they are applicable to the whole investment chapter, (41) their 
welfare effects are ambiguous; as evidenced by the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) experience, the panels have been reluctant to rule in favor of 
these exceptions, setting highly- demanding levels of proof that a measure is 
‘necessary’ or that it does not amount to the chapeau ‘arbitrary or unjustifi-
able discrimination’. (42) Given tribunals’ pro- investor tendency, we should 
expect same results in ISDS. (43)
Recent trends in investment awards could also endanger the regulatory 
space of States. In Achmea II, for example, the tribunal accepted jurisdiction 
over a claim for a State’s draft regulation, raising questions of when a dispute 
starts to exist and what is the exact scope of the consent to arbitrate. (44) 
These questions remain unresolved; the new IIAs neither explicitly state 
that a dispute cannot be extended to pre- emptive claims, nor provide that 
the consent to arbitrate only applies to existing breaches. Although IIAs do 
not prescribe past decisions as binding, the de facto precedent practices of 
tribunals may establish the future acceptance of such claims. (45)
 (38) NAFTA Art. 1114, TPP Art. 9.16.
 (39) R. SAPPIDEEN and L. HE, “Dispute Resolution in Investment Treaties: Balancing the Rights 
of Investors and Host States”, Journal of World Trade Law, Vol. 49, Issue 1, 2015.
 (40) TPP Art. 29.1, CETA Art. 28.3(1, 2) not applicable to expropriation, EU- Singapore FTA 
Art. 9.3(3) applicable only to National- Treatment.
 (41) ChAFTA Art. 9.8, EU- Vietnam FTA Ch. VII Art. 1.
 (42) See Public Citizen, Only One of 44 Attempts to Use the GATT Article XX/GATS Article XIV 
“General Exception” Has Ever Succeeded: Replicating the WTO Exception, Construct Will Not 
Provide for an Effective TPP General Exception, August 2015, www.citizen.org/ documents/
general- exception.pdf (accessed 16 July 2016).
 (43) A. NEWCOMBE, “General exceptions in international investment agreements”, in 
M.-Cl. SEGGER et al. (eds), Sustainable development in world investment law, Kluwer Law Interna-
tional, 2010, pp. 369-370.
 (44) Achmea B.V. v The Slovak Republic, PCA Case No. 2013-12 (Number 2), Award on Juris-
diction and Admissibility 20 May 2014. Also, L. FRANC- MENGET, ACHMEA II — Seizing Arbitral 
Tribunals to Prevent Likely Future Expropriations: Is it an Option?, Kluwer Arbitration, 28 March 
2013, http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2013/03/28/achmea-ii- seizing-arbitral-tribunals-to-
prevent-likely-future-expropriations-is-it-an-option/ (accessed 16 July 2016).
 (45) P. J. KUIJPER, supra note 35, pp. 66-69
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C. — Intellectual Property as Covered Investment
The inclusion of intellectual property (IP) rights in the investment defini-
tion, although only sporadically seen in BITs and earlier FTAs, (46) is now 
mainstreamed in all new- generation FTAs, (47) inviting investors to invoke 
IP violations before arbitral tribunals. Such claims already appeared in the 
AHS v Niger, Eli Lilly v Canada and Philip Morris v Australia ISDS cases. 
In the absence of explicit qualification of IP rights as covered investments 
in the relevant BITs, tribunals denied jurisdiction to hear such claims. (48) 
Under the new FTAs this will no longer be possible. The exposure of IP rights 
to ISDS has been characterized as a ‘rupture in the fabric of IP law’, (49) 
which have always been settled by State-to-State dispute settlement. Some 
new IIAs partly preserve this norm, removing the issuance of compulsory 
licenses and the ‘revocation, limitation or creation of intellectual property 
rights’ from ISDS. (50) However, these exemptions apply only to the extent 
that the measures are consistent with the Agreement on Trade- Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) or the IP chapter of the 
IIA, conditions that could be easy for investors to surpass. Furthermore, 
the carve-outs are only applicable to expropriation claims, meaning that 
investors can still start proceedings invoking other substantial standards, 
such as FET or National Treatment.
What is more, the new- generation IIAs make IP chapters more stringent, 
introducing ‘TRIPS and NAFTA plus’ provisions. Some treaties extend the 
copyright protection from 50 to 70 years, (51) reform that could impose 
losses on consumers and hinder future innovation. Others weaken the stand-
ards of patentability, facilitating the acquisition of initial patents. For exam-
ple, TPP’s Article 18.37 allows for the patenting not only of new products but 
also of ‘new uses or new methods of using a known product’. Hence, pharma-
ceutical companies will be able to acquire unlimited patents, curtailing access 
to affordable medicine. Likewise, TPP and CETA, although maintaining the 
TRIPS standard that patents last for 20 years from the filing date, de facto 
 (46) See for example the Belgium/Luxembourg BITs with Barbados, Colombia and Oman. Also 
US- Colombia/Peru, Korea and Panama FTAs.
 (47) TPP Art. 9.1(f), ChAFTA Art. 9.1(d)(vi), EU- Singapore FTA Art. 9.1(1)(g), EU- Vietnam 
FTA Art. 8.4.p(vii), CETA Art. 8.1(g), TTIP proposal Definitions x.2(g).
 (48) AHS Niger and Menzies Middle East and Africa S.A. v Republic of Niger, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/11/11, Award 15 July 2013; Eli Lilly and Company v The Government of Canada, UNCI-
TRAL Case No. UNCT/14/2; Philip Morris Asia Limited (Hong Kong) v The Commonwealth of 
Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award 17 December 2015.
 (49) S. FLYNN, How the Leaked TPP ISDS Chapter Threatens Intellectual Property Limita-
tions and Exceptions, Info Justice, 26 March 2015, http://infojustice.org/archives/34189 (accessed 
16 July 2016).
 (50) TPP Art. 9.8(5), EU- Singapore FTA Art. 9.6(3), EU- Vietnam FTA Art. 8.16(4), CETA 
Art. 8.12(5)(6), TTIP proposal Arts 5.6 and 5.7.
 (51) TPP Art. 18.63, EU- Singapore FTA Art. 11.5(4). 50 years in TRIPS Part II, Section I, 
Article 12 and NAFTA Art. 1705(4).
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lengthen their protection, providing for a patent term adjustment to com-
pensate for delays occurring during their registration. (52) CETA further 
secures monopolies by extending the data protection for pharmaceuticals 
from five to eight years. (53) The same treaty gives a right to appeal to 
patent holders, (54) allowing them to maintain market exclusivity, as the 
market approval for generic equivalent medicines is postponed until the 
appeal procedure is over. (55)
The Member States of the IIAs will have to adapt their national legislations 
to reflect these tougher standards, which, in conjunction with the inclusion 
of IP rights in ISDS, could suggest an avalanche of IP claims in the future.
D. — Financial Services and Taxation in ISDS
The Financial Services chapters of IIAs have always been in interaction 
with their Investment chapters. NAFTA’s Article 1401(2), for example, 
incorporates the investment articles regarding transfers, expropriation and 
denial of benefits into its Financial Services chapter. TPP and CETA move 
further, also incorporating the concept of the minimum standard of treat-
ment of investors, (56) enabling financial institutions to bring ISDS claims 
for violations of their ‘legitimate expectations’. A second interaction between 
the two chapters is the question of whether financial investments qualify 
as protected investments. The investment definitions of early BITs and 
regional IIAs vary, with some of them including bonds and others not. (57) 
This inclusion has been a powerful tool used by corporations to sue countries 
for measures adopted in response to their financial crises. It started with 
Argentina which, in 2005, had to perform a debt restructuring. Dozens of 
cases were initiated against it making it the world’s most sued country under 
IIAs. A prime example is the Abaclat v Argentina case, where approximately 
180,000 bondholders initiated an arbitral proceeding seeking US$3.6 billion 
from the country. (58) History repeated itself with the global economic crisis 
of 2008; the 2012 Greek ‘haircut’ on sovereign bonds resulted in two lawsuits 
 (52) TPP Art. 18.48, CETA Art. 20.27.
 (53) CETA Art. 20.29; 5 years in NAFTA Art. 1711(5)(6).
 (54) CETA Art. 27.4.
 (55) J. LEXCHIN and M.-A. GAGNON, CETA and Intellectual Property: The debate over phar-
maceutical patents, Canada- Europe Transatlantic Dialogue, CETA Policy Briefs Series, 2013, 
pp. 4-5, http://labs.carleton.ca/canadaeurope/wp- content/uploads/sites/9/CETD- Policy-Brief_
CETA-and-pharmaceutical-patents_MG_JL.pdf (accessed 16 July 2016).
 (56) TPP Art. 11.2(2)(a), CETA Art. 13.2(3).
 (57) NAFTA Art. 1139 does not include them, while Energy Charter Art. 1.6(b) does.
 (58) Abaclat and Others v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdic-
tion and Admissibility 4 August 2011. See also UNCTAD, Sovereign Debt restructuring and Interna-
tional Investment Agreements, IIA Issues Note, No. 2, UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2011/3, 2011, 
p. 3.
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against the country, Poštová v Greece and Laiki v Greece. (59) Despite Greece’s 
win in Poštová, the tribunal decided to allocate the ISDS costs between the 
parties. (60) With arbitration costs for the respondent being US$300,000 
(which were advanced) and its lawyers’ fees exceeding €4,650,000, (61) it was 
a very expensive case to defend. The new- generation IIAs establish the inclu-
sion of bonds in the definition of investment, (62) facilitating the emergence 
of similar cases in the future. To mitigate the risk, States add public-debt 
annexes, which, in principle, prohibit ISDS claims for cases of restructuring 
debts. But instead of extending this prohibition to the whole investment 
chapter, IIAs partly offset it, still allowing ISDS claims for restructurings 
that violate the National- Treatment or MFN Articles. (63)
International investment law and taxation are also linked. Earlier regional 
IIAs have been criticized for encouraging tax avoidance, by offering the 
opportunity to corporations to strategically place their investments in coun-
tries with optimal tax systems. (64) The conclusion, for example, of the 
US- Panama Trade Promotion Agreement has not only not prevented but 
incentivized money flows to Panama. The Panama Papers scandal that fol-
lowed, as well as tax evasion practices by transnational corporations such 
as Starbucks, Amazon and Google exacerbated the concerns that existing 
investment instruments do not secure tax justice. (65) The new wave of IIAs 
has been expected to address the matter, but this does not seem to be the 
case. They do not limit inflows and outflows of capital, (66) therefore, mak-
ing possible for corporations to transfer their money to tax heavens that are 
members to the agreements, such as Singapore, Netherlands, Switzerland or 
Cyprus. When such tax avoidance practices take place, States should be able 
to change their tax systems or withdraw tax privileges previously granted 
to corporations. A growing number of taxation ISDS claims, mainly against 
developing countries, illustrates that this right is limited. (67) The new IIAs, 
 (59) Poštová banka, a.s. and ISTROKAPITAL SE v Hellenic Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/13/8, Award 9 April 2015; Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co. Ltd. v Hellenic Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/14/16.
 (60) Ibid., para 378.
 (61) Ibid., para 374.
 (62) TPP Art. 9.1(c), ChAFTA Art. 9.1(d)(iii), EU- Singapore FTA Art. 9.1(1)(c), EU- Vietnam 
FTA Art. 8.4.p(iii), CETA Art. 8.1(c), TTIP proposal Definitions x.2(c).
 (63) TPP Annex 9-G(2), EU- Vietnam Annex(2), CETA Annex 8-B(2), TTIP proposal 
Annex II(2).
 (64) Cl. PROVOST, Taxes on trial: How trade deals threaten tax justice, Global Justice Now, 
February 2016, www.tni.org/en/publication/taxes-on-trial (accessed 16 July 2016).
 (65) For Panama papers see investigation by The International Consortium of Investigative 
Journalists, https://panamapapers.icij.org/. For tax avoidance of multinational corporations see 
report of UK Parliament’s House of Commons Committee, www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm201213/cmselect/cmpubacc/716/71605.htm (both accessed 16 July 2016).
 (66) TPP Art. 9.9, CETA Art. 8.13, TTIP proposal Art. 6. Same for EU- Singapore FTA Art. 9.7, 
which, even though refers to ‘taxation’ in para 2(g), does not explicitly removes it from its scope.
 (67) Cargill, Incorporated v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Award 
18 September 2009; Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European Food S.A, S.C. Starmill S.R.L. and 
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aiming to shrink the number of such claims, introduce taxation carve-outs. 
However, their language is blurry, with exceptions within exceptions. For 
example, under TPP Article 29.4(6b)(8), a taxation measure can still, under 
conditions, be challenged as infringing National Treatment or as amounting 
to indirect expropriation. The text fails to mention the FET standard, which, 
at a first glance, seems not to be applicable to taxation. However, this could 
be still subject to expansive interpretations; tribunals could argue that what 
not explicitly prohibited is deemed permitted and, thus, still apply it. The 
EU IIAs also take the route of non- explicit-mention. Although they con-
demn the ‘avoidance and evasion of taxes’, their tax exception clauses are 
not applicable to investment, with the exception of CETA that just excludes 
MFN. (68) Finally, as discussed in sub- Section II.A.1, the narrowing of 
investor’s definition only to enterprises with ‘substantial business activities’ 
cannot prevent covered subsidiaries from still bringing ISDS claims.
E. — State-owned Enterprises in IIAs
Being a sensitive issue among countries, the concept of State-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) has not generally been touched in international trade 
and investment law. Only GATT Article XVII provides limited rules on the 
behavior of these entities. This situation is, though, changing in the era of 
regionalism.
TPP is the first treaty that dedicates a whole chapter to disciplines on 
SOEs. The rapid growth in number and size of SOEs and their often non- 
transparent operation and poor management pose, indeed, a need for regula-
tion. (69) But one should not forget that SOEs have different orientations, 
as well as that they can play a positive role for countries, fostering economic 
development and employment opportunities. (70) TPP seems to do exactly 
that, depriving SOEs from all their benefits. Although Article 17.2.9 recog-
nizes the right of establishment and maintenance of SOEs, the agreement 
removes the GATT safeguard that parties can grant to their SOEs exclusive 
or specific privileges. On the contrary, Article 17.6 prohibits States from 
providing non- commercial assistance to their SOEs, when this would have 
‘adverse effects to the interests of another Party’ or could cause ‘injury to a 
domestic industry. These terms are quite broad and go beyond WTO stand-
S.C. Multipack S.R.L. v Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Award 11 December 2013; Perenco 
Ecuador Ltd. v The Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Ecuador (Petroecuador), 
ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6; Tullow Uganda Operations PTY LTD v Republic of Uganda, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/12/34; Vodafone v India, UNCITRAL, Notice of Arbitration 17 April 2014.
 (68) EU- Singapore FTA Art. 17.6(4), EU- Vietnam FTA Art. X.7(3), CETA Art. 28.7(2).
 (69) Pr. KOWALSKI et al., State-owned Enterprises: Trade effects and Policy Implications, OECD 
Trade Policy Paper No. 147, TAD/TC/WP(2012)10/FINAL, OECD Publishing 2013, pp. 6 and 12.
 (70) See A. CAPOBIANCO and H. CHRISTIANSEN, Competitive Neutrality and State-owned Enter-
prises: Challenges and Policy Options, OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers, No. 1, OECD 
Publishing, 2011, p. 9.
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ards. The concept of ‘adverse effects’ is expanded to services, while for the 
measurement of ‘injury to domestic industries’ a long and exhaustive list of 
economic factors is set out. (71) These rules do not take into consideration 
the non- profitable SOEs that need government support to perform public 
functions. In the same sense, Article 17.4 obliges all SOEs and designated 
monopolies to ‘act in accordance with commercial considerations’ and not 
to discriminate against goods and services of another party, when engaging 
in commercial activities. Again these provisions disregard SOEs with hybrid 
role and social functions inextricably linked with their commercial ones, 
such as natural monopolies in sectors of public utilities, public transport 
etc. TPP includes carve-outs on the aforementioned norms, though they are 
quite limited. Article 17.13(2)(3) provides a general exception for SOEs that 
fulfill a ‘government mandate’, while country- specific exemptions of par-
ticular enterprises are found in annexes. However, apart from the annex for 
Vietnam, there are no carve-outs related to public good, as we would expect. 
Overall, the strict rules, in conjunction with the establishment of a com-
mittee in charge of reviewing the implementation of the chapter, (72) may 
result to a regulatory chill for States. On top of that, while the State-to-State 
Dispute Settlement is the norm, obligations related to ‘covered investments’ 
spread over the chapter, as well as the requirement for SOEs exercising dele-
gated authority to comply with the whole Agreement, (73) open the way for 
investors to challenge SOEs’ activities as investment breaches. TPP’s twin 
brother, TTIP, also intends to insert a SOEs chapter with similar rules. This 
was made clear by the EU’s textual proposal of January 2015 and confirmed 
by the leaked TTIP documents released by Greenpeace. (74)
The initiative for the inclusion of a SOEs chapter belonged to the US. 
The objectives put forward by the government were that the reform would 
help in the efficiency and accountability of the existing SOEs, the non- 
discrimination against private corporations and would provide a boost for 
international competition. (75) The inclusion of the chapter, however, could 
also imply political ramifications and more especially the attempt of the 
US to pass its capitalistic model to free market TPP Member States, such 
as Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam, with an ultimate goal to stem the pro-
 (71) TPP Arts 17.7.1(d)(e) and 17.8.3 respectively.
 (72) TPP Art. 17.12.
 (73) TPP Art. 17.3.
 (74) EU Textual Proposal, Possible Provisions on State Enterprises and Enterprises Granted 
Special or Exclusive Rights Or Privileges, January 2015, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2015/january/tradoc_153030.pdf. For Greenpeace leak see www.ttip-leaks.org/#docdoc14. 
(both accessed 17 July 2016).
 (75) Office of the US Trade Representative, TPP Issue-by-Issue Information Center, https://
ustr.gov/trade- agreements/free-trade- agreements/trans- pacific-partnership/tpp- chapter-chapter-
negotiating-7 (accessed 17 July 2016).
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gress of the ever- growing Chinese SOEs. (76) After the US withdrawal from 
TPP, (77) it is unsure whether the remaining State Parties will maintain the 
SOE chapter in the agreement. If, however, they do, what we can expect is 
that such chapter could be particularly burdensome on developing coun-
tries such as Malaysia and Vietnam and small European economies, such as 
Hungary and Romania, whose economic infrastructure is based on SOEs.
III. — THE ‘REACTION’ OF STATES
On the other side of the coin, States are taking action to more actively 
participate in the investment treaty system, adopting the modest or more 
radical approaches analyzed below.
A. — Backlash against ISDS: Strengthening State-to-State 
Arbitration and Domestic Litigation
Evaluating the negative effects of the ever- increasing investor claims, 
States are trying to halt this phenomenon. The ‘bravest’ have renounced 
investment instruments altogether and are building stronger domestic pro-
cesses. This is the example of the Latin American countries Ecuador, Vene-
zuela and Bolivia, which withdrew from the ICSID Convention and started 
terminating their existing BITs. (78) This termination policy was also fol-
lowed by Indonesia, which in the years 2014 to 2016 denounced 19 out of 
its 71 IIAs in force. A different approach was taken by South Africa that 
determined to denounce its BITs on a case-by-case basis and conclude new 
IIAs only ‘in cases of compelling economic and political circumstances’. (79) 
Other States, although still negotiating investment treaties, are opting out 
from ISDS. Philippines and Japan did so at their 2006 Economic Partner-
ship Agreement (EPA). In 2011, Australia’s government also announced 
 (76) J. KELSEY, The risks of disciplines on State-owned Enterprises in the proposed Trans- 
Pacific Partnership Agreement, paper prepared for the stakeholder program at the 11th round of 
TPP Agreement negotiations in Melbourne, 4 March 2012, pp. 6-11, https://ghum.kuleuven.be/
ggs/publications/working_papers/new_series/wp161-170/wp-168-willemyns- website.pdf (accessed 
24 May 2016).
 (77) See infra note 136.
 (78) Ecuador has led the way and since 2008 cancelled its BITs with Cuba, Dominican Republic, 
El Salvador, Finland, Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Romania and 
Uruguay. Venezuela has taken Ecuador’s lead, unilaterally denouncing its BIT with the Neth-
erlands in 2008. Similarly, since 2012, Bolivia has terminated its BITs with the US, Argentina, 
Austria, France, Germany, Netherlands, Spain and Sweden.
 (79) See Trade and Industry Minister, Robert Davies’ speech at the session on UNCTAD’s 
IPFSD, Geneva, 24 September 2012, extract, www.igd.org.za/index.php/about-us/about-igd/21-
news/latest- stories/1597-south- african-minister-new-approach-needed-on-investment-treaties 
(accessed 17 July 2016).
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its intention not to include ISDS in its future IIAs. (80) It has kept this 
commitment in the 2011 Australia-New Zealand EPA, the 2012 Australia- 
Malaysia FTA and the 2014 Australia-Japan EPA, where State-to-State 
Dispute Settlement (SSDS) was maintained as the sole dispute settlement 
mechanism. However, both Japan and Australia are signatories of the TPP 
Agreement that includes the ISDS mechanism. Brazil followed the same 
strategy and replaced ISDS with SSDS in the Cooperation and Investment 
Facilitation Agreements concluded with Mozambique and Angola, in March 
and April 2015 respectively.
Even when States insist on ISDS, both their practices and new IIAs 
demonstrate an attempt to promote SSDS. Hitherto, the two mechanisms 
have existed alongside each other in investment treaties, without clear indi-
cation which one prevails. The truth is that the availability of SSDS has 
not made much difference; having the disadvantages of the diplomatic pro-
tection and little benefit for investors, States have been hesitant in using 
it. The environment is slowly changing in the era of regionalism. Over the 
past decade, States have taken their first timid steps bringing such claims 
to seek diplomatic protection, interpretation or declaratory relief. (81) The 
new- generation IIAs also draw particular attention to the SSDS chapter; it is 
made more elaborate and able to resolve a wide range of disputes, providing 
an attractive alternative even for investment disputes. (82) When it comes to 
sensitive issues, some IIAs break the silence and explicitly declare prevalence 
of SSDS. This is mainly the case of investment disputes in financial services, 
where the ISDS proceedings are suspended until the State-to-State tribu-
nal/committee renders its — binding to the ISDS Tribunal — decision. (83) 
Similarly, after the much- discussed Philip Morris v Australia case, TPP 
Article 29.5 excludes tobacco- related challenges from ISDS.
Likewise, the new wave of IIAs advances the backstage role of domestic 
courts. States used to include ‘fork-in-the-road’ clauses in their BITs, giv-
ing to investors an irrevocable election between litigation at the courts of 
host States or investment arbitration. However, having the ISDS option, 
investors have rarely gone for domestic litigation. The new- generation IIAs 
 (80) Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Gillard Government Trade Policy State-
ment: Trading our way to more jobs and prosperity, April 2011, p. 14, http://blogs.usyd.edu.au/japa-
neselaw/2011_Gillard%20Govt%20Trade%20Policy%20Statement.pdf (accessed 17 July 2016).
 (81) Diplomatic protection: Italian Republic v Republic of Cuba, ad hoc State-State arbi-
tration, Final Award 15 January 2008; Interpretation: The Republic of Peru v Chile to clarify a 
provision of Empresas Lucchetti, S.A. and Lucchetti Peru, S.A. v The Republic of Peru, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/4, Award 7 February 2005; Ecuador v United States, UNCITRAL, PCA Case 
No. 2012-5, Award 29 September 2012.
 (82) See N. BERNASCONI- OSTERWALDER, IISD Best Practices Series: State–State Dispute Settle-
ment in Investment Treaties, October 2014, p. 20, www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/best- 
practices-state-state-dispute-settlement-investment-treaties.pdf (accessed 17 July 2016).
 (83) TPP Art. 11.22(2c), CETA Art. 13.21(2).
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substitute ‘fork-in-the-road’ with waivers. (84) These clauses do not dis-
courage national proceedings, as they permit investors to first commence 
a proceeding in domestic courts and, if they wish, to discontinue it in favor 
of ISDS. Knowing that their choice will not be final, the option of domestic 
courts could become more appealing to investors. Finally, some new IIAs 
bind arbitrators to follow the interpretation of national courts when examin-
ing domestic law. They further underline that the tribunals’ interpretations 
will not be binding upon those national courts. (85)
B. — Enhancing Transparency
Having its roots in the similar concept of commercial arbitration, invest-
ment arbitration has always been developed in secrecy. However, its hybrid 
nature differentiates it from the purely private, commercial model. Often 
involving matters of public interest or of particular political and financial 
risk, investment disputes require greater openness, stability and proce-
dural legitimacy. (86) The re- orientation of international investment law is 
characterized by significant progress in the transparency levels. It started 
with the adoption of two instruments in 2014: the UNCITRAL Rules on 
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration and the UN General 
Assembly’s Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbi-
tration. The new IIAs follow this transparency path, either directly referring 
to the UNCITRAL Rules (87) or adopting rules, where all pleadings, awards 
and decisions shall be publicly disclosed. (88) This could lead to scrutiny of 
investors’ claims, who may think twice before starting a proceeding with 
little chance to succeed.
The amicus curia is a concept inextricably linked to transparency. It can 
improve accountability, assist the tribunals in being well- informed using the 
expertise of third- parties and promote public interest. (89) Despite being 
widely used in public international law, amici curiae have for a long time been 
 (84) TPP Annex 9-L(A2), ChAFTA Art. 9.14(2), EU- Singapore FTA Art. 9.17(f)(i), EU- Vietnam 
FTA Art. 8.8(1)(4b), CETA Art. 8.22(1g), TTIP proposal Art. 14(2b).
 (85)  CETA Art. 8.31(2), EU- Vietnam FTA Ch. 8, section 3, Art. 16(2), TPP Art. 9.25(1) and 
footnote 34, TTIP proposal Art. 13(3)(4).
 (86) D. EULER et al., Transparency in International Investment Arbitration: A Guide to the UNCI-
TRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration, Cambridge University 
Press, 2015, pp. 1-2.
 (87) CETA Art. 8.36, EU- Vietnam FTA Art. 8.20(1), TTIP proposal Art. 18.
 (88) TPP Art. 9.24, ChAFTA Art. 9.17 and Side Letter on Transparency Rules, EU- Singapore 
FTA Annex 9-G.
 (89) T. ISHIKAWA, “Third party participation in investment treaty arbitration”, International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 59, Issue 2, pp. 401-404; E. LEVINE, “Amicus Curiae in Inter-
national Investment Arbitration: The Implications of an Increase in Third-Party Participation”, 
Berkeley Journal of International Law, Vol. 29, 2011, p. 217; K. FACH GÓMEZ, “Rethinking the Role 
of the Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration: How to Draw the Line Favorably for 
the Public Interest”, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 35, 2012, pp. 562-563.
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disregarded in investment arbitration. BITs and older FTAs, even though 
permitting non- disputing parties to intervene in the proceedings, (90) make 
no mention of third-party submissions. This lack of explicit consent resulted 
in two unsuccessful early attempts of participation in Methanex and UPS 
cases. (91) In 2003, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission issued a statement 
setting out detailed — but not binding — criteria to be applied by tribunals 
when deciding whether submissions should be accepted. (92) This was fol-
lowed by the ICSID amendment of Arbitration Rules and Additional Facility 
Rules in 2006 with the insertion of Rule 37(2) establishing similar criteria, 
and confirmed by the 2010 UNCITRAL Transparency Rules Article 4 and 17. 
Following these developments, amici curiae submissions have been increased, 
and since 2008, their number has doubled. (93) In addition, participation 
is no longer sought only by NGOs, as it used to be, but by diverse entities, 
such as international organizations, industry bodies, indigenous people and 
consultancy companies. (94) The system has become more permissive, with 
more and more tribunals granting leave to participation. (95) In fact, the 
tribunals themselves sometimes request submissions from non-party enti-
ties. (96) However, this trend of permissiveness is not absolute, as tribunals 
usually do not go beyond the acceptance of filing written submissions. (97) 
The innovation of new IIAs is that they explicitly incorporate third-party 
participation. (98) Although they still give significant latitude to tribunals 
(“the tribunal may accept”), this novelty will probably be in favor of States, 
as the experience of ISDS cases has shown that the majority of the amici 
curiae submissions support the regulatory freedom of the respondent. (99)
 (90) NAFTA Arts 1128-1129.
 (91) Methanex v US, supra note 26; United Parcel Service of America Inc. v Canada, UNCI-
TRAL, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae 
17 October 2001.
 (92) Statement of the Free Trade Commission on non- disputing party participation, 2003, www.
state.gov/documents/organization/38791.pdf. (accessed 17 July 2016).
 (93) L. BASTIN, “The Amicus Curiae in Investor-State Arbitration: Eight Recent Trends”, Arbi-
tration International, Vol. 30, Issue 1, 2014, p. 128.
 (94) International organizations: AES Summit Generation Limited & Another v Republic of 
Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Award 23 September 2010, para 8.2; Electrabel SA v Republic 
of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, para 1.18; Industry bodies and indigenous people: Glamis 
Gold Ltd v United States of America, UNCITRAL, Award 8 June 2009, para 286; Merrill & Ring 
Forestry LP v Canada, UNCITRAL, Award 31 March 2010, paras 22-25; Consultancy companies: 
Apotex Inc v The Government of the United States of America, UNCITRAL, Procedural Order No. 2 
on the participation of a non- disputing party 11 October 2011, paras 23, 28-29.
 (95) BASTIN, supra note 90, pp. 142-143. Appendix 1 shows that, until July 2012, 11 out of 
18 petitions were granted permission.
 (96) Eureko v Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspen-
sion 26 October 2010.
 (97) BASTIN supra note 90, pp. 140-141.
 (98) TPP Art. 9.23(3), CETA Annex 29-A for SSDS also applicable to ISDS, EU- Singapore FTA 
Annex 15-A, TTIP Art. 23(5).
 (99) In this line see Aguas del Tunari, SA v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Peti-
tion, 29 August 2002, para 2; Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID 
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C. — Counterclaims and Arbitration Costs
Counterclaims in investment arbitration are a still rare phenomenon, 
which however have started picking up speed. The reluctance of host States 
to bring such claims lies in the long- standing perception that the sole objec-
tive of ISDS is protecting the rights of investors. However, this does not 
seem to have been the rationale of the drafters of the ICSID Convention, 
who believed in the equal access between host States and foreign investors 
to arbitration. (100) ICSID Article 46 explicitly allows counterclaims and, 
after the 2010 modification, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules’ Article 21(3) 
does as well. Counterclaims are advantageous for States, as they would be 
enabled to seek affirmative relief from tribunals. The notion could lead to 
diminishment of the number of ISDS claims; investors, regularly expecting 
counterclaims, could be discouraged from starting proceedings. (101) States 
have recognized these benefits and counterclaims have flourished within the 
past five years. (102) Their success depends mainly on the precise wording of 
IIAs. The tendency of tribunals has been to decline jurisdiction when there 
is no explicit consent for their use. (103) However, a recent approach first 
introduced in Pr. Reisman’s dissenting opinion in Roussalis case, and then 
adopted by the tribunal in Goetz case, (104) creates a novel situation. It sug-
gests that the investor’s consent to counterclaims is implied by the consent 
to arbitration itself and, therefore, tribunals may broaden their jurisdiction 
ratione personae to encompass counterclaims even without specific treaty 
Case No. ARB/05/22, Petition for Amicus Curiae Status 27 November 2006, s. 4; Piero Foresti and 
Others v. Republic of South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/01, Petition for Limited Participa-
tion as Non- Disputing Parties 17 July 2009, s. 4; Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12, Application for Permission to Proceed as Amicus Curiae 2 March 2011, 
p. 1-2 and 13-16; Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v. Republic of Ecuador, 
UNCITRAL, Submission of Amici 5 November 2010, s. 1.
 (100) Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the settlement of investment 
disputes between States and nationals of other States, Part III, para 13: “While the broad objective 
of the Convention is to encourage a larger flow of private international investment, the provisions 
of the Convention maintain a careful balance between the interests of investors and those of host 
States. Moreover, the Convention permits the institution of proceedings by host States…”.
 (101) G. LABORDE, “The Case for Host State Claims in Investment Arbitration”, Journal of 
International Dispute Settlement, Vol. 1, 2010, pp. 99-100; Th. KENDRA, “State Counterclaims in 
Investment Arbitration — A New Lease of Life?”, Arbitration International, Vol. 29, Issue 4, 2013, 
pp. 597-601; KUIJPER and al., supra note 35, pp. 95-96.
 (102) Sergei Paushok, CJSC Golden East Company and CJSC Vostokneftegaz Company v The 
Government of Mongolia, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability 28 April 2011; Metal-
Tech Ltd. v Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award 4 October 2013; Hesham 
T.M.Al Warraq v Republic of Indonesia, UNCITRAL, Award 15 December 2014; Perenco v Ecuador 
supra note 64, Interim Decision on the Environmental Counterclaim 11 August 2015.
 (103) See Oxus Gold plc v. Republic of Uzbekistan, the State Committee of Uzbekistan for Geology & 
Mineral Resources, and Navoi Mining & Metallurgical Kombinat, UNCITRAL, Award 17 December 
2015.
 (104) Spyridon Roussalis v Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Award 7 December 2011; Goetz 
v Burundi, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/2, Award 21 June 2012, paras 278-279.
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mention. The new- generation IIAs, with the exception of TPP, (105) still 
remain silent on the issue, but this new approach encourages counterclaims 
to be more widely brought and examined.
High arbitration costs have always been one of the main concerns of the 
investment arbitration system. The Organization for Economic Co- operation 
and Development (OECD) calculated them to reach US$8 million on average 
in 2012, with costs exceeding US$30 million in some cases. (106) Not only are 
the amounts excessive, but the tribunals have adopted different approaches 
to their allocation, causing uncertainty, as States could predict neither the 
outcome nor the level of the fees they would have to pay. (107) The tra-
ditional approach has been the one generally used in public international 
law, ‘pay your own pay’, whereby each party bears its own costs. (108) By 
the end of 2011, half of the cases brought made use of this rule, which has 
been criticized as particularly burdensome for small economies and devel-
oping countries. (109) Because of the general dissatisfaction, States have 
sought ways to alleviate costs. The cycle of reforms started again with the 
modification of UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in 2010; per Articles 42(1) 
and 40(2) all arbitration costs ‘shall in principle be borne by the unsuccess-
ful party. However, the arbitral tribunal may apportion each of such costs 
between the parties if it determines that apportionment is reasonable’. The 
new- generation IIAs adopt this ‘costs- follow-the-event’ approach and fur-
ther shrink arbitrators’ latitude to apportion the costs between the parties, 
allowing them to do so only ‘in exceptional circumstances’. (110) Seeking 
to rein in arbitration costs, the new IIAs give resort to mediation and also 
 (105) TPP Art. 9.19(2). Similarly in Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, “Invest-
ment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment Area” (2007), Art. 28(9).
 (106) OECD, Investor-State Dispute Settlement, Public Consultation: 16 May-23 July 2012, 
p. 18, www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment- policy/ISDSconsultationcomments_web.pdf (accessed 
17 July 2016).
 (107) See for example the approach taken in Señor Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/07/6, Award 7 July 2011, para. 296 and Togo Electricité and GDF-Suez Energie 
Services v. Republic of Togo, ARB/06/07, Decision on annulment 6 September 2011, para. 257 and 
differently in Spyridon Roussalis v Romania, supra note 101, para. 882 and GEA Group Aktienge-
sellschaft v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/16, Award 31 March 2011, para. 365.
 (108) I. UCHKUNOVA and O. TEMNIKOV, Allocation of Costs in ICSID Arbitration, Kluwer Arbi-
tration, 3 December 2013, http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2014/12/03/allocation-of-costs-in-
icsid- arbitration/. For examples of cases where the two different principles were applied see tables 
at https://works.bepress.com/inna_uchkunova/1/ and https://works.bepress.com/inna_uchku-
nova/2/ (both accessed 17 July 2016).
 (109) D. SMITH, “Shifting Sands: Cost-and-Fee Allocation in International Investment Arbitra-
tion”, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 51, 2011, p. 753; UNCTAD, Reform of Inves-
tor-State Dispute Settlement: In Search of a Roadmap, IIA Issues Note, No. 2, UNCTAD/WEB/
DIAE/PCB/2013/4, 2013, p. 7.
 (110) CETA Art. 8.39, EU- Singapore FTA Art. 9.26, EU- Vietnam FTA Art. 8.27(4) and TTIP 
Art. 28(4).
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provide for prompt termination of frivolous and unfounded ISDS claims in 
an early stage of proceeding. (111)
D. — Advancing Consistency: Authoritative Interpretations, 
Appellate Mechanism and Permanent Court
Tempering the abusive interpretation by tribunals and achieving uniform-
ity of investment awards seems to be at the top of States priorities.
By delegating to arbitrators the ruling of ISDS claims, States are deliber-
ately denouncing an element of their sovereignty, in return for new opportu-
nities. (112) This does not change the fact that they still remain ‘masters of 
the treaties’, (113) sharing interpretive authority with tribunals. So far, apart 
from the 2001 NAFTA Free Trade Commission’ Interpretation, (114) States 
have not made use of this authority. But feeling that their ties with the trea-
ties are being cut off, they are now trying to strengthen their interpretative 
role. They are endowing their recent IIAs with specialized treaty committees 
consisted of all State- parties representatives and assign them tasks such as 
developing recommendations about substantive standards, adopting bind-
ing authoritative interpretations, amending the rules of the agreement and 
appointing the members of tribunals. (115) Some new IIAs also clearly set 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as applicable law, (116) preventing 
ISDS tribunals from sidestepping its rules of interpretation and deviating, 
that way, from the intention of the treaty- drafters. (117)
The ISDS institutional structure is characterized by brand-new reforms. 
So far the pool of arbitrators has been quite small, mainly consisted of law-
yers of big law firms, raising concerns that they have a ‘business interest’ in 
cases and, thus, are investor- biased. (118) Aiming to eliminate these vested 
interests, some IIAs assign to the treaty committees the task of compiling a 
roster of arbitrators and choosing from it in case of disagreement between the 
 (111) TPP Arts 9.18(1), 9.29(4); CETA Arts 8.20, 8.32. 8.33; EU- Singapore FTA Arts 9.14, 9.20, 
9.21; EU- Vietnam FTA Annex I and Arts 18-19, TTIP Arts 3, 16(4), 17.
 (112) W. BURKE-WHITE and A. VON STADEN, “Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: 
The Interpretation and Application of Non- Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment 
Treaties”, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 48, 2008, p. 349.
 (113) UNCTAD, Interpretation of IIAs: What States can do, IIA Issues Note, No. 3, UNCTAD/
WEB/DIAE/IA/2011/10, 2011, p. 3.
 (114) NAFTA Free Trade Commission supra note 22. For the reasons of the interpretation see 
ibid., p. 13.
 (115) TPP Arts 9.25(3), 27.2.2(f) ; CETA Arts 8.10(3), 8.31(3), 8.44(3b), 8.27(2), 8.28(3) ; EU- Sin-
gapore FTA Arts 9.4(3), 9.19(3), 9.30(2)(a)(c) ; EU- Vietnam FTA Art. 8.34(2)(a)(b), TTIP proposal 
Arts 3, 13(5), 27(2)(c), 9(2).
 (116) ChAFTA Art. 9.18, CETA Art. 8.31, EU- Singapore Art. 9.19(2).
 (117) KUIJPER and al., supra note 35, pp. 40, 66.
 (118) Ibid., pp. 103-104.
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parties. (119) A binding code of conduct is also created, excluding conflicts 
of interest and safeguarding arbitrators’ impartiality. (120)
After many years of discussions, CETA and the draft text of TTIP pro-
vide for a second instance facility. (121) It is not the first time that the 
words ‘appellate body’ appear in an IIA; older and recent agreements also 
mention such a mechanism but they only suggest a future, potential estab-
lishment. (122) The novelty of the two agreements lies in the fact that the 
Appellate Tribunal is created by the pact itself and is binding, similar to 
the WTO Appellate Body. The appeals procedure improves the annulment 
process of ICSID Article 52(1); besides the correction of procedural errors, it 
also provides for the review of the awards on the merits, which would reduce 
the risk of erroneous and poorly reasoned final decisions.
The EU has again become a pioneer attempting to change the structure 
of the first instance. First seen in the November 2015 TTIP proposal and 
then included in EU- Vietnam FTA and CETA, (123) the new system aims to 
replace the ad hoc tribunals with a standing investment court. Some voices 
have been heard to suggest that it will pose several technical and political 
challenges. (124) But States have felt that its benefits would outweigh the 
drawbacks; the court, consisted by tenured and carefully selected judges, 
seeks to ensure greater legitimacy, fairness and independence. A major inno-
vation is that the tribunal members will be appointed by the committee, 
depriving the investors of any influence on the selection. (125) The investors 
will also not be able to choose the respondent to the claim; it will be in the 
EU’s sole determination whether the claim should be addressed by a Member 
State or the Union itself. (126) Whether such a Court will be established is 
still unclear, but, if it does, it could be valuable for small European States 
that in the past found themselves confronting corporations with greater 
economic and political power.
 (119) ChAFTA Art. 9.15, EU- Singapore FTA Art. 9.18.
 (120) TPP Arts 9.22(6), 28.10(1d); EU- Singapore FTA Art. 9.18(6)(7); EU- Vietnam FTA 
Annex II; CETA Art. 8.44(2); TTIP proposal Annex II.
 (121) CETA Art. 8.28, TTIP proposal Art. 10.
 (122) ChAFTA Art. 9.23, TPP Art. 9.23(11), EU- Vietnam FTA Art. 8.15.
 (123) TTIP proposal Art. 9, EU- Vietnam FTA Art. 12, CETA Art. 8.27.
 (124) E. ZULETA, “The Challenges of Creating a Standing Investment Court”, Transnational 
Dispute Management, Vol. 1, 2014.
 (125) TTIP proposal Art. 9.2-9.3, EU- Vietnam FTA Art. 8.12.2-8.12.3, CETA Art. 8.27(2)-
8.27(3).
 (126) TTIP proposal Art. 5, EU- Vietnam FTA Art. 8.6(2), CETA Art. 8.21. Also in EU- Singa-
pore FTA Art. 9.15(2).
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IV. — REGIONALISM: TOWARDS A HARMONIZATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW?
The surge of regionalism had been considered as a tool to abate the dis-
satisfaction over the bilateral investment system and to equalize the powers 
of investors and States, by obtaining a first consolidation of investment 
law. (127) Mega- regional FTAs had, hence, been seen as a ‘stepping stone’ for 
a future multilateralization, (128) which would be achieved with the grad-
ual accession of additional States to existing regional instruments. (129) 
This Section will evaluate whether the goal of such harmonization has been 
accomplished through regionalism, and whether the drafting of a multilateral 
investment treaty would be either desirable or plausible.
It could be argued that mega- regional FTAs, governing a substantial share 
of the global investment, make some progress towards the convergence of the 
different investment standards found in BITs. These treaties reflect a con-
sensus between their participants on addressing the concerns of the current 
regime, providing more clarified substantive obligations, liberalization com-
mitments and stronger regulatory transparency. (130) However, this fledging 
regionalism has added an extra layer to the already fragmented bilateral 
system; most IIAs affirm their co- existence with older bilateral or regional 
agreements and are silent on which one prevails, resulting in overlaps. (131) 
Investors are, thus, able to choose from these parallel treaties those that are 
the most preferential under which to bring their claims. To address this issue, 
the EU adopted a Regulation that provides for the replacement of Member- 
States’ BITs with the new IIAs concluded by the Union. (132) Nonetheless, 
all BITs include ‘transitional- period’ provisions, which guarantee protection 
even upon termination, meaning that the overlap will still not be avoided. As 
such, we could only talk about a partial consolidation being reached through 
regionalism.
 (127) M. MALLI, “Minilateral Treaty- Making in International Investment Law”, in A. K. BJORK-
LUND (ed.) Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy, 2013-2014, Oxford University 
Press, 2015, p. 524.
 (128) European Commission, Investment in TTIP and Beyond-The Path for Reform, Concept 
Paper, Tradoc 153408, May 2015, p. 11.
 (129) TPP Art. 30.4.
 (130) M. FELDMAN et al., “The Role of Pacific Rim FTAs in the Harmonization of International 
Investment Law: Towards a Free Trade Area of the Asia- Pacific”, EU15 Task Force on Investment 
Policy, ICTSD, March 2016.
 (131) TPP Art. 1.2(1), ChAFTA Art. 1.2(1,2). See also W. ALSCHNER, “Regionalism and Overlap 
in Investment Treaty Law — Towards Consolidation or Contradiction?”, Journal of International 
Economic Law, Vol. 17, Issue 2, 2014.
 (132) Regulation (EU) No. 1219/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 December 2012 establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements 
between Member States and third countries [2012] OJ L351/40, Art. 3.
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At the other end of the spectrum, if the goal is the uniformity of inter-
national investment law, this could be facilitated through a multilateral 
investment system. A multilateral treaty could better balance economic 
with public purpose interests, so as to meet both the expectations of the 
investors and host States. With the creation of unified rules, it could create 
a regulatory framework that both provides safeguards for securing foreign 
investment while also addressing non- investment concerns, such as the right 
to regulate on health care and the environment. (133) This could further 
contribute to the elimination of contradictory interpretations of the various 
ad hoc tribunals, providing a more secure environment both for States and 
investors. Without a doubt, the negotiating power of developed countries, 
the source of most FDI flows, would be still stronger during the drafting of 
such treaty. Nevertheless, a coalition of all developing countries trying to 
protect their interests could bring about a more balanced regime. Thus, a 
multilateral treaty could end the perpetual battle between investors and 
States over who will prevail and thereby lead to a ‘golden mean’.
However, the multilateralization of investment law is still viewed with 
skepticism by both scholars and developing countries alike. Some com-
mentators assert that a multilateral treaty is not necessary as BITs can 
already develop uniform standards, which would harmonize the investment 
regime. (134) However, as seen before, the substantive standards of BITs and 
FTAs are still far from uniform. The concerns of developing States mainly 
stem from the role foreign investors would acquire upon the drafting of such 
treaty. They claim that, under a multilateral system, it would be easier for 
corporations to move their investments from country to country causing 
unpredictability. A second argument put forward is that bilateral or regional 
negotiations are preferable, as they are less cumbersome for the economically 
weaker party, which can still channel and guide investment in support of 
its development. (135) The critics conclude that while individual consents 
of arbitration in bilateral treaties cannot elevate investors to subjects of 
international law, their unconditional recognition in a multilateral treaty 
would establish their legal personality. Especially as States would not be able 
to unilaterally modify or denounce such a treaty, thereby withdrawing the 
legal status accorded to corporations, as they could do with BITs. (136) But 
 (133) P. ACCONCI, “The integration of non- investment concerns as an opportunity for the 
modernization of international investment law: is a multilateral approach desirable?”, in G. SACER-
DOTI (ed.), General Interests of Host States in International Investment Law, Cambridge University 
Press, 2014, pp. 186-7.
 (134) S. W. SCHILL, “Multilateralizing investment Treaties through Most- Favored-Nation 
Clauses”, Berkeley Journal of International Law, Vol. 27, 2009, p. 500.
 (135) E. CHALAMISH, “The Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties: A De Facto Multilateral 
Agreement?”, Brook. Journal of International Law, Vol. 34, Issue 2, 2008, p. 340.
 (136) K. NOWROT, International Investment Law and the Republic of Ecuador: From Arbitral 
Bilateralism to Judicial Regionalism, TELC Research Center, 2010, pp. 14-16; P. MALANCZUK, 
“Multinational Enterprises and Treaty- Making — A Contribution to the Discussion on Non-State 
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the situation is not much — if any — different under the current regime; the 
myriad bilateral and regional IIAs offer several alternatives to corporations 
on where to place their investments, forcing States to make concessions in 
order to attract and maintain FDI. Furthermore, almost all IIAs are negoti-
ated based on the draft model of the more powerful State, and as States hold 
regular meetings with corporate lobbyists, investors have great influence on 
the negotiations. (137) Finally, regarding the legal personality of investors, 
we could argue that the ever- increasing number of BITs and regional IIAs 
and their contracting parties, as well as the binding consent to ISDS that 
they provide, already imply a de facto transformation of investors into sub-
jects of international law. This becomes more obvious if we consider the role 
that investors can play in investment law- making; in the absence of a uni-
form or customary regime, arbitrators mainly rely on the parties’ pleadings 
when identifying the meaning the substantive standards of IIAs. This gives 
investors a more pervasive role in influencing the shaping of investment law 
by proposing interpretations that are frequently adopted by tribunals and 
cited in subsequent awards. (138)
Be that as it may, the idea of a multilateral investment treaty seems even 
more farfetched, with developed countries trying to maintain fragmentation. 
The recent decision of the US government to withdraw from TTP in favor of 
pursuing bilateral agreements points in this direction. (139) The president’s 
preference of bilateralism creates uncertainty regarding the continuation 
of the TTIP negotiations, which is further enhanced by the government’s 
intention to strengthen commerce and investment ties with Great Britain 
after Brexit. (140) Under these developments, not only does the drafting 
of a multilateral treaty seem utopian, but the future of regionalism also 
appears nebulous. Other developed countries do not seem to take the same 
view regarding mega- regionals; ASEAN members expressed the wish for the 
Actors and the “Subjects” of International Law”, in V. GOWLLAND- DEBBAS (ed.), Multilateral 
Treaty- Making — The Current Status of Challenges to and Reforms Needed in the International Legis-
lative Process, Springer, 2000, pp. 60-63.
 (137) Corporate Europe Observatory, TTIP: a corporate lobbying paradise, July 2014, http://
corporateeurope.org/international-trade/2015/07/ttip- corporate-lobbying-paradise (accessed 
18 July 2016).
 (138) A. REINISCH, “Investors”, in M. NOORTMANN et al. (eds), Non-State Actors in International 
Law, Oxford Hart Publishing, 2015, pp. 264-267; M. PAPARINSKIS, “Analogies and Other Regimes 
of International Law”, in Z. Douglas et al. (eds), The foundations of International Investment Law, 
Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 94-96.
 (139) See Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal of the United States from the 
Trans- Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement, 23 January 2017, www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press- office/2017/01/23/presidential- memorandum-regarding-withdrawal-united-states-trans-
pacific (accessed 30 January 2017).
 (140) See President Trump and Prime Minister May’s Opening Remarks, 27 January 2017 www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press- office/2017/01/27/president-trump-and-prime- minister-mays-opening-
remarks (accessed 30 January 2017).
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TPP to proceed, even without the US, (141) and will possibly explore the 
opportunity to commence negotiations with China for the conclusion of the 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. (142) EU FTAs will also 
most probably not cease to exist. However, with the absence of the US, one 
of the major economic players, the regional model may have an ‘expiration 
date’. Instead of increased harmonization, an atomization of international 
investment law is on the horizon, with a return to the old bilateral model.
V. — CONCLUSION
The ‘BITs’ rush’ of the 1990’s is slowing down and is being replaced by 
intensified efforts at the regional level. In the aftermath of the 2008 global 
financial crisis, States felt that their economies would be revived through 
a strong, ‘one shot’ regulatory framework that would combine supplemen-
tary sectors such as trade, investment and services. (143) Thus, over the 
past decade, initiatives have been taken for the conclusion of mega- regional 
agreements that would not only ‘protect’ and ‘promote’ but also ‘liberalize’ 
investments. As the IIAs universe is expanding, concerns about the notable 
growth of investors’ power have been brought to the surface, not only by 
developing countries and civil society, but also by developed States that are 
now becoming targets of ISDS claims. This, in turn, revived the question of 
‘international subjectivity’ of multinational corporations.
This article has attempted to draw the picture of how the acceleration of 
regional IIAs has turned out to be a ‘battle’ between corporations and States 
on who will take up the slack. It observes that regionalism presents us with 
a paradox; on the one hand, the IIAs concluded or negotiated reaffirm the 
strengthened role of investors in international investment law, by provid-
ing to them higher standards of protection and easier access to ISDS. The 
broad investment standards have not been sufficiently tightened, but, on 
the contrary, definitions of investor and investment have been expanded to 
encompass elements so far not covered, such as intellectual property rights. 
The incorporation of investment in FTAs has resulted to its interaction with 
the financial services and taxation chapters, sliding financial violations into 
 (141) The Daily Telegraph, “Trans- Pacific Partnership: China could replace the US, says Malcolm 
Turnbull after Donald Trump signs executive order”, 24 January 2017, www.dailitelegraph.com.
au/news/nsw/transpacific- partnership-china-could-replace-us-says-malcolm-turnbull-after-donald-
trump-signs-executive-order/news-story/aaf25a1733c1cd7720f2b71cfb97f916 (accessed 30 January 
2017).
 (142) For the progress of the negotiations of the Treaty, see http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agree-
ments/rcep/Pages/regional- comprehensive-economic-partnership.aspx (accessed 30 January 2017).
 (143) M.-Fr. HOUDE et al., “The Interaction between Investment and Services Chapters in 
Selected Regional Trade Agreements”, in International Investment Law: Understanding Concepts 
and Tracking Innovations: A Companion Volume to International Investment Perspectives, OECD 
Publishing, 2008, p. 242.
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ISDS. Finally, the new IIAs move further towards strictly regulating sen-
sitive for States sectors such as SOEs. On the other hand, States are trying 
to ‘re- engage with the investment treaty system’. (144) A small group of 
countries has taken drastic measures by either terminating IIAs altogether 
giving competence to domestic courts or opting out from ISDS and promot-
ing SSDS. Mainly, attempts to limit investors’ influence have been made 
through reform of regional treaties; the new IIAs enhance transparency and 
embellish ISDS with safeguards such as counterclaims and allocation of costs 
to the losing party. In the search for a more predictable environment, some 
agreements are also introducing mechanisms such as authoritative interpre-
tations, appellate facilities or a standing investment court, which restrict 
the arbitrators’ latitude to adopt contradictory and investor- friendly inter-
pretations.
The article has concluded that, although some steps were taken towards 
the consolidation of the investment regime, regionalism ultimately led to 
a further fragmentation. It can serve as a ‘sweet spot’ for investors, who 
not only maintain their powers, but are given even more means to proceed 
against States. What is sure is that, with the main purpose of international 
investment law still being the protection of investors and with globalization 
making multinational corporations indispensable components of world econ-
omy, their role will not be easily diminished. Given the fact that regionalism 
does not seem to deliver the desired results, the alternative of a multilateral 
investment treaty could be the ‘one-eyed man in the land of the blind’, mark-
ing a new beginning in balancing States and investors conflicting interests. 
However, multilateralism still raises concerns among States and academics, 
which implies that the creation of such a treaty is utopian. At the same time, 
the future of regionalism itself seems also uncertain, with the US government 
leading the way back to bilateralism, pulling out of TPP and promoting the 
conclusion of BITs.
 (144) A. ROBERTS, “State-to-state investment treaty arbitration: A hybrid theory of interde-
pendent rights and shared interpretive authority”, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 55, 
Issue 1, 2014, p. 2.
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Despite the strong linkage between sustainable development and investment, older
international investment agreements (IIAs) have been criticized as threatening the
sustainable development of the host State. In recent IIAs, a slight shift towards tak-
ing the principle into account can be observed. However, the adoption of a sustain-
able-development-oriented approach in investment law depends largely on the
tribunals that are tasked with the interpretation of IIAs. This article examines the
role of arbitrators in promoting sustainable development. Despite their current
reluctance to engage in a sustainable development discussion, the situation may
alter with the conclusion of so-called new generation free trade agreements. These
agreements make more references to the principle and place at the arbitrators’ dis-
posal interpretative tools for the integration of sustainable development into their
argumentation. Finally, the article reflects on changes that would render the invest-
ment regime more compatible with sustainable development.
1 | INTRODUCTION
Sustainable development has been defined in various ways, but no
definition is yet universally accepted. The content of the principle
was initially shaped by the 1987 Brundtland Report1 and the 1992
Rio Declaration, which placed human beings at the centre of sustain-
able development and put weight on environmental protection.2
Since then its meaning has evolved; the Rio+10 and Rio+20 summits
described sustainable development in terms of three pillars: eco-
nomic, social and environmental.3 The recent adoption of the 2030
Agenda4 adds further elements to the concept. While still based on
the three pillars, Agenda 2030 also directly mirrors the human rights
framework; it is grounded in international human rights treaties, and
its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and targets encompass
issues related not only to economic and social rights but also cul-
tural, civil and political rights.5
Agenda 2030 also creates a strong linkage between sustainable
development and investment, explicitly linking its promotion with
substantive SDGs and targets.6 The adoption of investment promo-
tion regimes is also mentioned as a means of implementation of the
Agenda.7 However, the current regulatory framework for interna-
tional investment law has been criticized as threatening sustainable
development. These concerns reinforce the need for the establish-
ment of effective rules and processes to facilitate the realization of
the SDGs.8 On a positive note, governments have embarked on a
path of reforming international investment agreements (IIAs), shifting
shyly towards sustainable development;9 however, the steps taken
thus far do not seem to be sufficient.
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1World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford
University Press 1987).
2Rio Declaration on Environment and Development in ‘Report of the United Nations Con-
ference on Environment and Development’ UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (vol I) (12 August
1992) Annex (Rio Declaration).
3
‘Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Plan of Implementation of the
World Summit on Sustainable Development’ UN Doc A/CONF.199/20 (4 September 2002)
I, para 2; UNGA ‘The Future We Want’ UN Doc A/RES/66/288 (27 July 2012) I, para 3.
4UNGA ‘Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’ (2030
Agenda) UN Doc A/RES/70/1 (21 October 2015).
5ibid para 10; see also Goals 5, 10, 16 and 17.
6ibid Goals 1b, 2a, 7a and 10b.
7ibid Goal 17.15.
8L Cotula, ‘Foreign Investment, Law and Sustainable Development: A Handbook on Agricul-
ture and Extractive Industries’ (International Institute for Environment and Development
2016) 6.
9United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment

























































































































Although IIAs are inter-State agreements, States are not the only
ones shaping the international investment regime. Through investor–
State dispute settlement (ISDS), arbitrators are entrusted with the
task of interpreting these agreements. Therefore, whether and how
sustainable development will be put into practice also depends to a
great extent on their decisions. Sustainable development should be
considered as an ‘interstitial’ principle or a principle for the legal
interpretation of international treaties.10 How could arbitrators apply
this principle in ISDS when resolving investment disputes, particu-
larly those with explicit public interest components? Do the so-called
new generation IIAs impose an obligation on them towards integrat-
ing the principle into their interpretation? Does the arbitration sys-
tem itself need to be reformed for the aims of sustainable
development to be fulfilled?
Existing literature has already attempted to articulate and resolve
tensions between existing IIAs and environmental or social issues.11
This article extends the discussion to new generation free trade
agreements (FTAs), referring to the ambitious and wide-ranging trea-
ties signed or concluded after 2015, and assesses whether they have
addressed these sustainable development-related concerns. It princi-
pally concentrates on whether arbitrators could interpret their provi-
sions in light of the 2030 Agenda, in a way that furthers – rather
than hinders – sustainable development. The article first analyses the
current practice of ISDS tribunals when facing investment disputes
with explicit public interest components. Second, it examines the
sustainable development language found in post-2015, new genera-
tion FTAs,12 discussing the interpretative tools at the disposal of
arbitrators for the alignment of the agreements with SDGs. Particu-
larly, it analyses the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), the
EU–Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA),
the EU–Singapore FTA and the EU–Vietnam FTA. These agreements
are selected both due to their substantial trade value, and because
they reflect a recent shift in trade and investment policy: the conclu-
sion of ‘mega-regional FTAs’ or, in other words, of deep integration
agreements between regions with a major share of world trade and
foreign direct investment. The TPP and CETA are the first compre-
hensive outcomes of this new trend. The EU–Singapore and EU–
Vietnam FTAs are also worthy of discussion, as they can be consid-
ered as ‘pathfinder agreements’ on the road to an eventual EU–
ASEAN mega-regional FTA.13 It is not certain whether all of these
agreements will enter into force. The conclusion of the EU–Singa-
pore FTA is pending after an opinion of the Court of Justice of the
EU.14 Similarly, the future of TPP is uncertain following the with-
drawal of the US. Be that as it may, their negotiations are still impor-
tant, constituting a clear example of the investment approach that
States will most probably follow in the future. Finally, the article
reflects on changes to ISDS and suggests alternative dispute resolu-
tion methods that would render the investment regime more com-
patible with sustainable development.
2 | CURRENT PRACTICE OF ISDS
TRIBUNALS
Investment tribunals have already been confronted with disputes
involving sustainable development-related issues, brought either as
environmental claims or as human rights assertions.
Environmental claims have been relatively slow to arise in the
ISDS context. In early cases, the ‘traditional approach’ of arbitrators
was to prioritize investment law, considering it as lex specialis.15
Based on the ‘sole effects doctrine’,16 the Santa Elena and Water
Management II tribunals regarded the public purpose objective of a
State measure as irrelevant to the decision as to whether the invest-
ment treaty was breached; hence, it was not a reason to exclude or
limit investor compensation.17 Taking a different approach, other tri-
bunals engaged in the discussion of environmental issues, but still
considered them as subordinate to investment protection. In the
Metalclad award, arbitrators applied a strictly economic impact test
to find that an indirect expropriation had occurred, as the owner
was deprived ‘of the . . . reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit
of property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host
State’.18 In the Tecmed and Glamis cases, investment tribunals,
although seemingly having weighed public purpose and investors’
interests equally, set forth an expansive interpretation of the fair
and equitable treatment (FET) standard, prioritizing the ‘legitimate
10V Lowe, ‘Sustainable Development and Unsustainable Arguments’ in A Boyle and D Free-
stone (eds), International Law and Sustainable Development: Past Achievements and Future
Challenges (Oxford University Press 1999) 19; G Mayeda, ‘Where Should Johannesburg
Take Us? Ethical and Legal Approaches to Sustainable Development in the Context of Inter-
national Environmental Law’ (2004) 15 Colorado Journal of International Environmental
Law and Policy 37.
11K Gallagher and D Chudnovsky, Rethinking Foreign Investment for Sustainable Development:
Lessons from Latin America (Anthem Press 2010); MW Gehring, MC Cordonnier-Segger and
A Newcombe, Sustainable Development in World Investment Law (Kluwer Law International
2011); F Rojid and M Vasquez, ‘Investment Law and Poverty: Continuing the Debate
through UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development’ (2011) 14
Journal of World Investment and Trade 889; LN Skovgaard Poulsen, ‘Bounded Rationality
and the Diffusion of Modern Investment Treaties’ (2013) 58 International Studies Quarterly
1; CS Levy, ‘Drafting and Interpreting International Investment Agreements from a Sustain-
able Development Perspective’ (2015) 3 Groningen Journal of International Law 59; SW
Schill, CJ Tams and R Hofmann (eds), International Investment Law and Development: Bridging
the Gap (Edward Elgar 2015); JE Vi~nuales, ‘Foreign Investment and the Environment in
International Law: The Current State of Play’ in K Miles (ed), Research Handbook on Environ-
ment and Investment Law (Edward Elgar 2016) 1, 2–3; S Hindelang and M Krajewski (eds),
Shifting Paradigms in International Investment Law: More Balanced, Less Isolated, Increasingly
Diversified (Oxford University Press 2016).
12The article will examine FTAs considered as trendsetters. For this purpose, the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), the EU–Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement (CETA), the EU–Singapore FTA and the EU–Vietnam FTA will be analysed.
13LH Kiang, Minister of Trade & Industry of Singapore, ‘Speech at the Singapore–Hungary
Business Forum’ (27 September 2017) <https://www.sbf.org.sg/images/2017/Singapore-
Hungary_Business_Forum_SBF_CEO_Speech.pdf> 2.
14Opinion 2/15 of the Court [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:376.
15M Koskenniemi, ‘Fragmentation of International Law – The Function and Scope of the
Lex Specialis Rule and the Question of “Self-Contained Regimes”: An Outline’ (2009) 1
Transnational Dispute Management.
16C Henckels, ‘Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate’ (2012) 15 Journal of Inter-
national Economic Law 223, 225, fn 4.
17Compa~nia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No ARB/
96/1, Award (17 February 2000) paras 71–72; Waste Management, Inc v United Mexican
States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/3, Award (30 April 2004).
18Metalclad Corporation v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/97/1, Award (30
August 2000) para 103. See also N Bernasconi-Osterwalder and L Johnson, ‘International
Investment Law and Sustainable Development: Key Cases from 2000–2010’ (International
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expectations’ of investors.19 The non-discrimination standards20 have
also been open to wide interpretation; the S.D. Myers tribunal
adopted a competitive business approach in its assessment of ‘like
circumstances’ and found the environmental decisions of the host
State to be breaching its treaty obligations.21
Since 2012, we can observe a steep increase in disputes with
environmental relevance,22 which serves as a confirmation of the
growing importance of sustainable development in the field of inter-
national investment law. The gradually changing treatment of such
disputes by ISDS tribunals points in the same direction. In the Chem-
tura, Al Tamimi and Charanne cases, the tribunals took into account
the purpose of the host States’ environmental measures, accepting
the latter as a valid exercise of their regulatory powers.23 Similarly,
in the Marion Unglaube, Mamidoil and Peter Allard cases, arbitrators
considered the relevance of the host States’ economic conditions,
expecting ‘due diligence’ from investors.24 However, these steps are
modest, as arbitrators only assess environmental claims as part of
the factual analysis rather than as questions of law.25 Furthermore,
the fact that several recent awards still insist on the ‘traditional
approach’26 makes clear that investment and environmental law are
still not on an equal footing.
Although still infrequent, human rights arguments also appear in
ISDS. The acceptance of jurisdiction by tribunals ruling cases related
to human rights does not seem to follow a firm pattern; the reference
to international law as applicable law in the IIA was sometimes con-
sidered sufficient to establish jurisdiction for claims brought by the
investor,27 while in other cases it was not. But even in cases where
arbitrators denied jurisdiction, they nevertheless took the human
rights argumentation into consideration as ‘part of the factual matrix
of the claimants’ complaints’.28 This willingness to draw analogies
with human rights seems, however, one-sided.29 Unlike investors’
claims, when it comes to defences of States, arbitrators tend to dis-
miss human-rights-related assertions without elaborating on their dis-
missal.30 This is particularly true with regard to water arbitration
cases, where tribunals either did not take cognisance of the right, as
in Vivendi and Biwater,31 or refused to enter into a discussion, noting
that the respondent State had failed to sufficiently argue it, as in
Azurix.32 Differently, the Suez and SAUR tribunals acknowledged that
human rights are to be taken into consideration but set a very high
threshold for host States to prove the proportionality of their mea-
sure.33 Only a few exceptions to this reluctance can be found in case
law; the Continental Casualty and Philip Morris tribunals dismissed the
investor claims, holding that the governmental measures taken were
proportionate to the intended objectives: the country’s grave eco-
nomic crisis and the need to protect public health, respectively.34
Third parties have also participated in investment disputes with
sustainable development components, and since 2008 the number of
amicus curiae briefs has doubled.35 The first time that nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs) tried to intervene was in the Methanex
case. Despite the outcome,36 Methanex is considered to be a
ground-breaking decision, as the tribunal recognized that it had the
power to accept amicus curiae submissions, opening the door for
more petitions in the future.37 After some early unsuccessful
attempts of participation,38 we can observe an increased openness
of tribunals towards amicus curiae submissions.39 In addition, partici-
pation is no longer sought only by NGOs, but also by international
19Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/
00/2, Award (29 May 2003) paras 123, 139, 149; Glamis Gold Ltd v United States (Award)
(14 May 2009) (UNCITRAL) IIC 380 (2009) para 354.
20The non-discrimination standards prohibit discrimination on the basis of nationality. The
most common non-discrimination standards of IIAs are the national treatment (NT) and the
most-favoured nation treatment (MFN), which require treatment no less favourable than
the one afforded to national or other foreign investors, respectively.
21S.D. Myers, Inc v Canada (Partial Award) (12 November 2000) (UNCITRAL) IIC 249 (2000)
para 243.
22Vi~nuales (n 11) 12–13.
23Chemtura Corporation v Canada (Award) (2 August 2010) PCA Case No 2008-01 (UNCI-
TRAL) IIC 451 (2010) para 266; Adel A Hammadi Al Tamimi v Sultanate of Oman, ICSID Case
No ARB/11/33, Award (3 November 2015) paras 388–444; Charanne and Construction
Investments v Spain (Award) (21 January 2016) (Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Case No
62/2012).
24Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Petroleum Products Societe Anonyme S.A. v Republic of Albania, ICSID
Case No ARB/11/24, Award (30 March 2015) paras 613–614; Marion Unglaube v Republic
of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No ARB/08/1 and Reinhard Unglaube v Republic of Costa Rica,
ICSID Case No ARB/09/20, Award (16 May 2012) para 258; Peter A Allard (Canada) v The
Government of Barbados (Award) (27 June 2016) (PCA Case No 2012-06) IIC 864 (2016).
25CL Beharry and ME Kuritzky, ‘Going Green: Managing the Environment through Interna-
tional Investment Arbitration’ (2015) 30 American University International Law Review 396.
26Abengoa S.A. y COFIDES S.A. v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/09/2,
Award (18 April 2013); Hassan Awdi, Enterprise Business Consultants, Inc and Alfa El Corpora-
tion v Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/10/13, Award (2 March 2015) para 312; Bilcon of Dela-
ware et al v Government of Canada (Award on Jurisdiction and Liability) (17 March 2015)
(PCA Case No 2009-04) IIC 688 (2015) paras 691–692.
27Chevron Corporation & Texaco Petroleum Corporation v Republic of Ecuador (Interim Award)
(1 December 2008) (PCA Case No 2007-02/AA277) IIC 355 (2008) paras 2, 3, 207; Desert
Line Projects LLC v Republic of Yemen, ICSID Case No ARB/05/17, Award (6 February
2008); Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v Republic of Lebanon, ICSID Case No ARB/07/12,
Decision on Jurisdiction (11 September 2009).
28Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v Russian Federation (Award) (18 July 2014) (PCA Case
No 2005-05/AA228) IIC 417 (2009) para 76.
29T Meshel, ‘Human Rights in Investor–State Arbitration: The Human Right to Water and
Beyond’ (2015) 6 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 277, 282–283; V Kube and
EU Petersmann, ‘Human Rights Law in International Investment Arbitration’ (2016) 11 Asian
Journal of WTO and International Health Law and Policy 65, 86.
30CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/01/8, Award
(12 May 2005); EDF International SA, SAUR International SA, and Leon Participaciones Argenti-
nas SA v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/03/23, Award (11 June 2012).
31Compania de Aguas del Aconquija SA and Vivendi Universal SA v Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No ARB/97/3, Award (20 August 2007); Biwater Gauff Ltd v United Republic of Tanza-
nia, ICSID Case No ARB/05/22, Award (24 July 2008).
32Azurix Corp v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/01/12, Award (14 July 2006).
33Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA and Vivendi Universal SA v Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability (30 July 2010); SAUR Interna-
tional SA v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/04/4, Award (22 May 2014).
34Continental Casualty Company v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/03/9, Award (5
September 2008); Philip Morris Brand Sarl (Switzerland), Philip Morris Products S.A. (Switzer-
land) and Abal Hermanos S.A. (Uruguay) v Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No ARB/
10/7, Award (8 July 2016).
35L Bastin, ‘The Amicus Curiae in Investor–State Arbitration: Eight Recent Trends’ (2014) 30
Arbitration International 125, 128.
36Methanex Corporation v United States of America (Decision on Amici Curiae) (15 January
2001) (UNCITRAL) IIC 165 (2001).
37S Saha, ‘Methanex Corporation and the USA: The Final NAFTA Tribunal Ruling’ (2006) 15
Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 110; H Mann, ‘Open-
ing the Doors, at Least a Little: Comment on the Amicus Decision in Methanex v. United
States’ (2001) 10 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law
241.
38United Parcel Service of America Inc v Canada, ICSID Case No, UNCT/02/1, Decision of
the Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae (17 October
2001).
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organizations, business associations and indigenous peoples.40 Nev-
ertheless, their acceptance remains at the discretion of tribunals,
which, as the case law shows, has so far not been consistent.
After the analysis of the jurisprudence, one could conclude that
the responses of arbitrators to sustainable development lack consis-
tency. Inconsistent awards have raised concerns about the legitimacy
of the arbitral process; several commentators argue that ISDS exhi-
bits investor bias and may limit or even discourage government mea-
sures that further sustainable development.41
3 | THE ROLE OF ARBITRATORS IN
PROMOTING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
UNDER NEW GENERATION FREE TRADE
AGREEMENTS
Given the increasing number of ISDS cases involving some sustainable
development component,42 it is very likely we will also see such issues
being addressed by tribunals set up under the post-2015 FTAs. In this
section, we will examine whether these treaties contain language that
imposes the duty upon, or enables arbitrators to render decisions that
would – borrowing the tripartite typology of States’ obligations on
human rights – ‘protect, respect and fulfil’ sustainable development.
3.1 | Sustainable development references in new
generation FTAs
Unlike early IIAs, where explicit reference to sustainable development
was either absent or only appeared in preambles,43 new generation
FTAs give greater weight to the principle. They all include preambles
reaffirming the commitments of the parties to further sustainable
development and incorporate sustainable development chapters.44
These chapters recall international instruments such as the Rio Decla-
ration, Agenda 21 and the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair
Globalization, and acknowledge the aim of promoting investment in
such a way so as to contribute to the objective of sustainable develop-
ment. Following the example of older bilateral investment treaties
(BITs), all post-2015 FTAs also incorporate environment and labour
chapters,45 which include positive and negative obligations for the
parties, such as the right to regulate and the non-derogation from their
national laws in order to attract foreign investment. However, none of
the chapters of the treaties examined in this article gives recourse to
dispute settlement mechanisms.46 Disputes are to be resolved only by
government consultations or referral to a Panel of Experts.47 Despite
not being directly applicable to ISDS, both the preambles and sustain-
able development-related provisions could be seen as a manifestation
of parties’ intention to strengthen the importance of sustainable devel-
opment. They clarify the object and purpose of the agreements and, as
provided by Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the
Treaties (VCLT),48 they constitute relevant ‘context’, allowing invest-
ment tribunals to take into account the normative environment more
widely, holistically interpreting investment agreements.49
Turning to provisions that can form the basis of an ISDS claim, sus-
tainable development references are also present. The EU FTAs anal-
ysed ‘reaffirm’ the right of the parties to regulate in order to achieve
legitimate policy objectives.50 The wording of this provision, strongly
reminiscent of preambular language, is quite vague and cannot be seen
as providing clear guidance for ISDS tribunals. A similar right-to-regu-
late provision can be found in the TPP, which states that ‘nothing . . .
shall be construed to prevent’ the adoption of measures of environ-
mental and health objectives, unless these measures are ‘otherwise
consistent with this Chapter’.51 This provision complicates the
intended protection and confers to the arbitrators the task to deter-
mine whether this compliance exists. All new generation FTAs also
feature ‘general exceptions’. The post-2015 EU FTAs, importing the
language of Article XX of the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, assert that States can adopt measures aiming to protect the
environment, human life or health, provided that they are ‘necessary’
and not amounting to ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’.52 The
vagueness of these terms has made World Trade Organization (WTO)
panels reluctant to rule in favour of the ‘general-exceptions’ provision,
setting highly demanding levels of proof.53 Although WTO case law
does not set a precedent for investment arbitration, the absence of a
definition of these terms in the EU FTAs make the ‘general exceptions’
open to broad interpretation. Moreover, their applicability to ISDS is
quite limited, as they only cover specific sections of the investment
chapter. The TPP general exception as applied to ISDS is even nar-
rower, only addressing certain obligations under the performance
requirement article.54 Performance requirements are commitments
imposed on investors to meet certain goals with respect to their
40ibid 128–130; K Tienhaara, ‘Third Party Participation in Investment–Environment Dis-
putes: Recent Developments’ (2007) 16 Review of European Community and International
Environmental Law 230, 238–239.
41SD Franck, ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham Law Review 1521; O
Chung, ‘The Lopsided International Investment Law Regime and its Effect on the Future of
Investor–State Arbitration’ (2007) 47 Virginia Journal of International Law 953.
42UNCTAD, ‘Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development’ (UNCTAD 2015)
56 (UNCTAD IPFSD).
43A Newcombe, ‘Sustainable Development and Investment Treaty Law’ (2007) 8 Journal of
World Investment and Trade 399.
44Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) (adopted 4 February 2016, not yet in force)
Chapter 23; Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) (adopted 30 October
2016, provisionally entered into force 21 September 2017) Chapter 22; EU–Singapore Free
Trade Agreement (negotiations concluded 17 October 2014, not yet adopted) Chapter 13;
EU–Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (negotiations concluded 2 December 2015, not yet
adopted) Chapter 15.
45CETA (n 44) Chapters 23 and 24; TPP (n 44) Chapters 19 and 20.
46With the exception of the TPP (n 44) art 19.15(12) and 20.23.
47CETA (n 44) art 24.14–24.15; EU–Singapore FTA (n 44) art 13.16–13.17; EU–Vietnam
FTA (n 44) art 15.16–15.17.
48Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force
27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331 art 31(2).
49International Law Commission, ‘Report of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of Inter-
national Law’ UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006) 209.
50CETA (n 44) art 8.9(1); EU–Vietnam FTA (n 44) Chapter 8-II, Section 2, art 13bis.
51TPP (n 44) art 9.10(a).
52CETA (n 44) art 28.3(1–2); EU–Singapore FTA (n 44) art 9.3(3); EU–Vietnam FTA (n 44)
Chapter 8-VII, art 1.
53N Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al, Environment and Trade: A Guide to WTO Jurisprudence
(Routledge 2005) 76–147.






















































4 | CHOCHORELOU AND BERDUD
operations in the host country.55 The TPP generally does not make use
of performance requirements, which are only accepted in the form of
‘general exceptions’. Finally, all post-2015 FTAs include indirect expro-
priation annexes, which set forth factors indicating which types of State
conduct constitute indirect expropriation.56 The annexes provide that
non-discriminatory regulatory actions designed to protect public health,
safety and the environment do not constitute indirect expropriation,
except in ‘rare circumstances’.57 While the TPP does not give guidance
to arbitrators on how to apply this term, the EU FTAs elaborate on this
aspect defining ‘rare circumstances’ as measures with such a severe
impact in light of their purpose that they appear manifestly excessive.
Despite the clarification, this wording still leaves great discretion to
arbitrators to determine the threshold of indirect expropriation.
To summarize, the new generation FTAs do not provide a clear
normative environment for sustainable development. The obscure
wording of the relevant provisions does not provide sufficient direc-
tion to arbitrators.
3.2 | Interpretative tools
Could arbitrators overcome the ambiguities in these treaties, and
integrate sustainable development into their decisions? As invest-
ment tribunals have competence to decide only within the legal
framework of the agreement in question, we need to examine the
provisions of the post-2015 FTAs establishing the competence of
the tribunals: the ‘covered investment’ and ‘governing law’ clauses,
and whether they leave room for the consideration of sustainable
development claims. Moreover, we need to analyse the existing
jurisprudence on these clauses. Although no rule of strict precedent
exists in investment arbitration, the vagueness of IIA language has
made arbitrators shapers of investment law; through interpretation
they create normative rules, which, while non-binding, exert influ-
ence on subsequent tribunals, forming de facto precedent.58
3.2.1 | Covered investment
The 2030 Agenda ‘reaffirms that every State has . . . full permanent
sovereignty over all its wealth, natural resources and economic
activity’.59 According protection to investments violating national
legislation would undermine the right of States to make decisions
in their best interests. Older BITs addressed this issue of legality,
explicitly subjecting the definition of ‘covered investment’ to con-
formity with the domestic laws of the host State. Based on this
provision, several tribunals applied the so-called ‘clean hands’
doctrine to examine the legality of an investment, rejecting jurisdic-
tion for investments contrary to the environmental or human rights
laws of the host State.60 The FTAs examined here omitted the
domestic law criterion from the definition of ‘covered investment’.
Even so, it could be argued that tribunals could still apply the ‘clean
hands’ doctrine, a view which can be derived from the jurispru-
dence; two recent awards upheld ‘the widely-held opinion that
investments are protected by international law only when they are
made in accordance with the legislation of the host State’, even
without the inclusion of a relevant treaty provision.61 However,
assessing the legality of an investment may not be sufficient by
itself, especially in the case of developing country signatories of
FTAs, whose environmental and labour laws may fall short from
furthering sustainable development.
This is why, besides legality, the quality of the investment
should also be taken into account in the interpretation of ‘covered
investment’. The 2030 Agenda urges investment that stimulates
‘productivity, inclusive economic growth and job creation’.62 The
question would be whether arbitrators could reject jurisdiction for
investments that do not contribute to the host State’s sustainable
development. Under Article 25(1) of the Convention on the Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States (ICSID Convention),63 a dispute falls within the juris-
diction of the Centre if it directly arises out of an ‘investment’. The
absence of an ‘investment’ definition in the Convention gave rise
to different interpretations by tribunals. One of the most sustain-
able development-friendly interpretations was given in the Salini
case, where the following criteria were set as the typical character-
istics of an investment: (i) commitment of capital; (ii) a certain dura-
tion; (iii) participation in risks; and (iv) contribution to the economic
development of a host State.64 The Salini test was accepted in
several subsequent cases, but the majority of investment tribunals
dismissed the criterion of economic development.65 Some recently
concluded BITs introduce all four Salini criteria in the ‘covered
55UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003: FDI Policies for Development: National and Inter-
national Perspectives (UNCTAD 2003) 119.
56For a comprehensive analysis, see L Cotula, ‘Expropriation Clauses and Environmental
Regulation: Diffusion of Law in the Era of Investment Treaties’ (2015) 24 Review of Euro-
pean, Comparative and International Environmental Law 278.
57TPP (n 44) Annex 9-B(3)(b); CETA (n 44) Annex 8-A(3); EU–Singapore FTA (n 44) Annex
9-A(2); EU–Vietnam FTA (n 44) Chapter 8-II, Annexes, Annex on expropriation.
58B King and R Moloo, ‘International Arbitrators as Lawmakers’ (2014) 46 New York
University Journal of International Law and Politics 875, 882–883.
592030 Agenda (n 4) para 18.
60Inceysa Vallisoletana, SL v Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No ARB/03/26, Award (2
August 2006) para 335; Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v Republic of Philip-
pines, ICSID Case No ARB/03/25, Award (16 August 2007) paras 397, 401–402; Alasdair
Ross Anderson et al v Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/07/3, Award (19 May
2010) paras 57–59. For an analysis, see P Dumberry, ‘State of Confusion: The Doctrine of
“Clean Hands” in Investment Arbitration after the Yukos Award’ (2016) 17 Journal of World
Investment and Trade 229, 232–235.
61Mamidoil v Albania (n 24), para 359; Phoenix Action, Ltd v The Czech Republic, ICSID Case
No ARB/06/5, Award (15 April 2009) para 79.
622030 Agenda (n 4) para 67.
63Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States (adopted 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 October 1966) 575 UNTS
159 (ICSID Convention) art 25(1).
64Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No ARB/
00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction (23 July 2001) paras 50–52.
65Accepted in: Joy Mining Machinery Limited v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No ARB/
03/11, Decision on Jurisdiction (23 July 2001) para 53; Jan de Nul N.V. and Dredging Inter-
national N.V. v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No ARB/04/13, Decision on Jurisdiction
(16 June 2006) para 91; rejected in L.E.S.I. S.p.A. et ASTALDI S.p.A. v People’s Democratic
Republic of Algeria, ICSID Case No ARB/05/3, Award (12 July 2006) para 73(iv); Siemens,
A.G. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction (3 August
2004); Deutsche Bank AG v Democratic Socialist Republic de Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No ARB/






















































CHOCHORELOU AND BERDUD | 5
investment’ definition,66 but the post-2015 FTAs examined here do
not mention the contribution to the economic development.67 This
could make it more difficult for future FTA tribunals ruling in rela-
tion to these agreements to rely upon the Salini test and reject
jurisdiction for investments that do not promote sustainable devel-
opment.
3.2.2 | Governing law
All new generation FTAs set applicable rules of international law as
the ‘governing law’ of ISDS.68 Unlike the TPP, the EU FTAs also
explicitly provide for the applicability of the VCLT. As the VCLT cod-
ifies customary international law, it should be accepted that TPP tri-
bunals could also make use of its rules of interpretation. As
confirmed in the Report of the Executive Directors on ICSID Article
42, ‘the term “international law” . . . should be understood in the
sense given to it by Article 38(1) of the Statue of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ)’.69 Under Article 38(1)(a) of the ICJ Statute,
one of the primary sources of international law is international trea-
ties. This could give arbitrators the green light to apply to ISDS the
binding international human rights and environmental treaties rati-
fied by the disputing parties, even ex officio, a practice that they
have so far only sporadically used.70 These treaties do not impose
obligations on investors, but could be a useful interpretative tool,
especially from a sustainable development perspective. For example,
the 2015 Paris Agreement71 could become pertinent in the discus-
sion of some new generation cases springing from shifts in climate
change policy.
In this context, the question arises as to whether tribunals
could also rely on voluntary instruments to which parties have
adhered. Article 38 of the ICJ Statute does not identify soft law as
one of the sources of international law, a fact that led commenta-
tors to suggest it cannot be used by international courts and tri-
bunals.72 Others argue that the scope of Article 38 is narrow and
acknowledge the role that soft law could play in international
law.73 Investment tribunals do not adopt a coherent approach; a
study undertaken in 2011 shows that although some awards cite
non-legally binding instruments, only three of them were cited
more than once.74 The use of soft law by arbitrators can be justi-
fied by Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, which requires decision makers
to interpret disputes in the light of all relevant rules of interna-
tional law applicable between the parties. This so-called ‘systemic
integration’ approach could enable arbitrators to fill the gaps of the
vague IIA standards and prevent conflicts between IIAs and inter-
national legal standards.75 This could be of great practical signifi-
cance for sustainable development, as future tribunals may
integrate in their reasoning the SDGs adopted as part of the 2030
Agenda. Likewise, tribunals could take into consideration the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, already invoked by the
respondent in the South American Silver case76 and mentioned in
post-2015 FTAs,77 as well as the United Nations Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights referenced by the tribunal in the
Urbaser case.78 These instruments reflect the importance of corpo-
rate social responsibility, which, according to the UNCTAD Invest-
ment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development (IPFSD),
includes promoting low-carbon and environmentally sound invest-
ment.79 Even without imposing direct obligations on investors, cor-
porate social responsibility could acquire greater importance in
ISDS proceedings, by serving as a means for tribunals to evaluate
whether investor protection overrides States’ national development
objectives.
However, what if there is no (relevant) international treaty signed
by both disputing parties? Article 38(1)(b) and (c) of the ICJ Statute
allow decision makers to also apply international custom and general
principles of law. It is not easy to conclude which rules are recog-
nized as customary international law or as general principles, or how
investment tribunals could apply them in promoting sustainable
development. But some doctrines that are widely recognized in
international law could have a role in the interpretation of IIA sub-
stantive standards in line with the sustainable development objec-
tives.
For example, the ‘police powers’ doctrine, a norm of custom-
ary law operating autonomously from treaty law,80 could be of
help in determining the scope of indirect expropriation. Literature66Government of the Republic of India, Annex Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaty (adopted 18 December 2015) (Indian Model BIT) art 1.2.1; Agreement
between the Slovak Republic and the Islamic Republic of Iran for the Promotion and Recip-
rocal Protection of Investments (adopted 19 January 2016, not yet in force) art 1.2(c).
67TPP (n 44) art 9.1; CETA (n 44) art 8.1; EU–Singapore FTA (n 44) art 9.1(1); EU–Vietnam FTA
(n 44) Chapter 8-I, art 1(4)(p). In the TPP, the ‘certain duration’ phrasing was also removed.
68TPP (n 44) art 9.25(1); CETA (n 44) art 8.31; EU–Singapore FTA (n 44) art 9.19(2); EU–
Vietnam FTA (n 44) Chapter 8-II, Section 3, Sub-Section 5, art 16(2).
69
‘Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention of the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of other States’ (1965) 4 ILM 530.
70Azurix (n 32); Saipem S.p.A. v The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No ARB/05/
07, Decision on Jurisdiction (21 March 2007) paras 130, 132. See also Kube and Peters-
mann (n 29) 92–93.
71Paris Agreement (adopted 15 December 2015, entered into force 4 November 2016)
(2016) 55 ILM 740.
72J d’Aspremont, ‘Softness in International Law: A Self-Serving Quest for New Legal Materi-
als’ (2009) 19 European Journal of International Law 1075; P Weil, ‘Toward Relative Nor-
mativity in International Law’ (1987) 77 American Journal of International Law 413, 414,
fn 7.
73CM Chinkin, ‘The Challenge of Soft-Law: Development and Change in International Law’
(1989) 38 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 850; GJH Hoof, Rethinking the
Sources of International Law (Kluwer 1983) 188.
74T Cole, ‘Non-binding Instruments and Literature’ in T Gazzini and E de Brabandere (eds),
International Investment Law. The Sources of Rights and Obligations (Nijhoff 2012) 289, 304–
305, fn 41.
75UNCTAD, ‘Interpretation of IIAs: What States Can Do’ (UNCTAD 2011) 9; K Berner, ‘Rec-
onciling Investment Protection and Sustainable Development: A Plea for an Interpretative
U-Turn’ in Hindelang and Krajewski (n 11) 177, 186–187.
76South American Silver Limited (Bermuda) v The Plurinational State of Bolivia (Respondent
Counter-Memorial) (31 March 2015) (PCA Case No 2013-15) 1291 <https://www.pcacase
s.com/web/sendAttach/1291> para 220.
77CETA (n 44) preamble and art 22.3(2)(b) and 25.4(2)(c); EU–Singapore FTA (n 44) art
13.11; EU–Vietnam FTA (n 44) art 15.9; and TPP (n 44) art 9.17.
78Urbaser S.A., Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v The Argen-
tine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/07/26, Award (8 December 2016) fn 434.
79UNCTAD IPFSD (n 42) 46.
80J Vi~nuales, ‘Sovereignty in Foreign Investment Law’ in Z Douglas, J Pauwelyn and J
Vi~nuales (eds), The Foundations of International Investment Law: Bringing Theory into Practice
(2014) 317, 326–328; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
‘“Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right to Regulate” in International Investment Law’ (OECD






















































6 | CHOCHORELOU AND BERDUD
is divided on its applicability in international investment law,81 and
so is jurisprudence. In some ISDS proceedings, ‘police powers’ was
sidestepped by the ‘sole effects’ doctrine, where solely the effect
of the governmental measure on the property is crucial in the
determination of expropriation.82 Even in cases where tribunals
applied ‘police powers’, they mostly did it as justification for non-
payment of compensation, rather than to exclude liability.83 The
most radical pronouncement of the rule was made by the Metha-
nex tribunal, which held that all non-discriminatory governmental
measures, enacted in accordance with due process, do not consti-
tute expropriation.84 Although criticized as negating the very pur-
pose of expropriation provisions,85 this interpretation seems in line
with the indirect expropriation annexes of the post-2015 FTAs
examined here. Also, this interpretation is sustainable develop-
ment-sensitive, as it does not restrain the ability of States to reg-
ulate in favour of health or the environment, thus preventing
‘regulatory chill’.86
The ‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine, developed by the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) jurisprudence, gives a standard of
deference for States to implement public interest measures. To eval-
uate whether national authorities have overstepped this margin, the
ECtHR has developed a proportionality test, which is much less strict
than the one usually applied in ISDS.87 So far, the majority of invest-
ment tribunals have rejected the application of the ECtHR’s ‘margin
of appreciation’, arguing that it is not recognized as customary law.88
However, its growing acceptance by international courts shows that
the doctrine is emerging as a general principle of international law.89
In addition, Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute mentions judicial deci-
sions as subsidiary means for the determination of the rule of law.
Based on this provision, investment tribunals could take into consid-
eration ECtHR jurisprudence and subsequently the principles devel-
oped by it, a practice that has rarely been followed in ISDS.90
Scholars have questioned the suitability of ‘margin of appreciation’
within investment arbitration, arguing that it provides no guidance to
tribunals regarding the appropriate standard of review, thus
exacerbating fragmentation.91 However, if arbitrators apply the ECtHR
proportionality test as ‘corrective and restrictive of themargin of appre-
ciation’,92 the ‘doctrine could be a promising tool for guaranteeing the
right of governments to appreciate their development needs’.
The precautionary or in dubio pro natura principle could also
become relevant in ISDS. While no uniform definition exists, the prin-
ciple is understood as a strategy to cope with possible risks where sci-
entific understanding is incomplete.93 First introduced in
environmental law,94 it is now enshrined in several international legal
materials and domestic laws, and has been considered by international
courts. Hence it is emerging as international custom,95 an argument
that has also been presented by the host State in the David R. Aven
case.96 With this case still pending, the principle may prove a useful
device in the adjudication of environment-related investment disputes.
It could allow arbitrators to deviate from the general rule of interna-
tional arbitration and shift the burden of proof from the respondent to
the claimant, who would have to prove that its actions are not hinder-
ing the host State’s sustainable development.97
In summary, we conclude that investment tribunals could use the
‘governing law’ provisions to apply environmental and human rights
provisions to their analysis of the merits.
4 | REFORM OF THE CURRENT
INVESTMENT LAW REGIME
The commitment of the international community to a sustainable
future makes the questions of who arbitrates and under what rules
crucial. Despite the positive steps taken by the new generation
FTAs, further improvement of the agreements is recommended.
4.1 | Reform of the profile of arbitrators
It has been said that the investment tribunals so far come from a
small pool of ‘male, pale and stale’ corporate lawyers.98 Statistics
show that although ISDS cases are mainly brought against develop-
ing countries or small economies, 68 percent of arbitrators come
from North America and Western Europe.99 This could be
81B Mostafa, ‘The Sole Effects Doctrine, Police Powers and Indirect Expropriation under
International Law’ (2008) 15 Australian International Law Journal 267.
82Henckels (n 16).
83P Ranjan and A Pushkar, ‘Determination of Indirect Expropriation and Doctrine of Police
Power in International Investment Law: A Critical Appraisal’ in L Choukroune (ed), Judging
the State in International Trade and Investment Law: Modern Sovereignty, the Law and the Eco-
nomics (Springer 2016) 127, 131–132.
84Methanex (n 36) Part IV, Chapter D, para 7.
85Ranjan and Pushkar (n 83) 134–135.
86M Paparinskis, ‘Regulatory Expropriation and Sustainable Development’ in Gehring et al
(n 11) 301, 321–322.
87J Krommendijk and J Morijn, ‘“Proportional” by What Measure(s)? Balancing Investor
Interests and Human Rights by Way of Applying the Proportionality Principle in Investor–
State Arbitration’ in PM Dupuy, EU Petersmann and F Francioni (eds), Human Rights in
International Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2009) 421, 443.
88Siemens v Argentina (n 65) para 354; EDF v Argentina (n 30) paras 1003 and 1106; Biwater
v Tanzania (n 31) para 515; Quasar de Valors SICAV S.A. et al v Russian Federation (Award)
(10 July 2012) (SCC Case No 24/2007) IIC 557 (2012) para 22.
89Y Shany, ‘Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?’ (2006)
16 European Journal of International Law 907.
90Mondev International Ltd v United States of America, ICSID Case No ARB/(AF)/99/2,
Award (11 October 2002); Veteran Petroleum (n 28) para 76.
91J Arato, ‘The Margin of Appreciation in International Investment Law’ (2013) 54 Virginia
Journal of International Law 545.
92F Matscher, ‘Methods of Interpretation of the Convention’ in RSJ Macdonald, F Matscher
and H Petzold (eds), The European System for the Protection of Human Rights (Nijhoff 1993)
79.
93See <www.precautionaryprinciple.eu>.
94Rio Declaration (n 2).
95O McIntyre and T Mosedale, ‘The Precautionary Principle as a Norm of Customary Inter-
national Law’ (1997) 9 Journal of Environmental Law 221; A Sirinskiene, ‘The Status of Pre-
cautionary Principle: Moving Towards a Rule of Customary Law’ (2009) 118 Jurisprudencija
349.
96David R Aven and Others v Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No UNCT/15/3, Rejoinder
Memorial (28 October 2016) paras 76–77, fn 36–37.
97Beharry and Kuritzky (n 25) 418–420.
98J Paulsson, ‘Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution’ (2010) 25 ICSID Review –
Foreign Investment Law Journal 458.
99International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID), ‘ICSID Caseload Statis-
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considered as problematic, as it does not guarantee sufficient ‘par-
ticipation of developing countries in all the institutions of global
governance’, as SDG 16.8 requires. Investment arbitration should
comply with this goal, expanding the pool of arbitrators, with the
entry of decision makers of more nationalities. Furthermore, sustain-
able development objectives could be better reflected by the inclu-
sion of decision makers with different backgrounds in the
international investment tribunals. Examining the new generation
FTAs provisions regarding the qualification of arbitrators, we can
see that they prioritize legal competences, providing that they shall
have ‘expertise or experience’ in public international law or interna-
tional investment law.100 Legal knowledge is undoubtedly important.
However, several ISDS cases, and especially those with environmen-
tal and human rights components, also include complex social, tech-
nical and scientific issues.101 So far, investment tribunals have tried
to resolve these issues by resorting to external experts102 and new
generation FTAs seem to approve this solution.103 However, party-
appointed experts could entail bias, and if diverging expert opinions
occur, arbitrators will be ultimately left to determine which experts
they will follow.104 Also, as far as the ex officio appointment of
experts is concerned, arbitrators’ practice shows that they are hesi-
tant in taking this initiative.105 An alternative solution could be the
inclusion of non-legal arbitrators in ISDS, when appropriate, a
change in line with SDG 16.7 calling for ‘inclusive, participatory and
representative decision-making’.
Other statistics suggest that investment arbitrators favour clai-
mants at the expense of the respondent State’s sustainable devel-
opment.106 Their pro-investor tendency could originate from their
interest in attracting or maintaining high-paying corporate clients
and their ability to act as counsels in other, pending cases.107 Dur-
ing the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)
negotiations of November 2015, the EU proposed the replacement
of the ISDS mechanism with an Investment Court System.108 This
system was adopted in the EU–Vietnam FTA and CETA.109 One of
its major innovations is that a joint Investment Committee of the
contracted parties will appoint judges, who ‘shall be available at all
times and on short notice’.110 To ensure this availability, a monthly
retainer fee will be paid to them.111 Likewise, the EU proposal
attempts to prevent conflicts of interests by disallowing the parallel
work of arbitrators as lawyers and by introducing a new ‘challenge-
of-arbitrators’ system where the decision of disqualification will be
made by a neutral authority.112 The tenure and financial indepen-
dence of arbitrators, as well as the neutrality of the system, could
address the concerns of investor bias and enhance good governance,
an important element for sustainable growth.113 Much has been said
about the feasibility of this system, especially because of the limited
enthusiasm of States to reform the current system. These concerns
do not lack legitimacy; the establishment of an Investment court
would require renegotiation of the existing investment instruments,
which could not happen overnight. A good middle-ground solution
could be the adoption of an opt-in Convention, similar to the recent
Mauritius Convention on Transparency,114 which would extend such
a permanent mechanism to States’ existing obligations. As a whole,
the adoption of a standing Investment Court in subsequent FTAs
could form the basis for the realization of SDG 16 on ‘creating effec-
tive, accountable and inclusive institutions’.
4.2 | Revision of investment instruments
If the text of the investment treaties remains vague, it cannot give
the tribunals enough direction on interpretation. This is why the
improvement of the profile of arbitrators alone seems insufficient.
Rather, a revision of international instruments should be pursued.
New generation FTAs have shown notable attempts of clarifica-
tion, such as the inclusion of expropriation annexes and the narrowing
of the scope of FET115 and MFN treatment.116 However, as seen in
Section 3.1, their wording is still vague, making it difficult for arbitra-
tors to strike the right balance between the interests of foreign inves-
tors and the public interest of States. IIA models released by NGOs,
international organizations and governments, such as the 2005 Inter-
national Agreement on Investment and Sustainable Development
model, the 2012 Southern African Development Community (SADC)
Model BIT, the 2015 Indian Model BIT and the 2015 UN IPFSD, could
be of help in aligning IIA substantive standards with the SDGs. States’
model BITs are important, as they reflect a government’s negotiating
position for future IIAs and serve as a means to achieve coherence in
State treaty practice. Despite the need to compromise some of their
100TPP (n 44) art 9.22(5); CETA (n 44) art 8.27(4); EU–Singapore FTA (n 44) art 9.18(6);
EU–Vietnam FTA (n 44) Chapter 8-II, Section 3, Sub-Section 4, art 12(4).
101K Fach Gomez, ‘The US–EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Should it
Leave a Door Open for Non-legal Arbitrators?’ (2016) 34 Conflict Resolution Quarterly 199.
102ibid 205.
103EU–Vietnam FTA (n 44) art 8.26; TPP (n 44) art 28.15; EU–Singapore FTA (n 44) Chapter
8-II, Section 3, Sub-Section 5, art 8.26.
104Beharry and Kuritzky (n 25) 404.
105R Jacur, ‘Remarks on the Role of Ex Curia Scientific Experts in International Environmen-
tal Disputes’ in N Boschiero et al (eds), International Courts and the Development of Interna-
tional Law (TMC Asser Institute 2013) 444.
106G Van Harten, ‘Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication (Part Two): An Empiri-
cal Study of Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2016) 53 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 540.
107ibid 543, 554.
108European Commission, ‘Investment in TTIP and Beyond – The Path for Reform’ (2015)
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF> (TTIP proposal) 4,
11
109EU–Vietnam FTA (n 44) Chapter 8-II, Section 3, Sub-Section 4, art 12; CETA (n 44) art
8.27.
110TTIP proposal (n 108) art 9(11).
111ibid art 9(12–13); CETA (n 44) art 8.27(12–13); EU–Vietnam FTA (n 44) Chapter 8-II,
Section 3, Sub-Section 4, art 12(14–15).
112TTIP proposal (n 108) art 9.11(1) and (4); EU–Vietnam FTA (n 44) Chapter 8-II, Section 3,
Sub-Section 4, art 14(1)(4); CETA (n 44) art 8.30(1)(3).
113International Law Association (ILA), ‘Resolution 3/2002, New Delhi Declaration on Princi-
ples of International Law Relating to Sustainable Development’, ILA Resolution 3/2002, in
International Law Association Report of the 70th Conference (New Delhi 2002) (ILA 2002)
Principle 16; G Van Harten, ‘A Case for an International Investment Court’, Inaugural Con-
ference of the Society for International Economic Law (2008).
114United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor–State Arbitration
(adopted 10 December 2014, entered into force 18 October 2017) I-54749 (UNCITRAL).
115CETA (n 44) art 8.10; EU–Singapore FTA (n 44) art 9.4; EU–Vietnam FTA (n 44) Chapter
8-II, Section 2, art 14.
116For an explanation of the MFN standard, see n 20. TPP (n 44) art 9.5(3); CETA (n 44) art
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terms, States usually use their model BITs as the basis for their subse-
quent negotiations of investment agreements.117 Model BITs prepared
by NGOs and international organizations are even more significant for
sustainable development; as the result of the collective work of
experts in international law, these templates identify the shortcomings
of the current investment regime and provide a new direction consis-
tent with the requirements of the global economy. Although it is quite
difficult to evaluate the actual practical significance of these models,
they seem to have influenced State treaty practice, with a number of
treaties borrowing concepts identified in, for example, the IISD
Model.118 Clarifying the non-discrimination standards, model BITs set
criteria for the interpretation of the identical treatment of foreign and
local investors in ‘like circumstances’, a concept that remains unde-
fined in new generation FTAs. One of the criteria provided by the IISD
and SADC Models is the investment’s ‘effects upon the local, regional
or national environment’; similarly, the Indian Model BIT refers to ‘the
actual and potential impact of the investment on . . . the local commu-
nity, or the environment’.119 The adoption of this criterion in future
IIAs could prevent ISDS claims when, for example, a government
refuses to issue an emission permit to a foreign corporation for a loca-
tion where existing investors have exhausted the receptive capacity of
the ecosystem.120 Turning to FET, the most problematic issue from a
sustainable development perspective is the protection of the ‘legiti-
mate expectations’ of investors. Lacking definition, this broad concept
indirectly restricts States’ ability to change or introduce public interest
policies that may have a negative impact on foreign investors. Interest-
ingly, all IIA models omit investors’ ‘legitimate expectations’ from the
FET standard. Similarly, they have left out the ‘rare circumstances’
condition from the indirect expropriation clause, providing that regula-
tory measures applied to protect public health, safety and the environ-
ment never constitute an indirect expropriation.121 Unlike new
generation FTAs,122 IIA models do not restrict the use of performance
requirements, and Article 7.4 of the SADC Model BIT calls for foreign
corporations to train and employ nationals of the host State. Article 26
of the IISD Model BIT also provides an indicative list of performance
requirements that the host States may impose ‘to promote domestic
development benefits from investments’.123 These performance
requirements could help materialize expected spill-over effects from
foreign investment, such as employment for skilled domestic and
indigenous workers, protection of local sensitive industries or produc-
tivity improvement.124 Moreover, their imposition on investors could
help achieve SDG 9.5, asking for the promotion of ‘scientific research
. . . technological capabilities of industrial sectors in all countries, in
particular developing countries by 2030, encouraging innovation and
substantially increasing the number of research and development
workers’.125 Finally, IIAs could provide for the mandatory conduct of
sustainable development impact assessments. Envisioned by the IIA
models,126 impact assessments could ensure the establishment of
investments that clearly contribute to the SDGs.
According to SDG 16.3, countries should ‘promote the rule of law
. . . and ensure equal access to justice for all’.127 To meet this goal,
ISDS should ensure the more active participation of interested parties,
both disputing and third parties alike. Investment arbitration has been
developed as a one-way street, allowing only investors to file claims.
States rarely assert counterclaims, although both ICSID and UNCI-
TRAL Arbitration Rules envision them.128 The practice of tribunals has
so far been to deny jurisdiction because of the lack of explicit consent
in most IIAs.129 A recent approach, introduced in Reisman’s dissenting
opinion in the Roussalis case, and adopted by the tribunal in Goetz and
Metal-Tech cases, suggests that the investor’s consent to counter-
claims is already implied by the consent to arbitration itself, without a
need for explicit treaty reference.130 However, it is not apparent that
tribunals would be inclined to change their practice in this direction.
The best solution would be the clarification of the term ‘disputes’ to
encompass both claims and counterclaims,131 or the explicit broaden-
ing of the consent to arbitrate on counterclaims. Turning to third party
participation, the concept of amicus curiae briefs is now incorporated
in post-2015 FTAs.132 The wording of the provisions shows, however,
that tribunals still have significant latitude in the acceptance of these
claims (‘the tribunal may accept’). So far, arbitrators have not been will-
ing to deliver participation rights beyond the filing of written submis-
sions.133 The only exception was in the Piero Foresti case, where the
tribunal also allowed amici curiae to access case materials.134 A reform
117C Brown, Commentaries on Selected Model Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press
2013) 10–11.
118A De Mestral and C Levesque, Improving International Investment Agreements (Routledge
2013) 20.
119International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), ‘IISD Model International
Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development’ (2005) <https://www.iisd.org/pdf/
2005/investment_model_int_agreement.pdf> (IISD Model BIT) art 5(EB); Southern African
Development Community, ‘SADC Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Template with Com-
mentary’ (adopted July 2012) <http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/sadc-
model-bit-template-final.pdf> (SADC Model BIT) art 4(2); UNCTAD IPFSD (n 42) 92–93;
Indian Model BIT (n 66) art 4.1 (fn 2).
120The term ‘receptive’ capacity refers to the size of the population that can be supported
indefinitely upon the available resources and services of an ecosystem <http://www.sustain
ablemeasures.com/node/33>.
121IISD Model BIT (n 119) art 8(I); SADC Model BIT (n 119) art 6.7; Indian Model BIT
(n 66) art 5.4.
122TPP (n 44) art 9.10; CETA (n 44) art 8.5; EU–Vietnam FTA (n 44) Chapter 8-II, Section 1,
art 6.
123Indian Model BIT (n 66) art 26.
124UNCTAD IPFSD (n 42) 98.
1252030 Agenda (n 4) Goal 9.5.
126IISD Model BIT (n 119) art 12; SADC Model BIT (n 119) art 13; UNCTAD IPFSD (n 42)
67; Cotula (n 8) 75–78.
1272030 Agenda (n 4) Goal 16.3.
128ICSID Convention (n 63) art 46; United Nations Commission on International Trade Law,
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as revised in 2010 (adopted by UNGA ‘UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules as Revised in 2010’ UN Doc A/RES/65/22 (10 January 2011)) art 21(3).
129See, e.g., Oxus Gold plc v Republic of Uzbekistan (Final Award) (17 December 2015)
(UNCITRAL) IIC 779 (2015).
130Spyridon Roussalis v Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/06/1, Award (7 December 2011);
Antoine Goetz v Republic of Burundi, ICSID Case No ARB/01/2, Award (21 June 2012);
Metal-Tech Ltd v Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No ARB/10/3, Award (4 October 2013)
para 409.
131Beharry and Kuritzky (n 25) 408. So far, counterclaim provisions appear only in the
Investment Agreement for the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
(adopted 23 May 2007, not yet in force) <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Down
load/TreatyFile/3092> art 28(9); and TPP (n 44) art 9.19(2).
132TPP (n 44) art 9.23(3); CETA (n 44) Annex 29-A(43–46); TTIP proposal (n 108) art 23(5).
133Bastin (n 35) 140–141.
134Piero Foresti and Others v Republic of South Africa, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/07/01, Letter
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of new generation IIAs to grant full participation rights, explicitly
allowing third parties to attend and make oral submissions at the hear-
ings, could be beneficial. Full participation should not be limited to am-
ici curiae. Sustainable development requires fair representation of all
affected stakeholders.135 For this reason, individuals or local communi-
ties facing labour, human rights or environmental violations by inves-
tors, should be allowed to effectively join or even initiate ISDS
proceedings.
Lastly, the sustainable development component could be
strengthened through the selection of suitable arbitral rules under
which IIA parties will settle their dispute. All new generation FTAs
provide an indicative list, allowing investors to submit a claim under
any other rules, if the disputing parties agree.136 The choice of spe-
cialized arbitration rules could aid in ensuring that the process is
properly adapted to the issues raised in these disputes, especially
when it comes to disputes with environmental components, which
involve complex technical matters. In 2001, the Permanent Court of
Arbitration developed the Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes
Relating to the Environment and/or Natural Resources. These rules
provide for the use of arbitrators with expertise on the subject mat-
ter.137 They also allow tribunals to request a non-technical docu-
ment explaining any scientific information, or appoint experts.138 So
far, no known ISDS case has been settled under the PCA Environ-
mental Rules. Nevertheless, they could offer a sound alternative
for the settlement of disputes with sustainable development
implications.
Even reformed, ISDS may not be the most appropriate means to
further sustainable development. Domestic litigation could secure
broader access to justice, protecting the rights of stakeholders
neglected by the ISDS regime. Despite the concerns of partiality,
domestic courts could enhance investors’ accountability and prevent
them from receiving benefits beyond those provided to domestic
investors. IIA models enhance the role of domestic courts, requiring
exhaustion of local remedies before accessing ISDS.139 Conciliation
and meditation, already provided by new generation FTAs,140 may
also be sound alternatives. Being less expensive than ISDS, they
could be more accessible to stakeholders, especially in the develop-
ing world. Also, by involving a neutral third party, they could
enhance procedural fairness.141
5 | CONCLUSION
The interaction between international investment law and sustain-
able development should no longer be disputed. Whether this inter-
action poses a problem or an opportunity depends on from which
side of the spectrum we are looking at it.
The current practice of investment tribunals shows that they are
reluctant to engage in the discussion and consider the sensitivity of
sustainable development-related claims. However, the policies
emerging with the negotiation and conclusion of new generation
FTAs may alter the situation. These instruments include more expli-
cit and implicit references to the principle in their preambles, sus-
tainable development-related chapters and investment chapters.
Arbitrators may fill the gaps of the investment treaties, using the
interpretative tools they have at their disposal, and assist in the pro-
motion of sustainable development.
However, it is not apparent that investment tribunals alone
would change their practice in this regard. A reform of the cur-
rent investment arbitration regime is necessary for the creation of
a stable and sustainable development-friendly environment. This
could be achieved by improving the profile of arbitrators, by
incorporating people of more nationalities and different back-
grounds in the investment tribunals, as well as by redrafting
investment instruments to include substantive treaty provisions
that better reflect the principle. These reforms seem both eco-
nomically and politically plausible. They do not require an alter-
ation of the investment regime altogether, which would be a
difficult task. They rather suggest adjustments directed towards
taking sustainable development into account, which would respond
to the challenges posed by IIAs. Despite potential criticism against
the feasibility of the measures, let us not forget that steps which
in the past appeared utopian, such as introducing transparency in
IIAs and the arbitration system, today are established facts. These
reforms are aimed at governments, but could successfully material-
ize only with the effective support of NGOs and international
organizations, who, with their expertise, would be able to provide
technical assistance, analytical support and assist in consensus
building.142 This has been already recognized by governments,
who entrusted UNCTAD to play a lead role in the facilitation of
the IIA reform by organizing multi-stakeholder meetings and con-
sultations with member States.143 UNCITRAL also mandated a
working group to undertake related work.144 However, even if
reformed, the suitability of ISDS to further sustainable develop-
ment is still in question and, thus, the promotion of alternative
dispute resolution methods should be examined.
135JA Van Duzer, P Simons and G Mayeda, Integrating Sustainable Development into Interna-
tional Investment Agreements: A Guide for Developing Countries (Commonwealth Secretariat
2012) 411.
136TPP (n 44) art 9.19(4); CETA (n 44) art 8.23(2); EU–Singapore FTA (n 44) art 9.16(1);
EU–Vietnam FTA (n 44) Chapter 8-II, Section 3, Sub-Section 3, art 7(2)(d).
137Permanent Court of Arbitration, Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to
Natural Resources and/or the Environment (adopted 16 April 2002) <https://pca-cpa.org/
wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/01/Optional-Rules-for-Arbitration-of-Disputes-Rela
ting-to-the-Environment-and_or-Natural-Resources.pdf> art 8(3).
138ibid art 24(4) and 27(1), respectively.
139IISD Model BIT (n 119) art 5.2; SADC Model BIT (n 119) art 28.4(a); Indian Model BIT (n
66) art 14.3(i–ii).
140TPP (n 44) art 9.18(1); CETA (n 44) art 8.20; EU–Singapore FTA (n 44) art 9.14; EU–Viet-
nam FTA (n 44) Chapter 8-II, Section 3, Sub-Section 2.
141UNCTAD, ‘Reform of Investor–State Dispute Settlement: In Search of a Roadmap’
(UNCTAD 2013) 5.
142UNCTAD, ‘Reform of the IIA Regime: Four Paths of Action and a Way Forward’,
UNCTAD Issue Notes No 3 (UNCTAD 2014) 5, 8.
143UNGA ‘Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing
for Development (Addis Ababa Action Agenda)’ UN Doc A/RES/69/313 (17 August 2015)
para 91.
144UNGA ‘Report of Working Group III (Investor–State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the
Work of its Thirty-Fourth Session’ (Vienna, 27 November–1 December 2017)’ UN Doc A/
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